

Angola reopening the African window

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The history of the foreign policy achievements of Angola, although often puzzling and remarkably far-reaching and active, has experienced curious developments as of late.

During the troubled times of the Cold War, there was one main premise in international relations that most countries in conflict had to capitalize on: if one was at civil war or immersed in any kind of power struggle, it was necessary to choose a side between both blocks, be it the US or the Soviet Union. Although it was this Cold War scenario that nurtured several national revisionist movements – mainly spurred by communist ideologies – which consequently led to open conflict, such was the overall *modus operandi* of the time. The same rationale was adopted by the Angolan MPLA government and its rival party and civil war enemy UNITA. Even if the roots of the conflict cannot be attributed to the Cold War rivalries, it definitely played a role in enhancing its deadliness. Hence, the MPLA government sought the ex-

press support of Cuba and the Soviet Union, while UNITA aligned its foreign policy with the anti-communist struggle, firstly with apartheid South Africa, then with the US and many other African countries.

With the end of the civil war in 2002 and the death of Jonas Savimbi, UNITA became a normal political party – as opposed to an armed movement – while the Angolan government in power was confronted with the task of setting up a foreign policy system. Yet, due to UNITA's extensive contacts and immensely broad support base in the African continent, the MPLA government – which had roughly counted only on Cuba and the Soviet Union for backing – was influenced by the civil war foreign policy culture and mentally decided to look beyond Africa into other sources of support. This time the much needed support was financial. This decision was also a consequence of the lack of funding opportunities Angola had not only in Africa but also with the international financial organizations. Having its infrastructure destroyed after roughly 41 years of barely uninterrupted conflict, Angola had to search beyond Africa for credit lines large enough to fund its national reconstruction program, having found in China the perfect ally for such an endeavor. Consequently, Angola's official foreign policy line since 2002 has never become very African in its core, most

times not even rhetorically. Even though the country is part of regional African organizations, its foreign policy priorities laid with the US, Europe and China, an orientation which enabled Angola to grow economically and be consequently able to cast the image of a powerful African political player. Indeed, after surpassing Nigeria in oil production, Angola rose to become the 6th country with the highest GDP in Africa, while still holding one of the largest militaries in the continent, an impressive feat considering national reconstruction was initiated less than a decade ago. Today, Angola enjoys a comfortable position in African affairs and has its share of influence in world politics, something most politicians and analysts have yet to acknowledge. Having reached such a stage, Angola began to provide support for other countries – instead of simply receiving it –, especially to Guinea-Bissau, which despite being an African country should be considered through the prism of Lusophone cooperation when examined under the umbrella of Angolan foreign policy. Nonetheless, Angola recently decided to reopen the African window, albeit with a different ambition. Joaquim Espírito Santos, Director of African and Middle Eastern Affairs at the Angolan Ministry of External Relations, told the press on the occasion of Angolan National Assembly President Paulo



Kassoma's presence at the swearing in ceremony of Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan on May 29th that Angola was now seeking to solidify its relations with African countries. Such a statement by a high ranking political individual should be understood as a crucial change of focus, especially considering President José Eduardo dos Santos did not mention any African state when describing Angola's foreign policy priorities in his State of the Nation speech in 2010. To be sure, very little happens by chance in Angolan foreign policy, hence why Joaquim Santos' statement was pondered and probably 'signed' by the President himself, thus credibly contradicting the message of the State of the Nation speech.

A new phase in Angolan foreign policy was opened, enabling its government to reset the old MPLA and UNITA alliances celebrated during the civil war while producing a blank slate in the country's foreign policy, capable of setting new tones for cooperation, albeit with certain specificities and restraints (it should not be expected to see Angola cooperating with countries which are still seen firmly behind UNITA or whose leaders supported Jonas Savimbi's party). Furthermore, this new stance signals Angola's readiness to officially assume its designated position in African affairs, by politically reentering the continent and taking part in its challenges, defeats and victories. Several events might explain this new pan-African alignment. Perhaps a consequence of assuming SADC's presidency, of the strong condemnation the Angolan government has produced towards NATO's intervention in Libya or simply because a closer relationship with Nigeria – much like that with South Africa – would follow Angola's objective of becoming closer to African powers, hence raising its status by categorization and association. Nevertheless, much like the US, Europe and China, Angola sees in Africa another stage of political in-

vestment, one in which the country is realistically able to capitalize politically and economically, as Angola's reach is still not strong enough to influence political events in other parts of the globe.

In general terms, Angola's renewed stance is beneficial not only to the country itself but to the entire African continent. Indeed, Africa can now officially trust in the mild but growing support of a rapidly rising country such as Angola, by bringing joint collaborations and most importantly, potential common political positions, which might in the long term serve to strengthen African unity in international affairs. However, this is not to say that Angola will become one of the main representatives of Africa in the world. Far from that, Angola is expected to continue to maintain and deepen its relationships with other countries outside the continent, while nurturing new connections and friendships with African countries. For the next few years, the world should expect no less than having to deal not only with Nigeria and South Africa but also with Angola in a similar fashion, as sub-Saharan Africa welcomes a third great power.

Dilma's Brazil and South America: a lackluster start?

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Throughout the past decade, Brazil's rise in the international sphere has been consistently heralded as being sustained by the country's roots

and integration endeavors with the remaining South American nations. Indeed, despite being careful enough to avoid assuming an outspoken leadership role of his fellow neighbors, former President Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva never shied away from presenting Brazil's insertion in the surrounding region as an added token of the country's credentials in an evolving international order. By showcasing Brazil's peaceful influence in the continent and its lasting commitment towards a multitude of multilateral mechanisms, Brazil thus sought to present, and in a way substantiate, an image of a unified regional front engaged in a common objective of mutual and equitable development. As stated in his inauguration speech back in 2003, above all he aimed "to build a South America that would be politically stable, prosperous and united, based on democratic ideals and social justice". Grand designs aside, it soon became noticeable that Lula's intentions of reenergizing Brazil's focus on the region at the beginning of his first term were to be met with considerable challenges from a number of different origins. Not only were established institutional arrangements, such as Mercosul, painfully lacking a decisive institutional push that could finally patch its internal shortcomings but other players also slowly began contesting Brazil's nearby 'benign influence', either by resenting Brazil's economic clout like Argentina or by providing new poles of political-ideological attraction like Venezuela. In other words, much heavy-lifting work awaited the Brazilian authorities in order to successfully achieve their desired vision for South America.

Eight years later, the creation of Unasul and the increased pace of inter-regional exchanges, for example, undoubtedly comprised some significant achievements. But nevertheless, as Lula exited office, it was impossible to deny that – possibly as an inherent consequence of extensive excursions into international affairs



and the worldwide *fora* –, Brazil's focus on South America appeared to have partially lost its strength along the way, thus displaying some stiffness and inability to properly tackle some of the challenges in the region, such as the increase of unofficial trade bickering.

In that sense, expectations abounded around Dilma Rousseff's own take on this conundrum, even if the options at the table were not, in their essence, that intricate. Indeed, for all purposes, from a political, economic and commercial point of view, South America was bound to remain a priority for Brazil and therefore such an official status was never expected to change under a new leadership. The only real question remaining would be how high it would figure in the new government's foreign policy.

Accordingly, Dilma's own inauguration speech began to cast some light on this issue, when she declared that "we can transform our region into an essential component of the newly multipolar world, giving increasing consistency to the existence of Mercosul and Unasul". Moreover, newly-appointed Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota would be even more straightforward when stating that "each neighbor in South America will receive a growingly differentiated attention" in a bid to transform the region into "a space of economic, physical and human integration where dialogue and political concert are in charge of preserving peace and democracy". Afterwards, during Brazil's Diplomat Day celebrations, Dilma would then take the opportunity to unequivocally reaffirm: "the countries of our continent have become valuable political and economic partners in Brazil, and we know that the destinies of South America, the fate of each one of these countries and ours, are indelibly linked". The official rhetoric was therefore reasonably candid and the choice of Argentina as her first foreign trip on January 31st, seemed to corroborate the early assessment that Brazil was resolute in engaging more actively with the region.

However, against all odds, developments (or lack thereof) in the following months have come to provide a stark contrast with such designs, especially reflected by Dilma's meager calendar of visits abroad. In all fairness, changing circumstances have mostly dictated this lackluster dynamic: Dilma's attendance of the III Summit of South American-Arab countries in Lima, Peru on February 13th-16th – where she would have met with every regional peer at once for the first time – was called off because of unrest in Northern Africa, and likewise her visit to Paraguay on May 15th had to be postponed due to personal illness. Subsequently, one could then say that her plans to quickly become more personally involved in regional affairs were dealt unexpected, albeit minor, blows.

Still, amid all this, crude comparisons tend to surface easily. For example, after eight months in office Lula had already met and/or received every South American Head of State and in two years' time, he had visited every country in the region. Such a raw parallel, and more importantly the focus on the symbolism of foreign travel, would not even be in question if it were not, of course, for the legacy of Lula's trademark presidential diplomacy. Indeed, the reliance on his personal charisma and efforts was clearly exemplified by the 470 days in official visits – 150 of which to South American countries – that he spent abroad during his eight years in office, an absolute record among all of his predecessors. For what it was worth, even though it implied a level of worrisome unpredictably, Lula's own handling of foreign policy issues ended up characterizing Brazil's international insertion in the world at large.

Be as it may, Dilma has already made it perfectly clear that in many aspects and for better or for worse, she is not Lula and will not insist on mimicking his foreign policy style. Therefore, as initially expected, she will become increasingly comfortable in delegating the main foreign policy 'chores' to the Itamaraty, South American af-

fairs included. As evidence of this approach, in the past five months Patriota has already taken upon himself to meet with his counterparts from Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia and Chile. Meanwhile, on May 30th, Dilma finally paid a thrice-rescheduled visit to Uruguay and on June 6th welcomed Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez in Brasília. Furthermore, in late June, she is also scheduled to attend a yet-to be confirmed Mercosul Heads of State Summit.

With these growing contacts in mind, and as regional geopolitics inevitably dictate, with many more probably coming in the days ahead, it would be at least premature to jump on the bandwagon of lashing Dilma's performance in her first months in office. But as South America begins to long for the level of personal commitment and interest that frequently accompanied Lula's hyperactive diplomacy, one cannot fail to wonder if Dilma will ever succeed in providing a similar/alternative venue of personal engagement with the region. In that sense, Brazil's aspirations towards South America will very much depend on how well Dilma juggles Lula's governing legacy and how well she will be able to set her own terms for both the conduction of the country's foreign policy in the continent and the defense of nearby Brazilian interests.



Strengthening Portugal's soft diplomacy

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The Al-Jazeera news channels in Qatar, in both Arabic and English, are arguably the best example of a television service being used as 'soft diplomacy' by a small state. The advantage of Al-Jazeera's services is that they are not identified with a specific country or government, certainly outside the Arabic-speaking world. Could Portugal learn from this?

Like many other countries in Europe and elsewhere, Portugal has international television and radio services, RTP Internacional and RDP Internacional, but their target audience has been the diaspora, rather than a wider international audience. Despite having been available in the Americas and Asia since the 1990s, it was only in 2005 that RTP Internacional's broadcasts to these regions were time-shifted, rather than broadcast live from Lisbon. The only RTP services targeted at non-Portuguese audiences overseas have been RTP África and RDP África, which are for the five Lusophone African countries, retransmitted locally on terrestrial television and FM radio, as well as via satellite.

Although an international television channel jointly operated by CPLP members has been proposed, which could target a wider audience outside the Portuguese-speaking world,¹ it remains to be seen if such a channel will ever be established.

By contrast, the BBC's English-language international television channels, such as BBC World News, have always been commercially funded through subscription and advertising, owing to a decision by the Thatcher government not to fund the BBC World Service's expansion into television in the late 1980s. Consequently, there is a greater commercial need for the BBC channels to cater for local audiences, and satellite and cable operators, as illustrated by the subtitling of many programs in local languages.

The British government does, however, fund the BBC's television services in Arabic and Persian. In the 1990s, the BBC did operate an Arabic-language television news service as a commercial joint venture, but this closed following disagreements over content and editorial in-

dependence with Saudi backers. Many of the journalists who worked on the BBC channel were later involved in establishing the Al-Jazeera news channel in Qatar.²

Similarly, the French-language channel TV5Monde, which carries programming from France, Canada, Switzerland and Belgium, not only subtitled many of its programs in Western languages, but now Asian ones as well, with Vietnamese being the latest to be added.³

Australia has used a mixture of government funding and advertising for the Australia Network, operated by the public broadcaster, the ABC. This is on a tendered basis, rather than on the same basis as Radio Australia, and the ABC faces a competitive threat from Rupert Murdoch's Sky News, which has expressed an interest in bidding to operate the service. Assuming that it continues to operate this service, the ABC has plans to expand the Australia Network into other regions of the world,⁴ including Latin America, despite not currently having radio services in either Spanish or Portuguese.

An interesting example of cultural and linguistic diplomacy through broadcasting has come not from a public broadcaster, but a commercial one. Turkey's Kanal D broadcasts a channel to Romania, with all its Turkish programming in the original language with subtitles, rather than dubbed. This is partly because, as in Portugal, subtitling in Romania is preferred over dubbing, but it has the advantage of providing the Turkish language and culture with a higher profile in countries where people have had little exposure to it. By contrast, the country's state broadcaster, TRT, targets its international broadcasts either at the Turkish diaspora, or at the Turkic nations of Central Asia.

It might be unrealistic for RTP to provide dedicated international radio services in other languages, like those of the BBC or Radio Netherlands, let alone television ser-

1 "TV CPLP pode alargar a países extra-lusofonia" (*Lusa*, 6 March 2007).

2 Ian Richardson, "The failed dream that led to Al-Jazeera" (*Press Gazette*, 11 April 2003).

3 "Vietnamese subtitles on TV5MONDE Asia channel" (*Saigon Giai Phong*, 5 April 2011).

4 Mark Scott, "A Global ABC: Soft Diplomacy and the World of International Broadcasting" (Macquarie University, Bruce Allen Memorial Lecture 2009, 5 November 2009).



vices, such as those of France 24 and Deutsche Welle, but it could provide some foreign language content online, including audio and video. For example, RTP África could draw upon the skills of French speakers in Guinea-Bissau or Senegal, and English speakers in Mozambique and South Africa, while a new 'RTP Ásia' service could draw upon the skills of Indonesian speakers in Timor Leste, Chinese speakers in Macau, and Hindi or English speakers in Goa, thereby bringing the Portuguese-speaking world to wider regional audiences.

The use of the RTP name for multinational Portuguese-language television and radio services need not imply that the editorial line was determined by RTP itself, much less by the Portuguese government in Lisbon. Increasingly, little attention is given to what acronyms now stand for. TAP, for example, originally stood for Transportes Aéreos Portugueses, but since 1979, the airline has been known as TAP Air Portugal, and from 2005, simply as TAP Portugal.

Just as RTP África draws upon the resources of local broadcasters in Lusophone Africa, 'RTP Ásia' television and radio services could draw upon the resources of broadcasters in the region, such as TdM in Macau and RTTL in Timor Leste. In the case of India, where there are no radio or television broadcasts in Portuguese, even external services, RTP should appoint its own correspondent, or use a freelance journalist who could also provide services for Lusa, which does not have a correspondent in India either.⁵

TdM has established an international Portuguese-language television channel, with some programming in Chinese and English. This is available across the Asia Pacific region via the AsiaSat 5 satellite, as well as on Hong Kong cable, with plans to expand into other parts of the world, despite the limited availability of locally produced Portuguese-language content.

RTTL has become a regional broadcaster as a result of its television and radio services being broadcast via the

Indonesian Telkom 1 satellite, which can be received as far south as Darwin in Australia, and as far north as Macau. However, the potential use of this for soft diplomacy by Timor Leste, never mind other CPLP countries, has not been explored. Ironically, José Ramos-Horta identified the potential of satellite television as early as 1974, when he expressed concern to Australian officials that Indonesia's TVRI could be used as a propaganda weapon in the then Portuguese Timor.⁶ TVTL rebroadcasts programs from RTP and TV Globo, which could be subtitled in Indonesian or English, while RTL already carries radio programs in Indonesian.

The availability of Portuguese-language television programming subtitled in regionally important languages in the Asia Pacific region, as well as online material in these languages, would help to overcome misconceptions about Timor Leste's Portuguese language policy in Indonesia and Australia. In addition, it would also demonstrate that Portugal's involvement in Timor Leste is not motivated by 'preening chauvinism' over language and culture.⁷

While Brazil may expand the coverage of TV Brasil Internacional worldwide, RTP could still draw upon the programming of other non-commercial Brazilian networks, such as TV Cultura. Similarly, programming from Angola's TPA Internacional could also

be made available to RTP outside Europe and Africa, where it currently broadcasts its own channel. A dedicated CPLP television service appears to be unlikely, at least in the immediate future, but Portugal might be able to use this to its advantage, acting as a bridge between the Lusophone world on the one hand, and the increasingly important Asia Pacific region on the other.

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⁶ Wendy Way (ed.), *Australia and the Indonesian incorporation of Portuguese Timor, 1974-1976*, [Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Melbourne University Press, 2000], p 255.

⁷ Greg Sheridan, "Downhill since Habibie let go" (*The Australian*, 1 June 2006).

⁵ Constantino Xavier, "Portugal and Goa in the 21st Century: Towards an Alliance of the Small" (*Goanet*, November 2008).



Timeline of Events

Angola

1 May (Luanda):

A Libyan delegation headed by Secretary for African Affairs Guma Amer met with President José Eduardo dos Santos.

4 May (Luanda):

Angolan National Assembly Speaker Paulo Kassoma defended the need for the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to create its own permanent Parliament, which would replace the current SADC Parliamentary Forum.

10-15 May (London):

An Angolan National Assembly delegation traveled to the United Kingdom to meet with their counterparts at the initiation of British Inter-parliamentary Group. Business ties, agricultural opportunities and contacts with NGO's were some of the activities developed by the Angolan delegation.

11 May (London):

The UK Foreign Secretary William Hague made a statement to Parliament where he announced he would "add diplomatic staff" in the British Embassy in Luanda, among other posts.

11-13 May (Luanda):

UN Undersecretary-General Rebeca Grynszpan visited Angola, where she held working meetings with Vice-President Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos 'Nandó' as well as other ministers. Grynszpan is also associate administrator of the United Nations Development Program and stated that the organization would strengthen and empower local government.

12 May (Luanda):

The Japanese ambassador to Angola delivered poliomyelitis vaccines, worth some US\$4.7 million, to the country's health authorities. This move further signals Japan's growing interest in Angola.

13 May (Luanda):

US ambassador to Angola Christopher McMullen met with UNITA leader Isaias Samakuva. The head of the main opposition party was reassured by the US ambassador's guaran-

tees that his country would support the 2012 elections in Angola.

14 May (Luanda):

Zimbabwean Defense Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa visited Angola. This trip was framed in a recent diplomatic offensive by Robert Mugabe, who is trying to avoid international isolation ahead of SADC's summit. Mnangagwa was received by Vice-President Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos 'Nandó' and Foreign Affairs Minister George Chicoty. The Zimbabwean official publicly stated that the political situation in his country is stable.

16 May (Rome):

Angolan ambassador to Italy Manuel Pacavira represented his country in the Global Governance and Security Council Reform conference held in Rome. Pacavira defended the allocation of two permanent and five non-permanent seats for Africa in the UNSC, which should be chosen by the African Union.

16 May (Luanda):

Pierre Falcone, the French businessman who was recently acquitted by a Paris Court in an arms trafficking deal with Angola, was received in an audience by President José Eduardo dos Santos, to whom he transmitted his relief over the outcome of his case.

17-18 May (Luanda):

President of Madagascar Andry Rajoelina paid a 24-hour visit to Angola, where he was received by President José Eduardo dos Santos. Rajoelina asked for Angolan support for his country's transition process and hoped the two countries could re-launch diplomatic relations.

19-20 May (Windhoek):

Foreign Affairs Minister George Chicoty represented Angola's Head of State in the SADC's summit. Zimbabwe and Madagascar's situation topped the conference's agenda. Angola will assume the Community's chair from next August.

22-23 May (Luanda):

A delegation from China's National People's Assembly, headed by chairman of its Standing Committee Wu Bangguo, visited Angola. Contacts were made with the Angolan counterpart as well as with President José Eduardo dos Santos, with whom economic cooperation was discussed.

23 May (Luanda):

The Prime Minister of Australia sent special envoy Neil Mules to Angola to meet with Minister of Foreign Affairs George Chicoty, and discuss the development of Australian relations with Angola. This effort was framed, according to Mules, in a larger move by Canberra to deepen contacts with Portuguese-speaking countries.

23-27 May (Jakarta):

Angola was represented by Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ambassador Manuel Augusto, in the 93rd Non-Aligned Countries Ministerial Summit.

25-26 May (Addis Ababa):

Angolan Foreign Affairs Minister George Chicoty attended an extraordinary session of the African Union Assembly, where peace and security in the continent were discussed. Chicoty denounced armed Western interventionism in Africa and cited the examples of Ivory Coast and Libya.

29 May (Abuja):

Angola's National Assembly Speaker Paulo Kassoma represented President José Eduardo dos Santos in the swearing-in ceremony of Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan.

Brazil

1 May (Rome):

Vice-President Michel Temer attended the beatification ceremony of Pope John Paul II.

2-3 May (Brasília):

Foreign Minister of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Antonio Milososki met with his Brazilian counterpart Antônio Patriota, to review bilateral relations and sign a short-term visa waiver agreement.

3 May (Brasília):

Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota welcomed his Paraguayan counterpart Jorge Lara Castro to prepare President Dilma Rousseff's upcoming visit to Asunción on May 15th.

4-7 May (Brasília):

German President Christian Wulff travelled to Brazil accompanied by a vast business entou-



rage, seeking to deepen the Strategic Partnership between the two countries. Cooperation on science, technology and innovation as well as consultations on several international security issues were high on the agenda when Wulff met with President Dilma Rousseff.

7-10 May (Brasília):

Ghana's Vice-President John Dramani Mahama visited Brazil accompanied by a significant governmental entourage, seeking to review bilateral cooperation and increase Brazilian investment on the ground. Mahama took the opportunity to meet with Brazilian Vice-President Michel Temer.

7-8 May (Cairo):

Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota traveled to Egypt where he met with his counterpart Nabil al-Araby, with Secretary-General of the Arab League Amr Moussa, and with Minister for Planning and International Cooperation Fawza Aboul Naga. The reengagement of political contacts, trade and bilateral cooperation and regional security issues were high on the agenda.

10 May (Brasília):

Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez postponed his visit to Brazil due to a medical condition. In return, Venezuelan Foreign Minister Nicolás Maduro met with his Brazilian counterpart Antônio Patriota, to assess the main issues of the bilateral and regional agenda.

11 May (Brasília):

After a lengthy process, Brazil's Senate finally approved an increase of payments to Paraguay, from the current US\$120 million to US\$360 million, for excess energy from the nation's joint Itaipu hydroelectric project.

12 May (Brasília):

The Brazilian government decided to apply non-tariff trade barriers – such as tightening license requirements – to imports of cars and car parts, in a bid that will affect auto producers from Japan, South Korea, Mexico and the United States but which is mostly understood as retaliation against similar trade barriers previously adopted by Argentina.

15 May (Asunción):

Due to health issues, President Dilma Rousseff did not travel to Paraguay and was instead represented in the commemoration of the country's Independence Bicentennial by a delegation headed by Senator José Sarney and Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota. Patriota took this opportunity to meet with his local counterpart Jorge Lara Castro, to examine the main issues in the bilateral and regional agenda.

16 May (Brasília):

Chinese Minister of Commerce Chen Deming traveled to Brazil, where he co-chaired a meeting of the Economic and Trade Under Commission of the Brazilian-Chinese High-Level Coordination and Cooperation Commission (COSBAN) alongside Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota and Minister of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade, Fernando Pimentel. The strengthening of the Strategic Partnership between Brazil and China, the execution of the 2010-2014 Joint Action Plan, and the diversification of bilateral trade and reciprocal investment were high on the agenda.

16-17 May (Moscow):

Brazilian Vice-President Michel Temer led his country's delegation to the V Brazil-Russia High Level Cooperation Commission, seeking to assess the progress on the implementation of the Strategic Partnership Action Plan and of the Technological Alliance established between the two countries, among other issues.

17 May (Brasília):

Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt paid an official visit to Brazil, where he met with President Dilma Rousseff, seeking to assess the current bilateral framework, joint cooperation projects and several pressing international issues.

19-20 May (Rome):

Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota traveled to Rome to lobby in favor of Brazilian José Graziano da Silva for the position of Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Patriota also took this opportunity to meet with outgoing Director-General Jacques Diouf.

26 May (Brasília):

Spanish Foreign Minister Trinidad Jiménez met with her Brazilian counterpart, Antônio Patriota, seeking to review bilateral relations and increment trade ties as well as cooperation on education, culture, science and technology.

26-27 May (Buenos Aires):

Defense Minister Nelson Jobim attended the official inauguration of the Defense Strategic Studies Center – CEED, the first permanent body in Unasul's Defense Council. Afterwards, Jobim also took part in a joint Defense Council meeting.

28 May (Tegucigalpa):

President Dilma Rousseff's Special Advisor on International Affairs Marco Aurélio Garcia traveled to Honduras to witness former President Manuel Zelaya's scheduled return to his country as a pre-condition set by the Organi-

zation of the Americas (OAS) to readmit the Central American nation into its fold.

30 May (Montevideo):

President Dilma Rousseff traveled to Uruguay where she met with her counterpart, José Mujica. Global, regional and bilateral issues, including several infrastructure projects, were high on the agenda.

31 May-3 June (Brasília):

President of the World Bank Group Robert B. Zoellick visited Brazil to broaden the Bank's strategic partnership with the country in the context of Brazil's growing role in global issues and international development. To that end, Zoellick held meetings with President Dilma Rousseff, Finance Minister Guido Mantega and governors of several states.

Cape Verde

13 May (Praia):

After consulting with every political party, President Pedro Pires scheduled the upcoming presidential elections for August 7th.

16 May (Porto Novo):

In a meeting with ambassadors and representatives of international organizations in Cape Verde, Foreign Minister Jorge Borges declared that the Cape Verdean government wants to expand its transition period in a bid to become a Middle Income Country (MIC) by 2015, in order to ensure the "irreversibility" of the gains made.

29 May (Abuja):

Cape Verdean President of Parliament Basílio Mosso Ramos and Foreign Minister Jorge Borges represented the country in the inauguration of Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan.

Guinea-Bissau

2 May (Dakar):

The World Bank's Country Program Coordinator for Guinea-Bissau, McDonald Benjamin, announced that the international body would lend some US\$17.5 million to the country to fund satellite monitoring and coastguard patrols to curb illegal fishing, create three national parks and "the basis of tourism in the future".

**4 May (Bissau):**

In a Council of Ministers communiqué, Guinea-Bissau's government expressed its solidarity with the Libyan people and considered NATO's actions in the country as "cruel and unacceptable".

5 May (Luanda):

The Angolan government stated it would forgive Guinea-Bissau's debt in accordance with the decision made by the Paris Club of Creditors. The total debt owed by Guinea-Bissau to Angola is estimated at some US\$39 million.

9 May (Bissau):

A business delegation from the United Arab Emirates visited Guinea-Bissau. Received by Economy Minister Helena Embaló, the delegation showed particular interest in investing in the oil, natural gas, energy, infrastructure construction and the fisheries sectors.

10 May (Bissau):

The Paris Club of Creditors agreed to write-off Guinea-Bissau's US\$285 million debt. A further US\$27 million owed on a bilateral basis will be forgiven.

10 May (Paris):

International drug trafficking routes were analyzed in a G8 Interior Ministers' meeting in Paris. There is now a clear perception that drugs cross the Atlantic from South-America to land in West Africa, Guinea-Bissau included, before moving to Europe.

10 May (New York):

According to a UN Office on Drugs and Crime report, South American drug traffickers are increasingly using small airplanes, instead of ships, to transfer drugs to West Africa, including Guinea-Bissau.

11 May (Bissau):

Some 50 protesters took to the streets of Bissau to complain against high food prices and taxes imposed on foodstuffs. Although small, this protest was approached with caution by the government, which has in mind last year's Mozambique food riots.

11 May (Bissau):

Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior rebuffed accusations made by the G8 which qualified Guinea-Bissau as a narco-state, although he recognized the deep fragilities his country suffers from.

12 May (Washington):

At the end of the Portugal-United States 29th Bilateral Commission, both countries an-

nounced that a US diplomat would be placed in the Portuguese embassy in Bissau. The intention is to reinforce cooperation between Portugal, the US and Guinea-Bissau, and eventually lead to the re-opening of the American embassy in that country.

13 May (Bissau):

The head of the Judiciary Police resigned. Lucinda Barbosa justified her decision due to the lack of support she felt in combating drug trafficking.

16 May (Paris):

Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior made a stopover in Paris on his way to Timor Leste.

18-21 May (Dili):

Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior and Foreign Affairs Minister Adelino Mano Queta represented Guinea-Bissau in Timor Leste's 9th independence anniversary. On the 19th both countries signed a General Cooperation Agreement covering seven areas – from economic to cultural cooperation. Timor Leste's Foreign Affairs Minister Zacarias Albano da Costa stated on that occasion that "Timor Leste has a moral duty to help Guinea-Bissau in anything it needs".

20 May (Bissau):

World Bank official Carmen Pereira alerted to the fact that Bissau's seaport may become inaccessible within two years as sediments build up, leaving the country without its vital route for exports and imports.

20-24 May (Yamoussoukro):

President Malam Bacai Sanhá traveled to the Ivory Coast where he witnessed Alassane Ouattara's inauguration ceremony.

24 May (Bissau):

The World Bank decided to grant Guinea-Bissau an additional US\$2.2 million to support the country's electric grid and water supply development.

24 May (Luanda):

Following the 2nd meeting of Finance Ministers of the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries held in Luanda, Finance Minister José Mário Vaz announced both Portugal and Brazil had agreed to follow the Paris Club of Creditors' decision and pardon the bilateral debt of Guinea-Bissau. Portugal will forgive US\$108 million and Brazil will cancel 95% of the debt.

24 May (Bissau):

Guinea-Bissau's Attorney General Amine Saad stated that "Guinea-Bissau is not a narco-state" but that it does not possess the means

to fight drug trafficking. Saad required further EU support to tackle the current situation.

25 May (Washington):

The IMF Board decided to disburse US\$3.8 million. According to the Fund, Guinea-Bissau accomplished the vast majority of the reforms stipulated by the international body, and as such was entitled to receive further support.

25 May (Bissau):

Defense Minister Ocante da Silva announced that some 1300 military and police personnel would leave the state's forces over the next five years. The Minister also declared that the government would create a retirement fund to support those individuals.

27 May (Bissau):

Armed Forces Chief of Staff António Indjai asked the government to create an easier recruitment process to allow the Army to regenerate its ranks, something he considered essential for the success of the SSR process.

28 May (Dakar):

In a regional UN meeting, the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative in West Africa called upon the international community to support Guinea-Bissau's SSR process, in particular its military retirement fund.

30 May (Bissau):

The United Nations Integrated Peace-Building Office in Guinea-Bissau considered, through head of the SSR process department António Lopes, that the reform of the country's Armed Forces faces good perspectives due to the accrued stability Guinea-Bissau has achieved in the last year.

Mozambique

3-6 May (Cape Town):

President Armando Guebuza attended the annual World Economic Forum on Africa.

8 May (Moatize):

President Armando Guebuza attended the opening of Brazilian mining giant Vale's new US\$1.7 billion coal mine in Mozambique, which will tap thermal and cooking coal reserves of around 23 billion tones. Moreover, Vale's outgoing chairman Roger Agnelli declared that the company planned to invest over US\$4 billion in Mozambique, particularly in activities related to coal production and export.

**14 May (Mocuba):**

President Armando Guebuza met Zimbabwean Minister of State Security, Sydney Sekeramayi, to discuss matters related to recent political developments in Zimbabwe.

17-18 May (Maputo):

Australian envoy to Mozambique Neil Mules announced that his country will contribute US\$17.5 million Australian dollars to a water supply and sanitation project in the Mozambican provinces of Maputo, Nampula and Cabo Delgado.

18-20 (Windhoek):

President Armando Guebuza, accompanied by Foreign Minister Oldemiro Balóí, paid an official state visit to Namibia, seeking to deepen bilateral ties between the two countries. Guebuza took the opportunity to meet with his local counterpart, Hifikepunye Pohamba and visit some regions in the south of Namibia.

19 May (Maputo):

During the annual meeting between the local government and its partners, the United Kingdom's high commissioner to Mozambique Shaun Cleary announced that Mozambique's Program Support Partners, known as the Group of 19, will continue to support the country's state budget.

20 May (Windhoek):

President Armando Guebuza took part in a SADC extraordinary summit devoted to regional economic development and in a meeting of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation, with the situations in Zimbabwe and Madagascar still high on the agenda.

23 May (Maputo):

As a result of an agreement signed in May 2009 during the visit of Defense Minister Filipe Nyussi to China, Mozambique received a donation of non-lethal equipment for the Mozambican Armed Forces worth US\$15 million.

25 May (Maputo):

During the ceremonies of the 48th anniversary of the African Union (AU), Foreign Minister Oldemiro Balóí accused NATO of overstepping the mandate approved by the United Nations Security Council regarding the ongoing situation in Libya.

30 May (Maputo):

Norway's State Secretary to the Foreign Ministry Erik Lahnstein announced his country's interest in patrolling the coast of Mozambique to help fight piracy.

31 May (Munich):

Prime Minister Aires Ali attended an Economic Conference on Mozambique, as part of his four-day visit to the German state of Bavaria.

Portugal

1 May (Rome):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado attended the beatification ceremony of Pope John Paul II.

2 May (Lisbon):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado met with the President of the Republic of Korea's Special Envoy Park Geun-hye, to mark the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Lisbon and Seoul and to highlight the close links of cooperation at political, economic, commercial and cultural levels. Geun-hye also took the opportunity to meet with President Aníbal Cavaco Silva.

3 May (Lisbon):

Prime Minister José Sócrates announced that the government had reached an agreement with the troika of representatives from the IMF and the EU over a €78 billion bailout package to Portugal for the next three years.

5 May (Rome):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado took part in the meeting of the International Contact Group on Libya, with an update on the situation on the ground and the international mediation efforts towards a political solution of the crisis high on the agenda.

6 May (Sofia):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado took part in the "Central and Eastern Europe's Transition and the Change in the Middle East" conference organized by the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the European Council on Foreign Relations, where he spoke about the future of the EU in the region.

9-11 May (Doha):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado attended the opening session of the Doha International Forum, this year under the motto "Transition to Chaos or Reform". Afterwards, Amado also traveled to Egypt where he met with his new counterpart, Nabil Al-Araby, and with Secretary-General of the Arab League Amr Moussa, in order to assess the current changes on the ground and in the surrounding region.

11 May (Istanbul):

Secretary of State for European Affairs Pedro Lourtie attended the 121st Session of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. The Neighborhood Policy as well as the presentation of the activity report by the Secretary-General of the Council to member states were high on the agenda. Lourtie also took the opportunity to sign, on behalf of the Portuguese state, the Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence.

12 May (Istanbul):

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation João Gomes Cravinho took part in the 4th United Nations Conference on Least Developed Countries, with the aim of assessing the results of the Brussels Plan of Action adopted at the 3rd Conference in Belgium in 2001 and with the goal of adopting new measures and strategies for sustainable development over the next decade.

12 May (Brussels):

Secretary of State for European Affairs Pedro Lourtie attended a meeting of the EU's Outermost Regions, with greater regional integration between territories high on the agenda.

13 May (Brussels):

Secretary of State for European Affairs Pedro Lourtie took part in the EU's Foreign Affairs-Trade Council, where the reform of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), the upcoming EU-Japan Summit and the state of the Doha Round were assessed.

19-22 May (Díli):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado traveled to Timor Leste to attend the country's commemorations of the 9th anniversary of independence. Amado also took this opportunity to meet with President José Ramos-Horta, Prime Minister José Alexandre 'Xanana' Gusmão and his local counterpart Zacarias Albano da Costa as well as with UN Mission (UNMIT) and GNR (Portuguese Republican National Guard) forces on the ground.

24 May (Brussels):

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation João Gomes Cravinho took part in the in the EU's Council of Ministers for Development, with the adoption of an integrated programming strategy for South Sudan, the presentation of the Report on Official Development Aid and accountability, the exchange of views on water issues and the situation in the Ivory Coast high on the agenda.

**25 May (Paris):**

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation João Gomes Cravinho represented Portugal at the annual OECD Ministerial Council as well as in the "OECD's 50th Anniversary Week". The meeting's theme focused on international challenges in particular, new sources of growth and jobs, gender equality, sharing wealth and new paradigms for development.

São Tomé and Príncipe

2-3 May (São Tomé):

Gabonese Prime Minister Paul Biyoghe Mba – accompanied by Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and Francophonie, Paul Toungui – traveled to São Tomé, where he met with his counterpart Patrice Trovoada, President of Parliament Evaristo de Carvalho and President Fradique de Menezes, seeking to enhance bilateral ties. Biyoghe Mba also announced that Gabon's President Ali Bongo Odimba would visit São Tomé and Príncipe in June.

4 May (São Tomé):

São Tomé and Príncipe's ANP-STP awarded Nigerian oil firm Oranto Petroleum exploration rights for an oil block in the country's exclusive zone.

13 May (Abuja):

Prime Minister Patrice Trovoada traveled to Nigeria where he met with newly reelected President Goodluck Jonathan. Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, and Nigeria's aspirations to an eventual UN Security Council reform and greater economic cooperation – especially in the oil sector and budget support – were high on the agenda.

13 May (São Tomé):

Putting rumors regarding Prime Minister Patrice Trovoada's possible presidential bid in the upcoming election to rest, ruling party ADI announced that current National Assembly President Evaristo de Carvalho would be its official candidate.

14-18 May (São Tomé):

Timorese Secretary of State for Natural Resources Alfredo Pires traveled to São Tomé and Príncipe where he met with local Minister for Natural Resources Carlos Vila Nova to sign a

three-year cooperation agreement focusing on oil and gas exploration between the two countries. Pires also took the opportunity to meet with several officials from São Tomé and Príncipe's National Oil Agency as well as from the Joint Exploration Authority with Nigeria.

16 May (São Tomé):

São Tomé and Príncipe's Minister for Planning and Development Agostinho Fernandes announced that the European Union would deliver a financial contribution of €2.5 million as a result of a new fishing agreement.

25 May (São Tomé):

São Tomé and Príncipe's former President Manuel Pinto da Costa announced that he had registered his candidacy as an independent candidate for the July 17th presidential election.

29 May (Abuja):

President Fradique de Menezes attended the inauguration of Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan, where he took the opportunity to express his outrage at NATO and France's interventions in Libya and Ivory Coast, respectively.

Timor Leste

3 May (Díli):

President José Ramos-Horta and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) presented the Timor Leste National Human Development Report 2011 entitled "Managing Natural Resources for Human Development: Developing the Non-Oil Economy to Achieve the MDGs [Millennium Development Goals]". In it, the UN recommends that Timor Leste should use its oil wealth to boost sustainable development in the other sectors of the country's economy and reduce inequality between urban and rural communities.

7 May (Jakarta):

After an ASEAN Foreign Ministers gathering, Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa recognized that there was no consensus to bring the immediate inclusion of Timor Leste in the regional organization to the upcoming Summit of ASEAN Heads of State.

8 May (Jakarta):

Following the XVIII ASEAN Heads of State Summit, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono announced that the organization's respective foreign ministers were

tasked with the assessment of Timor Leste's readiness and the preparedness of ASEAN member countries to accept the country, the conclusions of this study to be delivered in the next gathering in October in Bali.

8 May (Istanbul):

Foreign Minister Zacarias Albano da Costa attended the Least Developed Countries (LCD) Summit, where he stressed the need for renewed and strengthened partnerships between the Least Developed Countries (LCD) and the international community to reduce poverty and reach the Millennium Development Goals.

9 May (Díli):

A Timorese court acquitted the country's Deputy Prime Minister, José Luís Guterres, of corruption and abuse of power after he was accused of securing an overpaid job for his wife.

9-13 May (Istanbul):

Foreign Minister Zacarias Albano da Costa headed the Timorese delegation in the 4th United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries.

10 May (Díli):

Based on leaked US cables, Australian newspaper *The Age* reported that China had offered to install a radar system in Timor Leste on December 2007. This offer was apparently later rebutted after consultations between the Timorese leadership, Australia and the US, due to the fact that such a facility would be manned exclusively by Chinese technicians. However, soon afterwards, Deputy Prime Minister José Luís Guterres officially denied that such plans ever existed.

13 May (Canberra):

Australian Immigration Minister Chris Bowen announced that his government would officially abandon plans to establish a regional immigration-processing center in Timor Leste.

14-17 May (Beirut):

Foreign Minister Zacarias Albano da Costa traveled to Lebanon where he held talks with President Michel Sleiman and caretaker Foreign Minister Ali Shami, to state Timor Leste's intention of joining the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) next November with 14 Timorese soldiers integrated into the Portuguese contingent already on the ground. Greater economic and cultural cooperation between the two countries as well as the situation in the Middle East were also high on the agenda.

**16 May (Díli):**

Timorese weekly newspaper *Tempo Semanal* disclosed a leaked UN report from January 24th outlining many weaknesses in Timor Leste's institutions, and saying consolidation of power with the Prime Minister may undermine the role of Parliament and the courts. Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão immediately refuted such charges.

22 May (Díli):

According to chief executive of EDP Internacional Paulo Miraldo, the Portuguese company is set to reorganize the electricity system in Timor Leste as part of an agreement signed with the country's government that will also provide training, technical assistance and draw up a new energy plan.

23-27 May (Bali):

Timor Leste's Foreign Minister Zacarias Albano da Costa attended the 16th Non-Aligned Movement's Ministerial Conference, where he called for a revitalization of the organization in order to effectively respond to contemporary global challenges.

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