

Macaronesia: The latest wish in Cape Verde's bucket list

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After a year full of diplomatic achievements, Cape Verde made sure to end 2010 with the fulfillment of another coveted ambition: the formalization and institutionalization of the Macaronesia region and all its including territories.

Geographically comprised of the archipelagos of Cape Verde, Madeira, Azores and the Canary Islands, Macaronesia has always been floated around as a supposedly aggregating concept between all of these politically distinct entities. Cape Verde on particular relied heavily on its promotion as a further step in the road towards a greater rapprochement with the European Union (EU). But the truth is, with a landmark Special Partnership signed in 2007, Cape Verde was now required to demonstrate that it was capable of advancing this one-of-a-kind relationship with Europe even more, within the agreed framework.

Indeed, the working action plan had already pointed out "regional integration" as one of the six structural pillars, indicating that "every encouragement should (...) be given to measures designed to strengthen relations between the outermost regions and Cape Verde". Therefore, for Cape Verde, the next step was only too obvious. With the debate regarding a full integration in the EU now completely overcome, the country needed to refocus its foreign policy on trying to convince neighboring countries of the advantages and the untapped potential of a formal mechanism between their outermost regions and Cape Verde.

In that order, Prime Minister José Maria Neves has increasingly sought to push this idea forward, for example when attending the XVI Conference of European Outermost Regions – held on October 27th and 28th in Tenerife – as an observer. However, convincing his peers of the merits associated with this project proved easier than expected, as they quickly understood it as a feasible working project to achieve tangible gains through cooperation in common social and economic development.

Moreover, Portugal and Spain also promptly recognized that this endeavor was an opportunity to further consolidate their relationship with Cape Verde, constantly praised by the

international community and therefore a worthy and desirable partner to establish greater ties with. The fact that the two countries constitute Cape Verde's greatest trading partners did not go unnoticed in these calculations.

Be it as it may, Cape Verde is clearly the one with more to gain in this enterprise. Through this kind of institutional vehicle, it can first and foremost consolidate its growing stance in the nearby region as a preferential interlocutor with the EU. By understanding that its foreign weight goes hand in hand with the country's ability to juggle its African and European call, Cape Verde has definitely come to terms with the need to constantly forge and reinforce connections with its preferential partners. Therefore, the newly branded Summit of Macaronesia Archipelagos (SMA) became an instrument in the pursuit of the country's self-proclaimed aspiration to become a true bridge of interests between both continents.

Furthermore, by investing in this formal alternative, Cape Verde also looks upon the generous EU development funds disbursed to the 'traditional' outermost regions with great interest. Indeed, even though the country's economic indicators are practically one of a kind in the surrounding region, Cape Verde still relies heavily on international



investment and financing, in order to overcome the structural shortcomings inherent to its insular status. The fact that the Summit took place in the Island of Mindelo, for example, was dully used by Prime Minister Neves to highlight the country's bet on the development of a local "Sea Cluster". Even so, critics could point out that as the Summit was attended by low-key officials, this signaled the differences in terms of political commitment among the parties involved. Although Portugal was represented by Foreign Minister Luís Amado, Spain by Vice-President Manuel Chávez González and the Canary Islands by President of the Regional Government Paulino Rivero Baute, the absence of Madeira and Azores' highest representatives – as well as that of Prime Ministers José Sócrates and José Luis Zapatero, after they had already committed themselves to going – gave some arguments to those who viewed this gathering as another ineffectual and hollow mechanism, only sustained by Cape Verde's political will and agenda. However, in all fairness, it appears it is still too early to pass judgement. At the end of the day, the constitution of a bi-annual SMA represents nothing less than a triumph for Cape Verdean diplomacy, thus further consolidating its stance as a growing influential actor in the Atlantic region. The possibilities for cooperation between all 28 islands and their three million inhabitants are endless: tourism, trade and environmental issues are just some of the areas that will probably be tackled soon. But more importantly, this event demonstrates Cape Verde's willingness to continue down the path of stellar relations with the EU, within the logic of "everything but institutions"; in other words, Cape Verde will keep seeking every possible and imaginable cooperation possibility with Europe, always bearing in mind the non-viability of full-blown membership in any given scenario. Still, for the time being, Cape Verde has once again managed to prove that diplomatic dynamism abounds, and that it should without a doubt remain

under the watchful and interested eye of the international community.

Guantánamo and the WikiLeaks: A hand full of nothing

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The release through WikiLeaks of US diplomatic cables revived the dormant controversial debate about Portugal's alleged authorization and/or knowledge of illegal CIA flights to Guantánamo. So much so that in an unusual move, Foreign Minister Luís Amado scheduled a press conference on the December 16th with the national media in order to answer questions on this issue.

This controversy peaked between 2006 and 2008. Suspicions were enough to initiate investigations, not only in Portugal but also in the European Parliament. However, and despite the supposed existence of irrefutable evidence, results were very inconclusive. Critics of the government were unable to provide even the slightest indication of Portuguese involvement in the case of the clandestine air routes. Yet, this year's release of diplomatic cables gave new impetus to the debate.

In one cable in particular, dated September 7th 2007, the US embassy in Lisbon writes that Portugal "granted permission to use Lajes [military air base] in support of repatriation of detainees from Guantánamo", adding that Prime Minister José Sócrates had "agreed to allow the repatriation of enemy combatants out of Guantánamo through Lajes Air Base on a case-by-case basis", a decision that "has never been made public".

These statements written by former ambassador Alfred Hoffman were understood by the national press and by all those involved in previous investigations as proof of government complacency, to say the least. Still, a closer inspection says otherwise. Firstly, the cable mentions repatriation flights, which are different from flights headed to Guantánamo or to secret detention facilities where the inmates were subjected to torture. Secondly, despite being repatriation flights, Hoffman noted that authorization would be granted on a case-by-case basis. In fact, in another cable from that same year dated July 11th, Hoffman had already underlined that "Amado agreed to allow the repatriation of prisoners through Lajes Air Base on a case-by-case basis under limited circumstances".

Such nuances become even more significant after reading previous cables, also released through WikiLeaks. In a US embassy document from September 8th 2006, Hoffman asked Amado if the US government "could use Lajes as a transit point for flights returning detainees to their home countries", to which Amado "said that he needed to check with the Prime Minister who would be difficult to convince, but that he would push hard for Portuguese cooperation so long as there was total transparency". The difficulty in convincing the Prime Minister is related to the political tension at the time: Amado had just testified before a Portuguese parliamentary commission upset to investigate the matter, in a moment where public controversy was very lively. Still, this cable only mentions repatriation flights and underscores that Portugal's assistance hinged on total transparency.

About a month later, in a cable dated October 20th 2006, the US embassy in Lisbon reports to Washington that in a subsequent parliamentary hearing, Luís Amado threatened "to resign if opposition forces can demonstrate any complicity on the part of the government regarding alleged illegal



CIA rendition flights”, adding that it “is critical that Washington readers recognize the GOP’s [Government of Portugal] need to ensure that it is on solid legal ground regarding our request on detainees”. On this “solid legal ground” the cable elaborates by saying that Portuguese law “requires written assurance by the final destination country that detainees will not be tortured or receive the death penalty as well as a US guarantee that they will be treated according to internationally-recognized conventions in the destination country”.

Again, the US embassy in Lisbon emphasizes the government’s requirements of transparency and solid legal grounds in order to allow repatriation flights. It is also curious to note how the US reported the intensity of the national controversy: “the normally unflappable Amado lost his cool during the testimony; an event that is completely out of character and shows the effects of unrelenting media and political attacks”.

To recapitulate: based on the leaked cables, the Portuguese government agreed to assist the US in repatriating Guantánamo detainees if the process was transparent and based on solid legal grounds, on a case-by-case basis, and if certain conditions were met - such as the assurance that the final destination country would not torture or apply the death penalty to the inmates. Furthermore, the US embassy acknowledges the need to fulfill these aforementioned requirements, and none of the released cables suggest that the US had illegal CIA rendition flights coming through Portuguese territory. The documents revealed through WikiLeaks were meant to increase transparency by denouncing undisclosed facts. All in all, the leaks brought hardly any new elements and even the novelties, for the most part, are insignificant to the public and political interest. What the leaks achieved was public embarrassment for the US and, in some cases, for other states. Furthermore, the disclosed cables will probably be coun-

terproductive, as they will affect the confidence needed for diplomatic activity, and thus harm the transparency they were meant to attain. So far, in Portugal’s case, the leaks reveal that Lisbon was committed to finding a solution for the Guantánamo detention center within a legal framework that guaranteed the rights of the inmates. In other words, and contrary to initial expectations, the Portuguese government actually benefits from the disclosure of these cables. For the moment, the conspiracy theory will have to wait.

Portugal is no longer a foreign policy priority to São Tomé and Príncipe?

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In the legislative elections that took place in August 2010 in São Tomé and Príncipe, the Independent Democratic Action (ADI) defeated the Liberation Movement of São Tomé and Príncipe/Social Democratic Party (MLSTP/PSD). Winning 26 parliamentary seats out of 55, Patrice Trovoada (ADI) replaced Rafael Branco (MLSTP/PSD) as the new Prime Minister. During the electoral campaign that preceded these legislative elections, the foreign policy of São Tomé and Príncipe was not only a matter of discussion but also of divergence between the MLSTP/PSD and the ADI. While Rafael Branco argued for the maintenance of São Tomé and Príncipe’s strategic partnerships with Angola and Portugal, Patrice Trovoada thought that they should be rethought. In

his view, São Tomé and Príncipe should be able to identify specific areas for cooperation with different partners, namely among neighboring countries. In other words, with Patrice Trovoada, Angola and Portugal would no longer be *primus inter pares* as far as the country’s foreign policy was concerned.

Later on, the new São Toméan Minister for Foreign Affairs, Manuel Salvador dos Ramos, stressed that the foreign policy priorities of the government were ranked as follows: first, neighboring countries; second, the member states of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP); third, the European Union; and lastly, the partners in Asia – with particular focus on Taiwan and South America – especially Brazil. Hence, as promised in the electoral campaign, Angola and Portugal lost their places as strategic partners in São Tomé and Príncipe’s political rhetoric. By contrast, in the name of greater regional integration, the government began to focus on strengthening relations with neighboring countries in Central Africa and in the Gulf of Guinea. Thus, over the past four months, Patrice Trovoada has visited Angola, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya and Nigeria.

One cannot miss the fact that Portugal was not on the Prime Minister’s priority list of official visits. Indeed, the first visit to Lisbon was made by Foreign Minister Manuel Salvador dos Ramos. If in the case of Luanda the strategic partnership has disappeared from the political rhetoric but continues to exist in substance, in the case of Lisbon the first indicators show a real willingness to pay less attention to the bilateral relationship. As far as one can tell, so far Patrice Trovoada seems to have chosen to favor geography over History. Apparently, the São Toméan Prime Minister seems to consider that the maintenance of strategic partnerships is incompatible with the desire to deepen the country’s regional integration. Patrice Trovoada seems to perceive the country’s



foreign policy as a zero-sum game. Moreover, one of Patrice Trovoada's first political disagreements involved Portugal. During the last summit of Heads of State and Government of the CPLP, held in Luanda in July, Portugal did not support the immediate membership of Equatorial Guinea, a stance that annoyed Patrice Trovoada, specially because he wished to encourage São Tomé's bilateral relations with its neighboring countries, also under a multilateral political umbrella.

Regardless of the personal views and preferences of Patrice Trovoada, Portugal and São Tomé and Príncipe not only have historical ties, but also common political and economic interests, and the relationship between the two countries was – and will continue to be – characterized mainly by cooperation rather than competition. Moreover, São Tomé and Príncipe is the one that benefits the most from the bilateral relation between the two countries.

As former French President Charles de Gaulle pointed out a long time ago, states do not have friends, only interests. Assuming that de Gaulle was right, then despite Patrice Trovoada's personal preferences or antipathies, sooner or later the political and economic interests of São Tomé and Príncipe will leave him with no other option but to rethink his political approach.

Only time will tell if Patrice Trovoada's decision to renounce the strategic partnership with Portugal was a wise political step. At first sight, it does not appear to be. As a consequence of interdependence and globalization, contrarily to what the Prime Minister seems to think, São Tomé and Príncipe's foreign policy does not have any other option but to find win-win solutions in a non-zero-sum game. Moreover, the maintenance of strategic partnerships with Angola and Portugal was compatible with a diplomatic strategy giving (new) prominence to neighboring countries. Under normal circumstances, it will not take long for São Tomé

and Príncipe to correct its current diplomatic route. It is a matter of time until Patrice Trovoada discovers that the strategic bet on the neighboring countries does not provide the expected results. If it were that simple, then other São Toméan Prime Ministers before him would have already done so successfully. In due time, Patrice Trovoada will show less enthusiasm regarding geography and more respect towards history.



Angola: The triumph of the state and the failure of the nation

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Angola celebrated the 35th anniversary of its independence from Portugal in November 2010. It was on November 11th 1975, after the signature of the Alvor Agreement that the first President of the Angolan Republic, Agostinho Neto, declared independence. In the following years, Angola met a tragic fate, filled with civil war – largely spurred by battling superpowers –, human catastrophe, underdevelopment, and above all a feeling of disillusionment towards independence. This disillusion is explained not by a willingness to return to Portuguese rule, but by a post-independence neopatrimonialism, in which not only Angola but many “post-colonial African leaders have rather relied on effected control and patronage through capturing power over the economy, rather than through the state in the form of a functioning administration”.¹ This post-independence modus operandi has benefited many African elites, while leaving several African peoples worse than they were during the colonial period.

Nevertheless, notwithstanding the legitimacy and immeasurable importance of discussing political freedoms, human rights and overall constitutional liberties, there is a latent broader picture to assess: the internal and external sovereignty of the state after its independence and the formation of the Angolan nation.

The years Angola experienced as an independent state – albeit not always domestically sovereign – are here divided into two parts. The first period of analysis ranges from 1975 until the end of the civil war in 2002, and will focus on state building efforts. The second period covers not only the presidency’s eight years of centralized power but also of pacification, economic boom, general reconstruction and development. Yet, because during this period the presidency assumed the responsibility of state building, the analysis will turn to the constraints of the birth of the Angolan nation and to the process of nation building.

There are two reasons for this division. Firstly, in 1975 most Angolans thought independence from Portugal

would finally bring them justice and increase the living conditions in the country, a time when Angola would finally exude national pride and assume its position among the free countries of the world. Yet the ensuing civil war demonstrated that independence was not the path towards peace. In fact, “gaining control of an African state immediately supplies recognition and prestige from the outside world and provides external diplomatic backing and access to aid, which then further lubricates the patronage networks on which the state is predicated”.² Angolan independence was in fact not the overall independence of its people and their country but the independence and political freedom of a small elite and of the state apparatus in external relations, which was de jure – but not de facto – internationally legal and sovereign in 1975. Up until 1991 – the year of nominal democracy and a multi-party system – Angola was hardly a working state. The government formed by the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), based mainly in Luanda, did not control nor reach the entirety of its territory, faced internal and external foes, and was not legitimized by popular consent. As a result, the Angolan population was deeply fragmented and unable to make use of all the dynamics entangled with sovereignty and independence. If the government’s internal sovereignty was constantly threatened by an enduring civil war, its external sovereignty – or independence – was limited by the Cold War circumstances of its birth. Hence, this period will be analyzed through the lens of state building, by assessing its successes and failures in what was then an unfavorable context of civil war and foreign interference. Secondly, from 2002 to 2010, Angola registered remarkable economic growth and an acceptable lasting peace, taking into consideration the past history of the country. More importantly, besides becoming truly independent in the early 1990s, after 2002 the Angolan presidency became the sole power in the internal order – a ruler with the monopoly on violence and consequently responsible

1 Ian Taylor, *The International Relations of Sub-Saharan Africa* (Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010), p. 6.

2 Ibid.



for the state and its population. Its legitimacy was then secured by the 2008 parliamentary elections which gave an almost absolute victory to the MPLA. However, as often occurs, because state building was now in the hands of the legitimized authoritarian elite, the Angolan nation failed to emerge – as autocracies are notably hostile to forms of power they cannot control.

Today, the process of nation building is locked by the nature of the government and of the state. Indeed, one of the main justifications for the absence of an Angolan nation is the lack of a devoted elite operating not only in the government but in universities, overseas and independently, with the necessary channels of communication to reach the population. Thus, in the second part of this article, our analysis will turn to nation building.

The puppet years between East and West

Angola's external sovereignty became extremely limited due to the circumstances of the Cold War. The MPLA – backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba – adopted communist ideals, while the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) – supported by South Africa and the US – served as a frontline for the containment of communism.

This meant that both the MPLA and UNITA had to abide by a certain behavioral and ideological background in order to assure their own survival as political forces, a rhetoric which failed to include or mobilize the general population. The dynamics of Angola's Cold War proxy conflict left it independent on paper but largely restricted in terms of exercising its internal sovereign rights. The fact that the Angolan government did not have complete control over the territory, the Armed Forces and the state apparatus (tax collection, education, health service, mail service, etc.), considerably limited the natural inclusion of the population in the process of state building. The country was presented to an elite largely played as a puppet by powerful actors in the theatre of a broader conflict. Consequently, the domestic scene was deeply affected by these circumstances, which prevented the birth of an overarching Angolan nation with a clearly defined territory and government. Moreover, because of the dividing lines implemented by the civil war, the power to decide the political inclination and the future of the country was largely absent, not only among the Angolan people but also in the native governing elite, which saw its survivability assured by Moscow.

Up until 1988/1989, the *status quo* in Angola remained largely unaltered. However, with the introduction of

Mikhail Gorbachev's *glasnost* and the gradual demise of the Soviet system, the dynamics of power in Angola began to change. The Tripartite Agreements, signed on December 22nd 1988, began the peace process and called for the withdrawal of foreign military forces from its territory. The agreements called for the departure of South African and Cuban Armed Forces from Angolan territory and for Namibia's independence, in part due to the result of the Cuito Cuanavale battle. A summit followed between the leaders of the MPLA and UNITA and several African leaders in 1989, at Gbadolite in Zaire, without producing any substantial results. Also in 1989, the Angolan government (MPLA) had offered amnesty to UNITA in an attempt for it to join the MPLA under a one-party state system, which

the former rejected because it saw this amnesty as an attempt to split the movement. Yet, with the support of the US, UNITA was able to force a shift in power which led the MPLA to drop the one-party state project in favor of opening the door to a multi-party democracy, with the inclusion of UNITA. This multi-party democratic system became official with the signature of the Bicesse Accords of 1991, which laid the transition and stipulated the first free elections under the supervision of the United Nations.

From 1988 to 1991/1992, there was a significant attempt at state building. The transference of power from the conflicting groups to the Angolan state and Parliament marked the very first step in the construction of a sovereign internal order. Yet again, this was only possible due to the US' loss of interest in the conflict after the demise of the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of Cuban military forces. The new circumstances of the international order defined Angola's external sovereignty and were reflected domestically in events to come. Angola did not become independent in the external sphere by itself, but was allowed to do so by powerful actors. Nevertheless, it was only with the end of the Cold War that Angola truly became an independent state.

Fighting restarted after the elections of 1992 – which were somewhat free and fair – when leader of UNITA Jonas Savimbi refused to accept the results of the election and join the Angolan Parliament on the opposition side. The Lusaka Protocol of 1994 also attempted to lay a path towards state building by proposing a national unity and reconciliation process which sought to integrate UNITA into Angolan politics by forming a coalition government. However, genuine mistrust and extremely poor international oversight of the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol reignited civil war in the country. During

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this period and up until 2002, all attempts to create an overarching state system - which would serve to stabilize the country and, most importantly, unite the Angolan people - failed to achieve any concrete results.

The failure of all these agreements only serves to prove the deep divisions between the two blocs. It was by now impossible to achieve any kind of national reconciliation, coalition government, or power-sharing agreement of any kind. It was also impossible to advocate federalism, partition or secession, as there were no claims to break the country in two. The existing political parties were not ethnically aligned enough, the population was not mobilized and a clear territorial division of the country never really existed. Both forces, the government of the MPLA and the rebel UNITA, were committed to achieving absolute power without any power-sharing agreement of any kind. It was an impossible situation, a classic zero-sum game which was only solved by the death of Jonas Savimbi in 2002. True state-building efforts would only come to materialize after this event.

National identity and the hardships of nation building

After the death of Jonas Savimbi and the integration of the UNITA apparatus into the government, state building in Angola was controlled by a small governmental elite slowly engaged in developing – considering the revenue – the country's damaged public infrastructure – a situation similar to that of other petro-rich authoritarian states recovering from a period of long conflict. Yet there is a direct link between the elite's control of state building and the underdevelopment of the Angolan nation.

Although the nation-building process in Europe was largely fabricated by intellectual elites, there is also an abstract and imaginary connection between the territory and its population called metageography. Metageography is a concept which holds that people carry geographical structures in their minds which are based on facts, experiences and myths.³ In Angola this concept first related to tribal areas (hunting spaces, rivers, lakes, mountains, etc), pre-colonial history, slavery and later the separation

between the Portuguese and the native population. Nevertheless, almost thirty years of civil war and centuries of imperial rule did not leave any political space for the birth of an Angolan nation. In fact, throughout recorded history there was only an Angolan *ethnie*, a conglomerate of people who shared specific attributes not only among themselves but later also with the Portuguese settlers.

There are several explanations as to why, after centuries of history, the Angolan nation was never formed. The most obvious justification is that Angolans were under Portuguese rule. This meant they were subject to Portuguese law, history, conscription, costumes, and most importantly language, through a process of official state assimilation. The political and cultural space Angolans had to develop their national identity was always occupied by the characteristics of the Portuguese nation. Moreover there never emerged a nationalizing project similar to the one in 19th century France. Even after the departure of the Portuguese system of governance, the Marxist-Leninist inclination of the government and the lack of an educated elite among UNITA's ranks – all in the context of a Cold (and civil) War – prevented the birth of a unifying overarching nation. Obviously, the greatest obstacle to nation building was the civil war, which divided the people. Yet this civil war was not fought along ethnic dividing lines but rather around political

ideas, interests and inclinations. Nonetheless, everything was set for the first manifestations of the Angolan nation when in 2002 Jonas Savimbi was killed and the war ended. However, this was not the case.

The government's heavily centralized power, its focus on energy exploration and precious stones and its unwillingness to provide for the entire population were some of the factors standing in the way of the Angolan nation. Authoritarian regimes are usually very nervous and suspicious about different forms of power other than their own. Indeed, the arrival of a new power (i.e. the nation) would disturb the government's comfortable position if not completely disrupt the flow of petro-dollars to the reserved elite by interfering with the disproportional influence they had on the oil extraction business. Of course, of all the forces that could threaten the government, the worst to be expected would be the rise of an Angolan nation, which would not only be interested in the welfare of its people,

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³ Martin Lewis and Kären Wigen, *The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography* (University of California Press, 1997).



culture and history but also in the preservation of its natural habitat – the territory – and consequently in the pace with which its natural resources are explored.

This is why the government is so keen on rallying the people around its designated power centre, a centre it can control. At the same time it nervously monitors openings of 'illegal' political spaces, to avoid any possible popular political mobilization. This is supported by a massive yet 'indulged' military. It is a behavior typical of authoritarian regimes hosting an underdeveloped nation while enjoying access to large dividends from natural resources.

There are however problems arising from the lack of unification under one nation, one aegis to give a sense of belonging. The secessionist movements in Cabinda and the North and South Lundas are a consequence of the state's petroeconomy-centric focus. The *modus operandi* of these secessionist movements in Cabinda and the Lundas is roughly the same as the government's. It is centered on sources of revenue – diamonds, in the case of the Lundas –, but completely fails to articulate any concept of national secessionism, something which is intrinsically easy and natural for Europeans in countries like Spain, the UK or in the broader Balkans region to fabricate. In the long run, if the nation does not come to terms there will probably be other groups claiming secession and independence, simply by reflecting the way the regime acts.

Conclusion

After a lengthy process of constant reemerging conflict and failing agreements which lasted until 2002, Angolan state building was finally put back on track after the end of the civil war. The period that preceded the conflict was marked by complex internal power struggles and external intervention which emptied the conflicting faction's legitimacy to govern, narrowed the country's sovereignty and constrained its independence. Although much has changed in terms of state building since 1975, Angola still has much to do. Despite being largely sovereign in the external and internal sphere, Angola must now work to consolidate the role of Parliament and the rule of law, while cracking down on corruption, one of the biggest obstacles to proper state functioning. It must also diversify its exports in order to depend less on oil revenues, and consequently on external financing, a move which would only solidify its economy.

There is also an upcoming urgent need to let the Angolan nation flourish and express itself. The Angolan democracy and independence are very young when compared to Western European countries or even to the US. It would be naive to assume the country will keep developing if it stays confined to its current *status quo*, with the same territory, population and regional context. In order to be able to withstand future changes, Angola must develop as a nation, a step which would not only unite the entire population but also attach it to the complete extension of the country's territory, natural resources and wild life. For this to materialize, the elite must loosen its grip on power and start producing material capable of nationalizing the

population. It needs to teach its language, history and geography to younger generations, something which is only possible by investing in universities, especially in the field of social sciences. If the MPLA and the presidency open the system and work towards this end, Angola possesses all the necessary ingredients to become the 'tip of the sword' in African development.

Angola has come a long way since its independence from Portugal in 1975. In only 35 years, it has experienced the first beginnings of what took western European countries several centuries, revolutions and wars to develop and create. History has proven that it is near impossible to ask so much in such a short time span. Yet, in Angola's case, the glass must always be half-empty, as possibilities are almost unlimited and there is still much more to achieve.

The government of the MPLA and the rebel UNITA, were committed to achieving absolute power without any power-sharing agreement of any kind. It was an impossible situation, a classic zero-sum game which was only solved by the death of Jonas Savimbi in 2002.



Source: United Nations.



Timeline of Events

Angola

3 December (London):

Global Witness released a report on Angola's oil sector stating Sonangol should focus on its exploration business and stop being a "parallel treasury for the Angolan government".

3 December (Luanda-Caracas-Havana):

Venezuela's National Assembly gave the green light to the creation of a joint venture between Venezuelan Oil Corporation, Cuban Company Cupet and the Angolan enterprise Sonangol, which will focus on exploration and extraction of hydrocarbons. Sonangol was also awarded the right to operate in two Cuban offshore oil blocks.

4 December (Abidjan):

Angolan ambassador to the Ivory Coast Gilberto Buta Lutucuta was present at Laurent Gbagbo's self-appointment as President following his electoral defeat. This gesture of support from Angola stood in stark contrast to the international community's strong condemnation of Gbagbo.

6 December (Luanda):

Ivory Coast's incumbent President and defeated presidential candidate, Laurent Gbagbo, dispatched his security advisor Kadet Bertin to Luanda to meet President José Eduardo dos Santos. Gbagbo and José Eduardo dos Santos enjoy a long-lasting relationship, allowing the former to call the latter for assistance.

6-9 December (Luanda):

British Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Henry Bellingham visited Luanda with the goal of strengthening relations between the two countries. Among the topics discussed with Foreign Affairs Minister George Chicoty and Vice-President Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos 'Nandó' were investment relations, trade, defense, environment and visa regimes. Bellingham also praised Angola's growing diplomatic status in its region.

7-8 December (Pretoria):

Foreign Affairs Minister George Chicoty arrived in South Africa to prepare José Eduardo dos Santos' official visit to the country later this month.

10 December (Luanda):

The Foreign Affairs Minister of Guinea Conakry, Bokari Fofana, made a stopover visit to Luanda to deliver a message to José Eduardo dos Santos from President Alpha Condé.

11 December (Quito):

Angolan Oil Minister Botelho de Vasconcelos participated in the OPEC meeting where he managed to maintain Angola's oil producing quota, although the country pumps over the Organization's target, some 1.9 million barrels per day in 2011.

12 December (São Tomé):

The chairman of Sonangol Manuel Vicente signed an overall agreement with President of São Tomé and Príncipe Patrice Trovoada, awarding the exploration and refurbishment of the port of Ana Chaves, as well as the concession of the capital's international airport.

13-15 December (Pretoria-Cape Town):

President José Eduardo dos Santos paid his first official visit to South Africa, accompanied by a several ministers as well as a business delegation. Economic relations were high on the agenda. President José Eduardo dos Santos and South African President Jacob Zuma discussed the security situation in the African continent, as well as prospects for Angola's 2011 SADC chairmanship. Angolan Foreign Affairs Minister George Chicoty praised President José Eduardo dos Santos' visit to South Africa stating that an important strategic partnership was born. President José Eduardo dos Santos was awarded South Africa's highest distinction, the Order of the Companions of Oliver Tambo, a clear sign given by President Zuma of his desire to strengthen bilateral ties.

14 December (Lusaka):

Vice-President Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos 'Nandó' represented President José Eduardo dos Santos in the summit of heads of state and government of the Great Lakes countries, which was mainly focused on the illegal exploitation of natural resources.

14 December (Luanda):

The National Assembly approved the governmental budget for 2011. The newspaper *Novo Jornal* informed that education and health would receive less funds than in 2010, whilst the defense, security and agriculture expenditure will rise.

21 December (Pretoria):

The Development Bank of Southern Africa, in partnership with the African Development Bank, stated that it had opened a US\$255 million credit line to Angola.

21 December (Luanda):

The Economist Intelligence Unit considered the creation of the Angolan Strategic Financial Oil Reserve and its entry into force in 2011 to be a "notable innovation" in the country.

21 December (Conakry):

Foreign Affairs Minister George Chicoty attended Alpha Condé's swearing-in ceremony as Guinea Conakry's new President.

22 December (Stockholm):

For budgetary reasons, Sweden decided to close its Embassy in Angola.

22 December (Bissau):

While on a stopover visit in Bissau, Foreign Affairs Minister George Chicoty defended a policy of "non-interference" in Ivory Coast's internal situation.

22 December (Cabinda):

A court in Cabinda ordered the release of human rights activists in the region, including Priest Raul Tati, lawyer Francisco Luemba, as well as four other detainees.

**23 December (Luanda):**

TAAG was forced to ground its intercontinental fleet – three Boeing airplanes – due to security issues, after suffering two incidents in December.

25 December (Maputo):

Angolan ambassador to Mozambique João Garcia Bires said that tourism between the two countries is set to increase due to the improvement of bilateral relations.

25 December (Luanda):

Defense Minister Cândido Pereira dos Santos Van-Dúnem sent a message of congratulations to President José Eduardo dos Santos on the end of the year. In the letter, the Defense Minister recognized the year was marked by the adoption of the country's new Constitution.

26 December (Luanda):

The government rejected the involvement of any Angolan mercenaries in Ivory Coast. Angola is a supporter of President Laurent Gbagbo.

27 December (Luanda):

UNITA leader Isaias Samakuva said that Angola should invite Laurent Gbagbo, who lost the recent elections in Ivory Coast, to come to Angola and wait there until the President elect Ouattara takes office.

28 December (Luanda):

Foreign Minister George Chicoty said the country managed to keep its name on the lips of the international community in 2010. Chicoty also said that among the various activities that contributed to this was the organization of the African Football Cup of Nations and the Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Portuguese Speaking Community (CPLP). Furthermore, Chicoty mentioned the visits of several heads of state to the country and Angola's participation in the EU-Africa summit. Chicoty also praised the participation of the Foreign Ministry in bilateral and multilateral conferences like ECOWAS – as part of the effort to restore peace in Guinea-Bissau – or the ECCAS. However, despite these achievements, the Foreign Minister points to constraints in the follow-up policies and agreements, particularly with African partners.

29 December (Luanda):

The Minister of Defense, Cândido Pereira dos Santos Van-Dúnem, stated that Angola would continue to develop bilateral relationships with neighboring countries in the perspective of building a better and safer Southern Africa region. Cândido Van-Dúnem added that the country would also continue to be present in every initiative of political agreement seeking the restoration and maintenance of peace and stability in Africa.

29 December (Luanda):

President José Eduardo dos Santos addressed the nation ahead of 2011. The President showed confidence in the economic recovery and its capacity to create jobs, supported by next year's public projects in the fields of agriculture, energy, mining and infrastructure and sustained by reforms in economic, administrative and judicial conducts.

Brazil

3 December (Brasília):

In a letter sent to President of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas, President Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva recognized the Palestinian state along its 1967 borders.

3-4 December (Mar del Plata):

President Lula da Silva, accompanied by Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, attended the XX Ibero-American Summit. Beyond tributes to late former Argentinean President Nestor Kirchner, the various leaders signed a Special Declaration on the Protection of Democracy in Latin America.

6 December (Brasília):

President Lula da Silva disclosed that the final decision over the fighter jet bid will be left to his successor, Dilma Rousseff, further delaying an already long process.

15 December (Brasília):

Dilma Rousseff's transition team officially announced that António Patriota will replace Celso Amorim as Brazil's next Foreign Minister. Furthermore, it was also confirmed that current Defense Minister Nelson Jobim will keep his post.

15-17 December (Foz do Iguaçu):

Australian Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd met with his counterpart Celso Amorim, seeking to reinforce bilateral ties. Rudd also took the opportunity to attend the working meetings of the Mercosul Summit as an observing party.

16-17 December (Foz do Iguaçu):

President Lula da Silva hosted the XL Mercosul Summit as the last act of Brazil's Pro Tempore presidency of this organization, accompanied by President-elect Dilma Rousseff. Lula also took the opportunity to meet bilaterally with his counterparts from Paraguay, Suriname, Uruguay – Fernando Lugo, Desiré Bouterse and José Mujica respectively – as well as with Australian Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd. For his part, Foreign Minister Celso Amorim held meetings with his counterpart from UAE, Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, as well as with Turkey's European Affairs Minister, Egemen Bagis.

23 December (Brasília):

The Congress, with the support of President-elect Dilma Rousseff's team, approved a 5.9% increase in the minimum wage, resisting pressure from labor leaders for a bigger rise and signaling her commitment to contain public spending next year.

25 December (Brasília):

In his last official address entitled Farewell to the Nation, President Lula summarized his government's performance and expressed confidence on the country's future and the administration of Rousseff. Lula also asked the people to support the new President the same way they supported him.

25 December (Andina):

Peruvian Foreign Minister José António Garcia Belaunde expressed the will to deepen cooperation between Peru and Brazil with the elimination of non-tariff barriers that still hinder free trade between these countries.

26 December (Tehran):

Several businessmen from Iran and Brazil met in Tehran to review ways of expanding economic cooperation between the two countries. Brazilian ambassador in Tehran Antonio Luís Espinola Salgado also took part in the event.

**27 December (Brasília):**

President Lula da Silva said that while many Latin American countries were hoping for more engagement with the US, very little has changed "or not at all" within the Obama administration.

28 December (Beijing):

Brazil, Russia, India and China agreed to invite South Africa to join their grouping of emerging economies, referred to as BRIC.

28 December (Madrid):

Spain's Repsol agreed to sell to China's Sinopec, through a capital increase of US\$7.11 billion, 40% of its subsidiary Repsol Brasil.

31 December (Brasília):

President Lula da Silva decided not to extradite convicted Italian terrorist Cesare Battisti.

31 December (Brasília):

The Brazilian government welcomed South Africa as a new BRIC member.

31 December (Brasília):

A ceremony was held in Brasilia for the start of the construction of a Palestinian embassy in Brazil, the first in the western hemisphere. President Mahmoud Abbas and President Lula da Silva attended the ceremony.

Cape Verde

11-12 December (Mindelo):

Prime Minister José Maria Neves and Foreign Minister José Brito hosted a summit of Macaronesian territories, including Cape Verde and the islands of Madeira, Azores and Canarias, seeking to institutionalize the region in a formal mechanism.

12-13 December (Praia):

After a two-day visit, a Chinese delegation headed by General Jia Xiaoning signed an agreement of military cooperation with Cape Verdean authorities, including the supply of equipment worth €1 million to the local Armed Forces. Xiaoning also took the opportunity to meet with Defense Minister Cristina Lima and the Chief of General Staff of Armed Forces, Coronel Fernando Pereira.

13 December (Dakar):

President Pedro Pires attended the World Festival of Black Arts in Senegal, alongside his counterparts from Libya, Liberia and Guinea-Bissau.

17 December (Praia):

According to figures from the delegation of the Portuguese investment promotion agency, AICEP, in Cape Verde, Portuguese exports to the archipelago rose by 22% in the first nine months of 2010, against the same period in 2009. In the same timeframe, investment by Portuguese companies in Cape Verde also rose from €8.5 million to €21.7 million.

20 December (Ouagadougou):

President Pedro Pires attended the swearing-in ceremony of newly elected President of Burkina Faso Blaise Compaoré.

22 December (Brussels):

After negotiations to renew the Partnership Agreement in the Fishing Sector, Cape Verde's Director General for Fishing Adalberto Vieira announced that the European Union (EU) would raise its financial aid for development of fishing in Cape Verde by 83%, to €435 million per year.

23 December (Conakry):

President Pedro Pires attended the swearing-in ceremony of the newly elected President of Guinea, Alpha Condé.

25 December (Abuja):

Cape Verde President Pedro Pires attended the second extraordinary summit of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to discuss the situation in Ivory Coast.

28-29 December (Abidjan):

With an ECOWAS mandate, heads of state Boni Yayi of Benin, Sierra Leone's Ernest Bai Koroma and Pedro Pires of Cape Verde met Laurent Gbagbo in Ivory Coast in an attempt to end the crisis following the disputed presidential election. West African leaders delivered an ultimatum to Laurent Gbagbo to step down or face a military ouster. They also met with the special representative of the UN Secretary-General in Ivory Coast to discuss the post-election crisis in the country.

Guinea-Bissau

3 December (Bissau):

The Ministry of Justice informed that Guinea-Bissau, Interpol and the UN signed a memorandum of understanding to create a drug-combat cell in the country. This initiative is framed in a transnational effort including Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast and Liberia.

7 December (Paris):

The Presidency's Office stated that Malam Bacai Sanhá spent a week in Val-de-Grace hospital for a "routine medical examination" with no further details. Sanhá's weak health, supposedly due to diabetes, forced him to travel abroad several times this year.

8 December (Bissau):

Armed Forces Chief of Staff António Indjai revealed that the Navy apprehended some 300 kilograms of drugs in Cacheu, north of Bissau, as well as detained two persons. This information comes after persisting reports of an alleged drug barons' meeting in the Bijagós archipelago.

11 December (Dakar):

President Malam Bacai Sanhá accepted the invitation of his Senegalese counterpart, Abdoulaye Wade, and participated in the opening ceremony of the World Festival of Black Arts.

13-16 December (Washington):

The IMF's Executive Board agreed that Guinea-Bissau had complied with the terms of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative regarding public finances and macroeconomic management under the Fund's Extended Credit Facility, and thus decided to pardon US\$1.5 billion of the country's international debt – some 87% of the total owed. Although in a dire political situation, this decision was considered crucial to assure the country's future sustainability. The World Bank backed this decision.

15 December (Nouakchott):

Armed Forces Chief of Staff António Indjai accepted his counterpart's invitation and visited Mauritania to strengthen relations between the two armies.

**17 December (Bissau):**

Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior stated that the IMF's decision restored the country's external image and its credibility, and was a decisive step to effective governance building.

19 December (Bissau):

CPLP Secretary General Domingos Simões Pereira highlighted that Guinea-Bissau's debt pardon does not solve the country's problems and that the international community would continue to monitor the political situation carefully.

18 December (Bissau):

Interior Minister Satú Camara handed her notice to Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior. The relationship between Gomes Júnior and Camara had been deteriorating since he suspended her in October after she nominated police officials without his consent and in violation of the SSR process.

20 December (Brussels):

The European Commission confirmed that it had submitted a proposal to EU member states about opening political consultations with Guinea-Bissau under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement. This article establishes a "consultation procedure and appropriate measures as regards human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law". These consultations can result in the blocking of the €120 million aid that the EU had allocated to Guinea-Bissau until 2013.

22 December (Bissau):

Former Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Rear-Admiral José Zamora Induta, was released, as well as former Counter-Intelligence Military Chief Samba Djaló and three other officials. The five now await trial in Bissau.

23 December (Bissau-Dakar):

The United Nations Integrated Peace-Building Office in Guinea-Bissau expressed its contentment over the release of Zamora Induta and four other military officers. The US Embassy in Dakar also welcomed it.

23 December (Conakry):

President Malam Bacai Sanhá attended the swearing-in of Guinea's newly elected president, Alpha Condé.

24 December (Bissau):

President Malam Bacai Sanhá stated ECOWAS members must work together to avoid bloodshed in Ivory Coast.

28 December (Bissau):

US cables released through WikiLeaks described Guinea-Bissau as a narco-state. Even if these claims are not new, Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior reacted by calling these allegations a defamatory campaign against his country.

28 December (Bissau):

For the first time in his current mandate, President Malam Bacai Sanhá convened the State Council. The members of the Council officially met the President and the country's political situation was on the agenda. Sanhá stated afterwards that the government would stay in power until the end of its mandate in 2012, a gesture intended to spur stability and an important sign for the international community.

31 December (Bissau):

President Malam Bacai Sanhá accepted, upon the government's proposal, the promotion of several military officials of the country's Armed Forces. This move, following Induta's liberation, is seen as an attempt to balance several affinities within the force. Among the promoted are the current Army Chief of Staff, the Inspector-General of the Armed Forces, the Air Force Chief of Staff (allegedly involved in drug trafficking) and the President of the Military Court.

Mozambique

3 December (Maputo):

According to newly released IMF report "Economic Prospects for Sub-Saharan Africa", Mozambique was the sub-Saharan African nation that best resisted the world economic crisis and can expect good economic recovery prospects over the next few years.

4-5 December (Riyadh):

President Armando Guebuza attended the Gulf-Africa Investment Forum of 2010 in Saudi Arabia, seeking to attract Arab capital to the potential of the Mozambican economy, especially in the agricultural sector.

8-9 December (Maputo):

Luxembourg's Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister Jen Asselborn visited Mozambique seeking new opportunities for bilateral cooperation and investment.

10 December (Maputo):

Germany donated €16.5 million to Mozambique through an additional financial cooperation agreement for 2010 and 2011.

15 December (Maputo):

South African Parliament Speaker Max Sisulu met with his Mozambican counterpart Veronica Macamo and President Armando Guebuza, seeking to enhance bilateral ties between the two countries.

23 December (Maputo):

The Parliament has approved a resolution proposed by the Frelimo majority to set up an Ad-Hoc Commission to draft constitutional amendments. Opposition parties Renamo and the Movement for Democratic Change voted against the proposal. Frelimo and President Armando Guebuza have ruled out any fundamental change and insisted on improving the existing constitution.

Portugal

1-2 December (Malta):

Defense Minister Augusto Santos Silva attended a meeting of the 5+5 Group that brings together ten Mediterranean countries from Europe and the Maghreb to discuss common security issues. Santos Silva also took the opportunity to meet with his French counterpart, Alain Juppé.

2-3 December (Tbilisi):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado paid an official visit to Georgia, where he met with his counterpart Grigol Vashadze. The strengthening of bilateral relations, regional issues and the international economic and financial crisis as well as Portugal's election as non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, were high on the agenda. Amado also took the opportunity to meet with President Mikheil Saakashvili.

**3-4 December (Mar del Plata):**

President Aníbal Cavaco Silva and Prime Minister José Sócrates attended the XX Ibero-American Summit, under the theme "Education for social inclusion". Both leaders later met with Brazilian President Lula da Silva, while Prime Minister Sócrates held a meeting with Argentinean President Cristina Kirchner.

6 December (Lisbon):

Secretary of State for European Affairs Pedro Lourtie met with his Spanish counterpart Diego López Garrido, seeking to prepare the upcoming European Council.

9 December (Brussels):

Defense Minister Augusto Santos Silva attended the EU's Defense Ministers Meeting.

9 December (Brussels):

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation João Gomes Cravinho attended the Development Ministers Council, where the EU's development policies and its financing were high on the agenda.

11-12 December (Mindelo):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado attended the Macaronesia summit, hosted by Cape Verdean authorities.

13-14 December (Brussels):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado attended the EU's Foreign Affairs Council and General Affairs Council.

13-15 December (Khartoum):

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation João Gomes Cravinho traveled to Sudan on the eve of the upcoming referendum in January 2011.

16 December (Brussels):

Prime Minister José Sócrates attended the EU's European Council, with the ongoing instability in the Eurozone high on the agenda.

16 December (Pristina):

Defense Minister Augusto Santos Silva visited the 300 Portuguese troops assigned to NATO's mission in Kosovo, KFOR.

23 December (Beijing):

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu stated that China is willing to help countries in the Eurozone return to economic health. This statement comes a day after Portuguese newspaper *Jornal de Negócios* reported that China is looking to buy between €4 and €5 billion of Portuguese sovereign debt to help the country ward off pressure in debt markets.

27 December (Lisbon):

In the first 11 months of 2010, Portugal was the third biggest destination in Europe for Brazilian investment, behind Luxembourg and France, and the fifth biggest in the world. Between January and November of this year, Brazilian companies invested a total of US\$959 million in Portugal, 20 times the amount invested in 2006.

São Tomé and Príncipe

12 December (São Tomé):

Prime Minister Patrice Trovoada and chairman of Sonangol Manuel Vicente signed an agreement in which the concessions on the port of Ana Chaves – the most important port of the archipelago – and the São Tomé international airport, were granted to the Angolan state oil company.

17 December (São Tomé):

According to Oil Minister Carlos Vila Nova, Australia's Force Petroleum and Angola's Grupo Gema have been disqualified from the list of firms competing for offshore exploration rights in the exclusive zone of São Tomé and Príncipe. British Afex Global, local company O.G. Engineering, and Nigerian firms Oranto Petroleum and Overt Energy are the four companies remaining.

Timor Leste

1 December (Singapore):

While attending a conference by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, President José Ramos-Horta expressed his symbolical wish to see Timor Leste achieve ASEAN membership in 2011, when former occupier Indonesia takes over as chair of the regional bloc.

2-3 December (Havana):

President José Ramos-Horta, accompanied by Foreign Minister Zacarias da Costa, paid an official visit to Cuba where he met with his counterpart Raúl Castro and his brother, Fidel Castro. Enhanced bilateral relations and cooperation were high on the agenda.

6 December (Díli):

According to Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Alberto Carlos, China agreed to offer a new building to Timor Leste, this time to house the future Centre for Diplomatic Studies.

7-10 December (Bali):

Prime Minister José Alexandre 'Xanana' Gusmão travelled to Indonesia to attend the 3rd Bali Democracy Forum. Gusmão also took the opportunity to hold a bilateral meeting with Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, with cooperation in the agricultural, irrigation and maritime sectors, as well as Timor Leste's accession to ASEAN, high on the agenda.

11 December (Díli):

Government spokesman Agio Pereira renewed Timor Leste's criticism over Woodside plans for the Greater Sunrise field, warning that any intended costs could escalate in a similarly to what recently happened with the Australian Pluto field – also explored by Woodside.

21 December (Wellington):

New Zealand's Foreign Minister Murray McCully stated that his country will maintain its police presence in Timor Leste, even if the United Nations scales back its police mission there.

**21 December (Díli):**

According to Japanese ambassador to Timor Leste Iwao Kitahara, Japan has decided to contribute US\$14 million to the rehabilitation of the Oecusse District Seaport.

22 December (Díli):

According to Government spokesman Ágio Pereira, Timor Leste's petroleum income leapt to an all-time high of US\$914 million in 2010, up by about 38% compared to 2009.

24 December (Díli):

Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão said the Australian-led International Stabilisation Force (ISF) should leave the country, stating that Timor Leste is now capable of managing its own problems. The ISF is expected to leave only after the 2012 presidential and legislative elections, but the Prime Minister favors an earlier withdrawal.

28 December (Díli):

Fundasaun Mahein has warned of a growing threat from organized crime and noted links between the Indonesian military and drug trafficking. Timor Leste's Secretary of State for Security Francisco Guterres said that the government was aware of the report and was already acting on the issues raised.

Reading List

Amado Luiz Cervo and Antônio Carlos Lessa (eds.), *Emerging Brazil under Lula: an assessment on International Relations (2003-2010)* (*Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, Vol. 53, Special Edition, 2010).

"Timor-Leste: Time for the UN to Step Back" (*International Crisis Group*, Asia Briefing No. 116, 15 December 2010).

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