



Reaching out for new beginnings: South Africa rethinks Angola

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When thinking about Angola and South Africa, one instantly tends to assume that both countries cooperate in every possible sphere, presuming the problem is with the nature of the African continent, not with its leaders or history. Surprisingly, the picture is much grimmer.

Decades have passed since relations between Angola and South Africa made it into their respective political agendas. For almost three decades, both countries battled in a classic Cold War environment, fighting imperial rule from Portugal, the apartheid regime and later during the Angolan civil war. In 1987/1988 during the battle of Cuito Cuanavale, relations reached a record low, only to improve when Nelson Mandela became President of South Africa. Yet, with the arrival of Thabo Mbeki to office, relations began to deteriorate. Mbeki's efforts to mediate in the Angolan civil war were ill received

by the MPLA's José Eduardo dos Santos, who considered the latter to be meddling in Angola's domestic affairs, a thorny issue between the two countries. The Second Congo War also played a role in this matter, mainly because of both countries' opposite and irreconcilable interests in the conflict.

On the diplomatic front Mbeki's poor personal relations with José Eduardo dos Santos must also be considered a cause for this relationship stalemate. Mbeki never visited the Angolan capital on an official state visit. Only in 2008 did Mbeki go to Luanda, intending to brief José Eduardo dos Santos about his mediation efforts in Zimbabwe, thus failing to mend their own personal and diplomatic relations.

Nevertheless, Jacob Zuma has so far successfully managed to invert the situation since having been elected President of South Africa. Zuma had spent time in exile in Angola during the apartheid era and is said to have received support from MPLA in his political endeavors in South Africa. He also visited the country as president of the ANC in 2008, in celebration of the anniversary of the battle of Cuito Cuanavale, which was a major step towards rapprochement. Moreover, Zuma had previously visited Luanda as South African Deputy President in 2004. His first official visit as head of state to Angola

in August 2009 was seen as a sign of South Africa's willingness to improve relations between the two countries. Hence, it is not abnormal that Zuma has chosen a country close to him to pay his first visit. However, personal preferences aside, Angola is a giant petro-economy, disputing the leading role of Africa's biggest oil exporter with Nigeria, and has one of the continent's biggest militaries along with South Africa. Paving its way to becoming a regional power, Angola is a compulsory stop for any African leader.

Many have suggested a cold war of sorts might emerge between the two countries. Several pundits point to South Africa's decade long prominence in the region, Angola's petro-nationalism, and economic and diplomatic divergences between both countries. Petro-nationalism and a certain arrogance in business dealings – derived from high economic revenue – are among the most prominent issues brought up by diplomats working with the country. But the signs are not in place. There is no climate of constant tension, border militarization, spy games or economic sanctioning. Instead, South Africa's foreign policy priorities indicate that it is very much willing to cooperate with Angola and work to solve some of Southern Africa's problems. In his 2009 visit, Zuma led a massive delegation of ministers



and businessmen. His emphasis was not focused on debating the past and widening divisions, but rather on deepening trade relations and regional economic growth. Much like everyone, Zuma is eager to grab a piece of the Angolan economic cake. With Angola's increasing regional power and significance, South Africa has much to gain by developing closer trade relations with the country. In fact, it is indeed bizarre that it has only now understood Angola's prosperity and attempted to cooperate towards common profits. However, its immediate concern resides in security.

South Africa has had many problems with immigration in the past. Nonetheless, by betting on regional economic growth, largely spurred by future trade cooperation with Angola – which means revenues will be kept in the region – South Africa will be assuring that workers will not need to migrate to its country, as the region becomes more and more prosperous. Regional economic growth would also work to make borders less porous, enhance security and thus stop remains of illegal immigration and possibly drugs and arms trade in the region. Enhancing security between the two countries also provides an additional benefit. South Africa and Angola have the biggest military apparatus in the entire African continent. Yet, while having large armies can prove to be advantageous, it is also the case that soldiers must be employed and not sedentary. This alone enables progressive and possibly unified peacekeeping operations to ensure both countries remain safe and economically fertile, while providing a great service to the entire Southern African Development Community. Hence, joint peacekeeping operations should be regarded positively.

On the foreign policy front, a closer relationship would provide both Angola and South Africa with enough diplomatic leverage to solve issues close to their borders, mainly illegal immigration in the case of Zimbabwe

and the Democratic Republic of Congo to a certain extent. Although important diplomatic aspects remain to be solved – South Africa still has not sent an ambassador nor a trade representative to Luanda – it appears there is enough political motivation to overcome these problems.

Prosperous trade relations must back diplomatic initiatives. In this matter, it remains to be seen whether or not South African business is strong enough to penetrate the very competitive market of Angola. Perhaps President Jacob Zuma is trying to achieve some sort of preferential status. Nevertheless, competing with American, Brazilian, Chinese, European and Indian companies in Africa's newest crown jewel might take more than political preference and sheer willpower.

Brazil and Turkey: What do they want?

SEAN GOFORTH

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Last May, the foreign policy lances of Brazil and Turkey noticeably crossed paths. President of Brazil Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey tried to broker a fuel swap deal with Iran to stave off a fourth round of United Nations (UN) sanctions against the Islamic Republic. In failing, the process exposed the lengths to which Brasília and Ankara were willing to defy the West on key foreign policy matters.

The Iranian nuclear fuel deal is but one in a long list of moves carried out by each country against Western

interest in recent years. Brazil's irritations go back to 2002, when it started using the WTO as a conduit for challenging US trade policy. This spring the WTO ruled in Brazil's favor regarding US cotton subsidies, which amount to US\$3 billion annually. Brazil created hundreds of tariffs across a wide range of industries as retaliation against Washington's illegal subsidies. Rather than fulfill its commitment in essence, the Obama administration spent money in order to paper over the problem, agreeing to pay Brazil US\$147 million a year in order to keep its cotton subsidies. Still, the United States has a host of other trade barriers that prevent Brazilian goods from being competitive in the US market, and Brazil is threatening to settle other matters before the WTO. Eventually this could cost US taxpayers much more than US\$3.147 billion a year.

Within Latin America, as the United States have been disengaging from the region since 9/11, Brazil has stepped into the role of regional power with less brio than American policymakers would probably like. Brazil mounted a robust, arguably priggish, campaign to restore Manuel Zelaya to office after a bloodless coup toppled the Honduran President in 2009. Yet on other matters, notably the rise of authoritarianism among governments allied with Hugo Chávez, and Chávez's attempt to start an arms race in South America, Brazil has looked the other way (while leading the region in military spending). Brazil's haphazard leadership in Latin American affairs has denied the US a strong partner to help stabilize the region, leaving it open to greater influence from the likes of Venezuela and Iran.

Turkey has proven a thorn of equal prick. Taken for granted as an "indefectible partner", in the words of Diogo Noivo, Turkey's support on NATO policy is no longer a given. In 2009, Turkey held up the selection of former Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen until the Obama administration, along



with Rasmussen, gave unspecified pledges to Turkey. Since then, critics have started to dismiss NATO as “an institution hobbled from within” because of Turkey.

Meanwhile, Turkey’s orientation toward the Middle East appears to be drifting away from Israel and more moderate Arab governments, like Egypt and Jordan, and toward the region’s more noxious residents, Iran and Syria. Some pundits, such as Soner Cagaptay, interpret this as a sign of Ankara’s new “Islamist worldview”. Certain evidence fuels this outlook, such as the sevenfold increase in Turkey’s exports to the Middle East and North Africa from 2001-2008. If accurate, this diagnosis would resound across the grand chessboard of Eurasian geopolitics.

Despite dire predictions, there is plenty of solace in the ‘soft balancing’ approach now practiced in Ankara and Brasília. This tactic has led each government to cultivate new allies and show more spikes in dealing with old ones. The important question is soft balancing to what end? In most every case, Brazil and Turkey’s quarrels with the West are not signs of a concerted effort to sap the West or undermine the Western order. Rather, their foreign policies are best seen as constructive critiques designed to show their importance in world affairs, and thereby hasten their full membership to the Western club. Brazil, above all, wants a permanent seat in an expanded UN Security Council. Turkey wants admission to the European Union (EU). The United States and EU should expend some energy to accommodate them.

In an idealistic sense, this should be done because Brazil and Turkey are Western. Of course, they are not culturally Western. But, more importantly, they represent “the triumph of the Western idea” that Francis Fukuyama feted two decades ago – clear, if imperfect, democracies with vibrant market economies. On a practical level, if the two are not incorporated into the West they are likely to grow frustrated and turn

away. Said US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, if Turkey is indeed moving eastward, it is “in no small part because it was pushed, and pushed by some in Europe refusing to give Turkey the kind of organic link to the West that Turkey sought”.

Discord is often instructive. Instead of brazen defiance, Brazil and Turkey have vented their gripes using Western institutions and norms, and expanded their influence through trade and diplomacy. The key to keeping each country in the West’s orbit, instead of having them work against it, is to vest them with the responsibility and respect befitting their stature. Because when rising powers go from venting their frustration through Western outlets to working around them, the West is in trouble indeed.

Timor Leste’s crippling coalition: Politics as usual?

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On September 8th, Timor Leste was once again faced with a political crisis, when Vice Prime Minister Mário Carrascalão resigned, underscoring the frailty of the ruling government and showcasing the current obstacles to the country’s development.

Indeed, one could have expected as much since the formation of the current coalition in 2007. Back then, newly elected President José Ramos-Horta, seeking to begin a new chapter in Timorese politics, opted to invite the National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction (CNRT), headed by

José Alexandre ‘Xanana’ Gusmão, to form government with four other smaller parties. The objective was to neutralize former Prime Minister Marí Alkatiri’s FRETILIN, who had won that year’s parliamentary election but whose previous rule had significantly contributed to the country’s daunting situation. FRETILIN was thus considered a party no longer fit to continue at the helm of the country.

In that order, Xanana Gusmão organized the Parliamentary Majority Alliance (AMP) with the support of his own CNRT, the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the Democratic Party (PD) and the Timorese Social Democratic Association (ASDT). From the start, the risk of self-implosion was notorious as it was a cabinet mainly constituted with the purpose of keeping their direct adversary at bay, without any political affinities or agenda in common.

Still, against many soothsayers, Xanana Gusmão’s coalition proved more resilient than many would have expected. The recent resignation of Carrascalão, however, has brought this political arrangement under new fire.

Appointed in January 2009 as both Deputy Vice Prime Minister and Co-ordinator for State Administration, Carrascalão – the last Indonesian-era governor of Timor Leste and a leading voice within the PSD – was assigned oversight over government procurement, with the aim of fighting fledgling corruption inside the public administration. But apparently – if one is to believe his stinging resignation letter – his recommendations were never followed through. In August, reports began to surface of serious disagreements with the Prime Minister and in the beginning of September, government spokesman Ágio Pereira declared that Carrascalão’s initiatives had “made no advancements in identifying, discovering or uncovering any corrupt activities” and often constrained service delivery. Afterwards, Xanana Gusmão also publicly insulted him by calling him “stupid and a liar”, which



was then considered the final straw. After news broke out, concerns quickly grew regarding the future of the coalition and the country's political stability. Indeed, among the ruling parties, the PSD is currently taking the most heat, as its president, current Foreign Minister Zacarias da Costa has apparently not been on speaking terms with Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão since April. Even Justice Minister Lúcia Lobato - another PSD appointee - is under considerable pressure to resign due to allegations of conflict of interest. In this context, it is no surprise that many-feared Carrascalão's resignation would be the final tipping point, with the PSD walking out from the AMP agreement.

Probably seeing an opening for his own return, opposition leader Marí Alkatiri was quick to pronounce this latest episode as another token of Xanana's incompetence in ruling the country. Although he fell short from

asking for an opportunity to form government, he declared his intention to seek the advancement of the 2012 elections to 2011, thus hoping to benefit from the current political uncertainty and capitalize on his own party's efforts.

Trying to defuse the situation, President Ramos-Horta promptly classified it as mere individual problem that should not lead to early elections. He did, however, advise Xanana Gusmão to reshuffle his cabinet, a suggestion that he does not appear too keen on following. As for the PSD, it has demanded a "set of conditions" to be accepted by the Prime Minister in order to stay in government, thus setting itself in an undisputedly favourable bargaining position to advance its own agenda or finally tear down the coalition.

Ultimately, the 'anaesthetic' effect of the 2006 unrest and the 2008 assassination attempts on both Ramos-Horta and Xanana Gusmão

are still present among local players, and therefore it is only expectable that every political force will try to overcome this latest obstacle. This does not mean that early elections are an impossible scenario, but for now the coalition is more likely to stand on its own, especially considering that the alternative lies with a FRETILIN solution. This said, Timor Leste's ruling class should be aware of the concerned international focus on these developments as the patience of foreign donors and the United Nations grows increasingly thin when confronted with political actors apparently unwilling to work together for their country. For the sake of much needed stability and development, a coherent and effective government is imperative in order for Timor Leste to face the numerous challenges ahead.



The political economic problem behind Mozambique's riots

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In early September of this year, the announcement that the government was raising the prices of a few commodities spouted riots in Maputo and the nearby city of Matola. While the proximate cause of the riots was the increase in prices, especially that of bread, the crisis highlights deeper problems within the Mozambican economic and political system. Though the riots that hit Maputo this year have frequently been compared to those that occurred in 2008 in response to a global food production crisis and other price increases in Mozambique, the idea that a similar crisis is ongoing and led to the recent riots is incorrect. Mozambique does indeed find it difficult to feed its own people, but at the root of this are broader domestic development failures and import dependency, the true causes of the riots. The problems of the food system in Mozambique provide a lens through which we can interrogate Mozambique's development model and how it may be made more sustainable and impactful for all Mozambicans.

Food and fighting

The first week of September saw chaos in Maputo and other parts of Mozambique as thousands took to the streets to protest the government's announcement of increases in the prices of electricity, water, and, most importantly, an increase in the price of bread of approximately 30%. The protests quickly turned to riots in Maputo and Matola, with streets barricaded, shops looted, and tires and cars burned. Police were overwhelmed by the riots, and after running out of rubber bullets, began using live ammunition against rioters, killing at least 13 people and injuring hundreds more. Hundreds of people were arrested and it emerged in the aftermath that the protests-turned-riots had been organized through an anonymous text messaging (SMS) campaign.

In the aftermath of the riots, the government initially and stubbornly stated that it would not be cowed by disorder in the streets and that the price increases would go ahead as planned. Government spokesman and Deputy Justice Minister Alberto Nkutumula declared: "the price

increase is irreversible. Prices will only fall if all of us work hard". However, as domestic unrest continued and the international community condemned the government's use of force, it was announced that the price increase for bread would be completely reversed and those for water and electricity would be reduced. Additionally, the prices of rice and sugar were reduced and a number of government austerity measures were announced to try to make up the financial gap caused by rescinding the price increases.

Pundits and policy makers alike were quick to blame the international food system and a Russian wheat export ban as the causes of the riots. Olivier de Schutter, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food said ominously that "the crowds' anger in Mozambique and other countries was predictable. We know where the food system is failing. We know which measures should be taken. But lack of political will and a lost sense of urgency have unacceptably delayed decisive action". With a rise in global wheat prices and general uncertainty in commodities markets, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) called a special session of grain experts for September 24th to discuss the situation and Abdolreza Abbassian, an economist with the FAO, warned that "people still remember what happened a few years ago, so it is a combination of psychology and the expectation that worse may come. There are critical months ahead".

Yet for all the concern that the riots in Mozambique are the harbinger of a new international food crisis, like the one in 2008 that saw riots in countries across the globe and brought down the government of Haiti, more sober voices have pointed out that the situation today is very different from the crisis of two years ago. Food prices remain about 30% lower today, the market is better able to cope with shocks like the loss of this year's Russian wheat crop through diversification of suppliers, and there has not been a coincident rise in other commodity prices, most importantly the price of oil. The speculation after this year's Mozambique riots that a new food crisis might be upon us may have been the spark of such a



crisis, as food prices spiked in the aftermath of the riots. However, as Maximo Torero of the International Food Policy Research Institute put it, “apparent similarities between today’s rising wheat prices and the food-price crisis of 2007-2008 are just that: apparent, not real. Suggestions to the contrary serve to drive up prices and hurt poor people, who spend much or most of their incomes on food”.

The riots’ true causes

What was initially overlooked in commentary on the riots was that the Mozambican government was increasing prices not only for food, but also for water and electricity, with prices for each slated to rise more than 10%. While food is an extremely important concern in a country where, according to the FAO, over half of those in poverty suffer from acute malnutrition, it is but one measure of how expensive it is becoming to live and survive in Mozambique. Alice Mabota of the Mozambican League for Human Rights painted the riots in a broader context, stating that “the government... can’t understand or doesn’t want to understand that this is a protest against the higher cost of living”. Yet the domestic economic situation in Mozambique is itself a product of broader macroeconomic factors.

While the government of Mozambique joined the chorus singling out global wheat prices as the causes of its own price increases, the true culprit was the weakening of the national currency, the metical. Mozambique is highly import-dependent, with most of its food coming through South Africa. As the South African rand has strengthened this year, costs of living have risen sharply in Mozambique, exacerbated as well by prices that had been kept artificially low by the government prior to the 2009 elections. The metical has fallen by 21% against the rand since January, and by 47% over that past year, so the purchasing power of both the government and individual consumers has fallen sharply.

Mozambique has been widely hailed as a success story of post-conflict reconstruction, with consistently high economic growth rates in the 2000s as it has recovered from three decades of civil war. Growth has averaged 8% per year since full peace arrived in 1994, but fell to 5% in 2009 as the effects of the global economic recession hit the country, and the country remains stuck at the bottom of the UN Human Development Index, currently in the 172nd spot. Unemployment also remains high, at an official rate of 21%, though the UN suggests that the

unemployment rate in Maputo may be as high as 60%. A UN Development Programme report in 2007 found that the benefits of Mozambique’s economic growth have accrued primarily to the richest fifth of the population, which accounts for most of the expansion in income and consumption. Meanwhile the poorest quintile only accounts for 10% of this growth.

The sectors in which economic growth has occurred are also very uneven. Extractive industries have seen the greatest growth, with large investments and production expansion in the coal and oil sectors and the construction of the massive Mozal aluminium smelter. Agricultural production, though, has only returned to pre-war levels. Essentially, Mozambique is producing food at 1970s

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levels for a population that has grown by approximately 10 million people over the last 35 years. About 80% of the population remains dependent on agriculture for work and subsistence, and agriculture accounts for over one quarter of Mozambique’s gross domestic product (GDP), but the agricultural sector remains severely underdeveloped. In spite of the country’s vast area, less than 10% of Mozambique’s potentially cultivable lands are in use at any time. Hundreds of thousands of people depend

on international food aid to survive, their numbers expanding whenever a natural disaster strikes or when a price shock affects the international market, as occurred in 2008.

The expansion that has been taking place in Mozambique’s agricultural sector has not contributed to the amelioration of this problem. In 2009, mirroring the worldwide trend, the Mozambican government announced a policy to devote up to 20% of arable land to the cultivation of bio-fuels. Though the government noted that these policies would not force any subsistence farmers to leave their land, the use of land for energy production largely benefitting the West when Mozambique’s own people suffer from food insecurity was irresponsible to say the least. UK-based Sun Biofuels has been cultivating thousands of hectares of jatropha in Mozambique, and in 2009 it was announced that Brazil would invest US\$6 billion in the production of sugar cane ethanol in Mozambique, with much of the final product destined for Brazil.

The structural problems in the agricultural sector and the food system are symptomatic of deeper issues in the political economy of development in Mozambique. Mozambique has been a darling of the aid community since the end of the civil war, and it is frequently trumpeted as a success story thanks to the country’s transition from

the destruction of war to consistent economic growth over a relatively short period of time. However, as this piece has already argued, “economic growth” is not actually a good metric for development in Mozambique, as the growth has been uneven, unequal, and has occurred largely in environmentally unsustainable extractive industries. While there has been some poverty reduction, the majority of Mozambicans have been unable to reap the benefits of economic expansion and remain dependent on subsistence agriculture and international aid to survive. Similarly, the Mozambican government would collapse were it not for foreign aid. Over half of the government budget is currently paid for by aid, and aid remains responsible for about 15% of Mozambique’s GDP. According to OECD figures, Mozambique is the eighth most aid-dependent country in the world.

Mozambique’s ruling Frelimo party developed close ties to the aid-generous Nordic countries when it was a rebel group fighting against Portugal, and it maintained these ties after independence. The government has also historically met the targets determined for it by the Bretton Woods institutions and other donors, keeping aid flows open. However, this acceptance of donor impositions has long been questioned by those who feel Mozambique achieved independence and defeated a Rhodesian and South African-backed insurgency only to sacrifice its sovereignty to development agencies and banks.¹

This year, Mozambique’s main foreign donors, the so-called ‘G19’ group of donor countries and banks, announced a halt in budget increases in response to what they saw as electoral irregularities and the Frelimo government’s failure to meet targets aimed at combating corruption and inefficiency. In the past this might have been cause for greater concern in Mozambique, but the government now has alternative sources of revenue in the form of income from mineral extraction and increased investment by countries like Brazil, India, and China, who are generally less concerned about governance and human rights in their investment decisions.

New investments are also not aimed at sectors that will provide direct benefits to Mozambique’s poor. Even if national revenues increase due to increased tax revenue, and even if this money is used for poverty reduction, the Mozambican people will remain disempowered, lacking control over the means of production and having a government beholden to foreign corporate interests. The huge Mozal aluminium smelter project, for instance, only created about 1.500 jobs, with one third of these held by foreigners. This pattern is likely to hold in the expanding coal and oil industries as well. Expansion in agriculture is geared toward industrial-scale farming, especially of non-food crops. Thus the poorest Mozambicans will remain dependent for survival on the government, which in turn will remain dependent on foreign backers. And

without growth in domestic food production capacity, Mozambique will remain at the mercy of global food price fluctuations.

Frelimo’s original program, beyond the overthrow of the Portuguese colonial regime, called for the empowerment of peasants through the modernization of agricultural production. However, this goal was derailed by the civil war against Renamo and, under pressure from international donors and the domestic food crisis, the government’s socialist modernization program was abandoned in the 1980s. Mozambique instead became integrated into the international capitalist system. Though the government has maintained

an active role in economic management, Mozambique has essentially been transformed into an import-export market economy. The agricultural sector has demonstrated this transformation through its increased production of commodity crops like cashews for export and now biofuel crops, rather than the production of food for the population.

Preventing starvation and promoting development

Given Mozambique’s great surplus of uncultivated agricultural land and the fact that the great majority of the population already ‘works’ in the agricultural sector, development and poverty reduction should logically make use of these resources. As in the case of the Mozal smelter, industrial development projects have not brought significant job creation and transfer of technical expertise remains limited. Mozambique possesses vast

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¹ See David N. Plank, “Aid, Debt, and the End of Sovereignty: Mozambique and Its Donors” (*Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 3 September 1993): 407-430.



quantities of untapped agricultural expertise; what it lacks is capital investment in agriculture that makes use of this resource. Expansion of agricultural production should take place with food security in mind, paying special attention to the need for a mix of drought- and flood-resistant crops to combat the constantly lurking threats of natural disasters and climate change.

Mozambican President Armando Guebuza has in the past highlighted the need for increased rural development, and has proposed the creation of a rural development bank to provide increased credit to small-holding farmers, but these initiatives were not welcomed by major donors. Due to its heavy dependence on foreign aid, the government was unable to launch such an initiative on its own. In May of this year, the Aga Khan Foundation inaugurated the First MicroBank Mozambique in Pemba, aimed at providing rural microfinance; Guebuza was in attendance and provided a strong endorsement. Further initiatives like those of the Aga Khan Foundation are needed in order to build local entrepreneurship in Mozambique and shift the development paradigm.

Mozambique today is a disempowered participant in the global economy, stuck between donors who wish to impose their own structural requirements and investors who provide capital and development designed for their own benefit. The overall underdevelopment of Mozambique's agricultural sector and continued

investment in biofuel and cash crops rather than staples has saddled the country with a food dependency that leaves the population at risk of starvation in the face of currency and price fluctuations. Rural agricultural development can lift the rural population out of poverty and reduce Mozambique's dependence on foreign aid and investment, all the while improving food security.

Achieving sustainable agricultural development will be difficult without foreign aid, but the government should be increasingly assertive in its pursuit of this specific goal, and should work more closely with organizations like the Aga Khan Foundation that are willing to support it.

The early September riots were not food riots. They occurred in response to general price increases that would have drastically raised the cost of living for the poorest and most vulnerable Mozambicans. These price increases in turn have their roots in Mozambique's position in the international economic system. To prevent further instability, Mozambique's government must ensure that economic growth and integration into the global economy do not bypass or come at the expense of the Mozambican

people. As Diamantino Nhampossa of the *União Nacional de Camponeses* (National Peasants Union of Mozambique) told Raj Patel of the *Observer*, "these protests are going to end. But they will always come back. This is the gift that the development model we are following has to offer".

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Timeline of Events

Angola

3 September (Luanda):

After a four-year hiatus, the government announced it would seek to launch an offshore oil exploration bid in 2011. According to Deputy Oil Minister Aníbal Silva, recent oil exploration success in Brazil, notably in the pre-salt, further motivated this move.

3 September (Luanda):

Head of the Presidency's Civil House and State Minister Carlos Feijó stated that the government would reform the country's tax system. The government's goal is to improve collection, effectiveness, and increase revenues, as well as shield the budget against oil price fluctuations. Also, he announced some US\$13 billion, financed by an oil-fund, would be spent on improving the country's electricity production - mainly by revamping dams - and its power grid by 2016.

4-9 September (Luanda):

Guinea-Bissau's Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen. António Indjai met with his Angolan counterpart, Gen. Francisco Pereira Furtado, as well as with Defense Minister Cândido Pereira Van-Dúnem. Narco-trafficking and the situation of Gen. Zamora Induta were high on the agenda.

6 September (Luanda):

Brazilian ambassador to Angola Ana Lucy Petersen stated that Brazil is seeking to identify new areas of cooperation with Angola within the framework of the recently signed Strategic Partnership. The two countries already have some 30 Cooperation Agreements signed.

8 September (Luanda):

Ruling MPLA party spokesman Rui Falcão said his party expected inflation to drop to single digits in 2011 for the time in the country's history. This year inflation is averaging 13%.

9 September (Luanda):

Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen. Francisco Pereira Furtado announced that Angola would send officials to Guinea-Bissau in order to assess the ongoing SSR process and identify Guinea-Bissau's most pressing needs.

9-13 September (Luanda):

Prime Minister of Guinea-Bissau Carlos Gomes Júnior met with Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos, seeking support in the

economic area and in Security Sector Reform. José Eduardo dos Santos highlighted the need to identify cooperation areas beyond SSR. Furthermore, a new Technical and Military Assistance Protocol between the two countries was signed between Defense ministers Cândido Pereira Van-Dúnem and Aristides Ocante da Silva.

15 September (Brussels):

The EU, under the new European External Action Service, designated Spaniard Javier Puyol Pinuela as the Union's representative in Luanda.

17-18 September (Maputo):

Defense Minister Cândido Pereira Van-Dúnem traveled to Mozambique, where he met his counterpart Filipe Nhussi to sign a cooperation protocol in the defense sector, which covers areas such as military instruction institutions, military legislation and civilian-military relations.

20 September (Luanda):

President of the D. R. Congo Joseph Kabila paid an official visit of a few hours to Angola. Kabila was received by Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos, and both agreed to work towards identifying new cooperation areas between the two countries. The security situation in the Great Lakes region was also debated.

21 September (New York):

Angolan Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs George Chicoty participated in the UN's 65th General Assembly, where he stated that Angola could assist Somalia in training military personnel within African Union efforts to stabilize the country.

22 September (New York):

Angolan Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs George Chicoty declared that Angola would support Portugal's bid for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council for 2011-2012.

22 September (Luanda):

President José Eduardo dos Santos met briefly with Prime Minister of São Tomé and Príncipe Patrice Trovoada, seeking to assess the current state of bilateral and regional cooperation. Trovoada declared he expected to see Angolan companies - and not only Sonangol - involved in oil exploration in STP.

23 September (Lisbon):

Angola's national oil company Sonangol increased its participation in the biggest Portuguese private bank, Millennium BCP, surpassing a 10% share.

23 September (New York):

AU President Jean Ping met Angolan Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs George Chicoty, to whom he praised Angola's role in supporting stabilization efforts in Guinea-Bissau.

23 September (Maputo):

Minister for Planning Ana Dias Lourenço revealed Luanda's plan to pardon half of Mozambique's estimated US\$72 million debt to Angola.

23 September (Shanghai):

Angolan ambassador to China João Manuel Bernardo stated that the Chinese government's credit to his country currently stands at US\$6 billion.

23 September (Washington):

Oil Minister João Botelho de Vasconcelos confirmed that Angola is pumping 1.9 million barrels per day, above OPEC's quota, placing the country as Africa's second producer behind Nigeria.

24 September (Washington):

The IMF approved the disbursement of a US\$353 million share from the US\$1.3 billion loan after reviewing government accounts and measures to reduce the non-oil budget deficit after debt payments. The Fund welcomed Angolan plans to establish a sovereign wealth fund.

24 September (Bissau):

Angola's military technical mission, planned to last two weeks and intended to assess the ongoing SSR process and identify Guinea-Bissau's reform needs, was forced to return to Luanda a week early, after Rear-Admiral Bubo Na Tchuto - officially only a Defense Ministry Counselor - invited the mission to leave the country. Angolan officials considered the gesture an offense but the political power remained committed to supporting Guinea-Bissau.

25-28 September (Shanghai):

Vice President Fernando Dias dos Santos 'Nandó' traveled to China to preside over Angola's day at the World Expo, where he took the chance to invite Chinese businessmen to



invest in Angola. 'Nandó' was also received by Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping. The Angolan dignitary praised China's cooperation with his country and said it should be expanded.

27 September (Luanda):

Roberto Leal Monteiro, Interior Minister since 2006, was abruptly fired when it became known he authorized the capture of Portuguese businessman Jorge Oliveira in late 2009 by Angolan agents without the consent of local authorities. Oliveira had escaped to São Tomé and Príncipe to avoid paying some debts to Angolan firms.

27 September (Washington):

In a letter addressed to the IMF, Finance Minister Carlos Alberto Lopes explained the Fund's ongoing reforms in the public sector and declared that the Angolan economy will grow by 5% or 6% this year, behind the 9,7% growth predicted earlier this year.

30 September – 1 October (Abuja):

National Assembly Speaker Paulo Kassoma represented Angola during Nigeria's 50th independence anniversary celebrations.

Brazil

1 September (Brasília):

On his first trip abroad, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos met with his Brazilian counterpart Luíz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva. Bilateral relations, trade, the integration process in South America and cooperation on matters of defense and security were high on the agenda.

7 September (Brasília):

Defense Minister Nelson Jobim announced that President Lula da Silva would only decide on the jet fighter program winner after the October elections.

8 September (Brasília):

Lesotho's Foreign Minister Mhlabi Kenneth Tsekoa met with his Brazilian counterpart and other dignitaries, aiming to sign a cooperation framework agreement between the two countries in the fields of health, agriculture and poverty reduction.

9 September (Brasília):

Congo's Foreign Minister Basile Ikouébé met with his Brazilian counterpart, Celso Amorim, seeking to advance technical and environmental cooperation between the two countries.

10 September (Lisbon):

Defense Minister Nelson Jobim met with his Portuguese counterpart Augusto Santos Silva. Bilateral cooperation and the possibility of Portuguese participation in the construction of the Brazilian KC-390 transport aircraft were high on the agenda.

11-13 September (Geneva):

Foreign Minister Celso Amorim attended the 8th International Conference of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), as a guest speaker and met with WTO Director Pascal Lamy to discuss perspectives for the Doha Round. Amorim also met with United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Navanethem Pillay to discuss the institutional reform of the Human Rights Council, with the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross Jakob Kellenberger and with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres - with whom he signed a Memorandum of Understanding between Brazil and UNHCR on the provision of humanitarian aid.

14 September (Brasília):

Kenya's Foreign Minister Moses Wetangula met with his Brazilian counterpart Celso Amorim as a follow-up to President Lula da Silva's recent trip to Kenya. Agriculture, education and cooperation on biofuels were high on the agenda.

14 September (Brasília):

EU Trade Commissioner Karel de Gucht met with Foreign Minister Celso Amorim and Foreign Trade, Industry and Development Minister Miguel Jorge. Negotiations between the EU and MERCOSUL regarding a trade agreement were high on the agenda. After the meetings, Gucht expressed his conviction that such agreements would be achieved, at the latest, by 2011.

15 September (Brasília):

Tanzania's Foreign Minister Bernard Kamillius Membe met with his Brazilian counterpart Celso Amorim as a follow-up to President Lula da Silva's latest visit to the country. Bilateral cooperation on biofuels and the ongoing investments of Brazilian Petrobras in Tanzania were among the topics discussed.

17-19 September (Havana):

Foreign Minister Celso Amorim visited Cuba, where he met with several dignitaries, including President Raúl Castro. Bilateral cooperation and regional integration issues were high on the agenda.

20-29 September (New York):

Foreign Minister Celso Amorim attended the 65th UN General Assembly. Amorim also took this opportunity to participate in other

meetings regarding the reconstruction of Haiti, worldwide disarmament, the Alliance of Civilizations, Sudan and counter-terrorism. Furthermore, Amorim met with several ministerial counterparts, namely from BRIC, IBSA, G4 and Arab countries.

23 September (Brasília):

Brazilian state oil company Petrobras raised US\$70 billion, giving the company the financial resources to fund one of the largest oil exploration plans, estimated at US\$224 billion for the 2010-2014 period.

29-30 September (Port-au-Prince):

Foreign Minister Celso Amorim met with Haitian President René Préval, Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive, Foreign Minister Marie-Michèle Rey and with Special Representative of the UN Secretary General and Commander of the UN Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) Gen. Luiz Guilherme Paul Cruz. The reconstruction process and Brazil's contribution to the country and to the UN mission were high on the agenda.

Cape Verde

1 September (São Tomé):

Cape Verdean Prime Minister José Maria Neves met briefly with his counterpart from São Tomé and Príncipe Patrice Trovoada. Improved ties between the two countries were among the topics discussed.

2 September (Brussels):

The European Commission announced that Cape Verde was among the beneficiaries of the Flex Vulnerability (V-Flex) mechanism, aimed at some countries in the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) block. The funds to Cape Verde will amount to a total of €9 million in 2010.

8 September (Vatican City):

Cape Verdean Prime Minister José Maria Neves met with Pope Benedict XVI. Bilateral relations and the creation of a bilateral working commission to elaborate a framework agreement between the Holy See and Cape Verde were high on the agenda.

9 September (Praia):

Cape Verdean telecommunications company Cabo Verde Telecom - 40% of which is controlled by Portugal Telecom - announced an investment plan of €30 million to improve the quality of telecommunications, specifically Internet access, throughout the archipelago.

**13 September (Praia):**

Assistant Secretary of State to the Prime Minister Humberto Brito announced that the Cape Verdean government had asked the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) for €408 million to fund the Community Development program (PDC). The project would cover the areas of human development, integration, and development of facilities for production, transport and communications.

18 September (Abuja):

Cape Verdean President Pedro Pires attended the ECOWAS extraordinary summit on Guinea-Bissau, seeking to provide a regional framework for the country's security problems. Possible deployments of troops to Guinea-Bissau as members of a stabilization force or further investments in an SSR program were high on the agenda.

18-24 September (New York):

Prime Minister José Maria Neves - accompanied by Foreign Minister José Brito - attended the 65th UN General Assembly and the High-Level Meeting on the Millennium Development Goals, where he announced that Cape Verde was on track to fulfill its objectives by 2015.

21 September (New York):

Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Mauritania and Senegal agreed to delineate their maritime boundaries. Norway's Environment and International Development Minister, Erik Solheim oversaw the agreement.

27 September (Praia):

According to Finance Minister, Cristina Duarte, Cape Verde's economy is already showing signs of recovery, with an estimated gross domestic product (GDP) growth of around 6% for 2010.

28 September (Praia):

Head of Mission to Cape Verde for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Valerie Cerra praised the local government's "prudence", noting that the main challenge was the "efficient" execution of the public investment program. The IMF, according to Cerra, is likely to approve the Cape Verdean public policy program at its board meeting in November.

Guinea-Bissau

1 September (Bissau):

Following a Bissau-Guinean government request, Chinese ambassador to Guinea-Bissau Yan Ban Gua delivered US\$1.2 million worth in constructions goods to the country's Armed Forces.

2 September (Brussels):

The European Commission announced that Guinea-Bissau was among the beneficiaries of the Flex Vulnerability (V-Flex) mechanism and that it would thus receive €8.5 million in 2010.

4-9 September (Luanda):

Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen. António Indjai visited Angola, where he met his counterpart Gen. Francisco Pereira Furtado, as well as local Defense Minister Cândido Pereira Van-Dúnem. Indjai focused his cooperation appeals on countering narco-trafficking and illegal immigration. Publicly, the official denied the military's responsibility in requesting a stabilization force, blaming it on the civilian authorities. Indjai also stated that his predecessor, Gen. Zamora Induta, remained under custody due to the charges linking him to drug trafficking, and that he would be judged by civilian courts.

7 September (Luanda):

Gen. António Indjai stated that Guinea-Bissau depended on Angola's assistance for the SSR program and to promote permanent stability. He pointed out the particular situation of his country's war veterans, which needed to be treated with greater dignity.

9 September (Luanda):

After Gen. António Indjai's visit, Angola's Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen. Francisco Pereira Furtado disclosed that Angola would send military and police officials to Guinea-Bissau to evaluate his country's involvement in the SSR process and identify Guinea-Bissau's needs.

9-13 September (Luanda):

Following Gen. António Indjai's footsteps, Prime Minister of Guinea-Bissau Carlos Gomes Júnior paid an official visit to Angola. His efforts were mainly focused on gathering support in the economic area and for the Security Sector Reform. Guinea-Bissau's approach to Angola is in tandem with Luanda's effort in leading the international community's efforts to stabilize the country.

10 September (Luanda):

Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos publicly stated that his country would support Guinea-Bissau in its efforts to achieve stability. In particular, he identified the Bissau-Guinean Armed Forces as being the recipient of

necessary cooperation, so that they become a stable influence instead of a source of trouble. José Eduardo dos Santos said Angola's actions would be framed within CPLP decisions.

10 September (Luanda):

A new Technical and Military Assistance Protocol was signed between Defense ministers, Cândido Pereira Van-Dúnem and Aristides Ocante da Silva. Van-Dúnem highlighted his country's support for the SSR process in Guinea-Bissau, which would continue to focus on military downsizing through demobilization and reintegration, as well as re-equipment.

14 September (Lisbon):

Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to Guinea-Bissau Joseph Mutaboba met Portuguese Foreign Affairs Minister Luís Amado to discuss Guinea-Bissau's stabilization process. Mutaboba's visit is framed in a European 10-day tour intended to inform and gather support from major EU capitals about the UN's efforts in the country.

14-16 September (Conakry):

Guinea-Bissau's Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen. António Indjai visited Guinea-Conakry, in a moment when Guinea-Bissau's neighbor in facing growing tensions ahead of the presidential elections.

15 September (Bissau):

The Bissau-Guinean National Assembly met to discuss the possible contours of a foreign stabilization mission. The *Partido da Renovação Social*, the main opposition party, as well as the Guinean Democratic Movement, the Worker's Party and the Republican Party for Independence and Development rebuffed the idea, leaving the government party – the PAIGC – isolated.

15 September (Brussels):

Under the new European External Action Service, the EU designated Spaniard Joaquin Gonzalez-Ducay as Union representative in Bissau.

15 September (Bissau):

Under an agreement signed with the World Bank to reform the energy and water supply sectors in Guinea-Bissau, the government announced it would shut down the public company which supplied these services – *Empresa de Electricidade e Água da Guiné-Bissau* – and open up the sector to private investors. The World Bank will supply US\$12 million to support needed investments.

16 September (Lisbon):

Portuguese Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation João Gomes Cravinho stated that the instability in Guinea-Bissau is "dreadful for the Bissau-Guinean population"



and a “danger to other countries”, recognizing the need for a stabilization mission.

17 September (Abuja):

In an extraordinary Head of State and Government meeting, ECOWAS discussed the possibility of sending a stabilization force to Guinea-Bissau focused on supporting the Security Sector Reform. The main goal of the mission would be to cut 1.500 ranks from the Bissau-Guinean military – currently 4.500 strong – 1.000 of which are aged over 51 years or older. ECOWAS will need to gather US\$70 million to carry the mission. Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan cautioned that the country could relapse “into a state of anarchy” and should not “bear the burden [of reform] alone”.

17-29 September (Bissau):

An IMF mission visited Bissau to assess the Extended Credit Facility program – which lent some US\$34 million to the country last May – and the Highly Indebted Poor Country initiative (HIPC). The Fund expects to conclude the HIPC initiative by the end of the year, but Guinea-Bissau maintains a US\$1.5 billion debt.

18 September (Conakry):

Following his stay in Abuja, President Malam Bacai Sanhá paid a stopover visit to Conakry, where he met his counterpart General Sekouba Konaté. The two dignitaries discussed the security situation in West Africa, as well as each country’s security issues. Sanhá also tried to mediate the local presidential election standoff by meeting with the two candidates, Cellou Dalein Diallo and Alpha Condé.

19 September (Bissau):

President Malam Bacai Sanhá stated that despite being inconclusive, the meeting of ECOWAS was positive.

19-23 September (Beijing/ Shanghai):

Accepting the Chinese Communist Party’s invitation, Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior visited China, where he met Chinese Vice-President Xi Jinping. The two discussed ways to deepen Chinese cooperation with Guinea-Bissau. Carlos Gomes also visited his country’s pavilion at the Shanghai Expo.

21 September (Brussels):

Following his visit to Lisbon, Special Representative to Guinea-Bissau for the UN Secretary-General Joseph Mutaboba traveled to Brussels to meet EU officials. Mutaboba stated he felt much more confident about Guinea-Bissau’s future than a few months ago.

22 September (Bissau):

President Malam Bacai Sanhá addressed the nation on the occasion of the country’s 37th anniversary of the declaration of independence – which is celebrated on September 24th.

Sanhá highlighted the government’s positive economic management achievements, while encouraging it to pursue the needed reforms in the public finances and benefit from the assistance of IMF.

23 September (New York):

At the margins of the UN’s 65th General Assembly, Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim stated that isolating the country could not solve the situation in Guinea-Bissau. Instead, the international community must remain focused on assisting Guinea-Bissau, particularly by reforming its military.

23 September (New York):

AU President Jean Ping met Angolan Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs George Chicoty and praised Angola’s role in supporting stabilization efforts in Guinea-Bissau.

23-24 September (Addis Abeba):

The Special Representative of the African Union to Guinea-Bissau, Sebastião Isata, met AU Commissioner for Peace and Security Ramtane Lamamra to discuss the need for the AU to create a permanent structure in Guinea-Bissau. Isata also met the EU Representative, Ambassador Koen Vervaeke, with whom Isata defended the need for the EU to return to Bissau after closing down its SSR mission there.

24 September (New York):

Angolan Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs George Chicoty informed the International Contact Group on Guinea-Bissau that Angola would contribute with US\$30 million to support stabilization efforts in that country.

24 September (New York):

At the end of the 7th meeting of the International Contact Group on Guinea-Bissau, Foreign Affairs Minister Adelino Mano Queta declared that ECOWAS would play the leading role in the future stabilization mission to the country, abiding to the request made by President Malam Bacai Sanhá to the Community. Sanhá asked for an SSR support mission without a military component.

24 September (New York):

Guinea-Bissau’s Foreign Affairs Minister Adelino Mano Queta rejected international pressures to release former Armed Forces Chief of Staff Zamora Induta, who remains under custody without trial.

24 September (New York):

Representative of the UN Secretary General to Guinea-Bissau Joseph Mutaboba stated that the decision to establish a stabilization mission was purely a Bissau-Guinean one that should be respected and supported.

24 September (Bissau):

Guinea-Bissau celebrated its 37th declaration of independence anniversary without any of its chief political and military leaders in the country. While some of these leaders searched for international support for internal reforms, rumors were spreading in Bissau that one of the leaders in the April 1st coup, Bubo Na Tchuto, was close to re-assuming the Navy command post, supported by Gen. António Indjai.

24 September (Bissau):

Angola’s military technical mission, planned to last two weeks and intended to assess the ongoing SSR process and identify Guinea-Bissau’s reform needs was forced to return to Luanda a week early after Rear-Admiral Bubo Na Tchuto – officially only a Defense Ministry Counselor – invited the mission to leave the country.

25 September (New York):

President Malam Bacai Sanhá participated in the UN’s 65th General Assembly. Sanhá met UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon as well as the International Contact Group on Guinea-Bissau. In his speech to the General Assembly, Sanhá declared that Guinea-Bissau required sustained international support.

27 September (Brussels):

Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior met José Manuel Durão Barroso. The President of the European Commission highlighted the importance of the possible stabilization mission in Guinea-Bissau, and talks were held on the possible re-engagement of the EU in the country. Gomes Júnior explained the future mission would involve ECOWAS and the CPLP.

29 September (Bissau):

Upon leaving the country after completing its mission, IMF delegation chief Paulo Drummond declared that the Fund expects – if political and security conditions remains fairly stable – the country to grow 3.5% in 2010 and 4.3% in 2011.

Mozambique

1 September (Maputo):

Violent protests erupted in the Mozambican capital after a 50% rise in fuel, food and electricity prices, with particular impact on lower classes. The protests quickly turned into full-scale rioting.

1-5 September (Hanoi):

Prime Minister Aires Ali, leading a cabinet delegation, met with his local counterpart



Nguyen Tan Dung. Ali also met with officials from the Ho Chi Min and Binh Phouc provinces, seeking further cooperation in agricultural issues between the two countries.

2 September (Maputo):

President Armando Guebuza held an emergency cabinet meeting to analyze recent turmoil in the country. Spokesperson and Deputy Justice Minister Alberto Nkutumula later declared that the price hikes in the country are "irreversible" despite the violent protests.

7 September (Maputo):

Planning and Development Minister Aiuba Cuereneia announced that the Mozambican government would reverse a bread price increase and would restore some subsidies for electricity and water. This decision came a week after riots in the capital, in which 13 people were killed.

16 September (New York):

The UN released a report entitled, "The Global Partnership for Development in a Time of Crisis" which places Mozambique in 11th place amongst the biggest beneficiaries of international aid in 2008, with a total of US\$1.994 billion.

23 September (Maputo):

At the opening of the eighth session of the Joint Commission on Bilateral Cooperation, Angolan Planning Minister, Ana Dias Lourenço, reaffirmed that Luanda would write off half of the US\$60 million debt owed by Mozambique.

28 September (New York):

Foreign Minister Oldemiro Balói represented Mozambique at the 65th UN General Assembly. During his address, Balói focused on the need to reform the international organization, including the revitalization of the General Assembly itself.

29 September – 4 October (New Delhi):

President Armando Guebuza visited India, seeking to boost bilateral cooperation and promote a favorable business environment between the two countries. Guebuza met with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, President Pratibha Patil and several other dignitaries, with whom he signed agreements regarding the avoidance of double taxation, mineral resources, micro, small and medium businesses as well as a new credit line of US\$500 million for infrastructure projects, agriculture and energy. According to the Indian Prime Minister, both countries are to create a partnership based on four pillars: "greater political engagement, deepening economic cooperation, strengthening defense and security cooperation and cooperation in capacity-building and human resource development".

Portugal

1 September (Podgorica):

Secretary of State for European Affairs Pedro Lourtie met with Montenegro's Minister for Foreign Affairs Milan Rocen and Minister for European Affairs Gordana Djurovic, in order to assess the current EU bid and express Portugal's support to the integration process.

1-2 September (Tripoli):

Prime Minister José Sócrates, accompanied by Foreign Minister Luís Amado, attended the 5+5 Meeting of Mediterranean countries and later took part in the celebrations of the 41st anniversary of the Libyan revolution.

2 September (Tirana):

Secretary of State for European Affairs Pedro Lourtie met with Albania's Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Edith Harxhi. EU-Balkans relations and Portugal's support to further integration in the region were high on the agenda.

6 September (Lisbon):

Pakistan's Minister for Foreign Affairs Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi met with his Portuguese counterpart Luís Amado. Bilateral relations, EU-Pakistan relations, the situation in Afghanistan as well as the economic and financial crisis and climate change were high on the agenda. Amado also took the opportunity to reaffirm Portugal's solidarity with the victims of the floods that recently struck Pakistan.

7-9 September (Lisbon):

The Grand Dukes of Luxembourg, at the helm of a business delegation, paid a state visit to Portugal. Amongst several cultural events, the Duke met with President Aníbal Cavaco Silva, Prime Minister José Sócrates and Speaker of Parliament Jaime Gama. Foreign Minister Luís Amado also took this opportunity to meet with Luxembourg's Vice Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn, as well as with Economy and Foreign Trade Minister Jeannot Krecke, with whom he signed an agreement on double taxation exemptions between the two countries.

10 September (Lisbon):

Defense Minister Augusto Santos Silva met with his Brazilian counterpart Nelson Jobim. Bilateral cooperation and the possibility of Portuguese participation in the construction of the Brazilian KC-390 transport aircraft were high on the agenda.

10-11 September (Brussels):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado attended the Informal Meeting of EU Foreign Ministers (Gymnich), designed to prepare the upcoming summit of EU leaders.

13 September (Lisbon):

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation João Gomes Cravinho met with his Indonesian counterpart Vice Foreign Minister Triyono Wibowo. Bilateral cooperation and the possible inclusion of Timor Leste in a trilateral framework were high on the agenda.

15 September (Lisbon):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado met with Representative of the UN Secretary-General to Guinea-Bissau Joseph Mutaboba. International efforts to stabilize the country were high on the agenda.

16 September (Brussels):

Prime Minister José Sócrates, accompanied by Foreign Minister Luís Amado, attended the European Council. Although the objective was to discuss the EU's stance in the world, the Roma expatriations by the French government caught every country's attention.

19-26 September (New York):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado attended the 65th UN General Assembly. He also participated in several high-level meetings regarding Pakistan, the Alliance of Civilizations, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization, the Conference on Disarmament and the International Contact Group for Guinea-Bissau. Amado also took the opportunity to meet with his counterparts from CPLP, the Ibero-American Conference, EU, NATO, US and Russia, among many others.

23-24 September (Brussels):

Defense Minister Augusto Santos Silva attended the Formal Gathering of EU Defense Ministers, where the current projection capability of the organization's civil and armed forces were discussed.

24 September (Vienna):

Portugal was elected for a two-year term as a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors.

25-26 September (New York):

Prime Minister José Sócrates attended the 65th UN General Assembly, where he took the opportunity to meet with several world dignitaries. The main topic was Portugal's candidacy to the UN Security Council.

**29 September (Vienna):**

Secretary of State for European Affairs Pedro Lourtie met with his Austrian counterpart Johannes Kyrle and Secretary of State for Finance Andreas Schieder. Bilateral relations, European integration issues, EU enlargement, the Balkans and the EEAS, were high on the agenda.

30 September (Bratislava):

Secretary of State for European Affairs Pedro Lourtie met with his Slovakian counterpart Milan Jezovica and Secretary of State for Finance Vladimir Tvaroska. Bilateral relations, European integration issues, EU enlargement, European economic government and the EEAS, were among the issues discussed.

30 September (Lisbon):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado met with his counterpart from São Tomé and Príncipe Manuel Salvador dos Ramos. Bilateral cooperation on international issues such as the global economic crisis were high on the agenda.

30 September (Lisbon):

Foreign Minister for the Democratic Republic of Congo Alexis Thambwe Mwamba met with his Portuguese counterpart Luís Amado. Bilateral relations, EU-DRC cooperation and regional integration issues were among the topics discussed.

São Tomé and Príncipe

1 September (São Tomé):

Prime Minister of Cape Verde José Maria Neves met with his São Tomé and Príncipe counterpart Patrice Trovoada. Bilateral ties, were high on the agenda.

9 September (São Tomé):

Spokesman for the Council of Ministers Abenildo de Oliveira announced that the government of São Tomé and Príncipe would extend the deadline for bidding on seven blocks for oil prospecting in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) by two months.

9-10 September (Libreville):

Newly-elected Prime Minister Patrice Trovoada paid his first official visit abroad – accompanied by his new Foreign Minister, Manuel Salvador dos Ramos – to neighboring Gabon, in a clear

sign of his intended foreign policy orientations. Trovoada met with President Ali Bongo, with the deepening of bilateral economic and trade relations high on the agenda.

15 September (Abuja):

Prime Minister Patrice Trovoada traveled to Nigeria where he met with local authorities, aiming to boost the process of joint oil exploration between both countries, as decided by a 2001 treaty that established the Joint Development Authority (JDA).

19 September (São Tomé):

According to UNICEF coordinator for education in São Tomé and Príncipe Ruth Leal, the country may achieve three of the Millennium Development Goals, specifically universal primary education, the reduction of infant mortality and improved maternal health.

12 September (São Tomé):

Prime Minister Patrice Trovoada stated that he wanted Angolan oil companies – Sonangol or other – to participate in the public tender for oil exploration in his country.

22 September (Luanda):

Prime Minister Patrice Trovoada met with Angolan President, José Eduardo dos Santos. During this brief visit, bilateral and regional cooperation was high on the agenda of both officials.

27 September (New York):

Foreign Minister Manuel Salvador dos Ramos represented São Tomé and Príncipe at the 65th UN General Assembly, where he defended multilateralism as vital in seeking solutions based on the UN Charter.

30 September (Lisbon):

Foreign Minister Manuel Salvador dos Ramos met with his Portuguese counterpart, Luís Amado, seeking to enhance bilateral ties between the two countries.

Timor Leste

7-9 September (Kerala):

President José Ramos-Horta visited the Indian state of Kerala, where he met with Governor R. S. Gawai and with Chief Minister V. S. Achuthanandan. Horta also later attended the international conference on "Global Warming, Climate Change, Sustainable Development and Secular Spirituality".

8 September (Díli):

Prime Minister José Alexandre 'Xanana' Gusmão congratulated newly elected Australian counterpart Julia Gillard on her recent win.

8 September (Díli):

Vice Prime Minister Mário Carrascalão resigned from his position after accusing Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão of calling him a "liar" and an "idiot" as well as not taking into consideration his recommendations for further reforms to curb ongoing corruption inside Timor Leste's state structures. The ruling coalition is now considered at risk.

15 September (Díli):

Setting aside previous rumors, Spokesperson for the Council of Ministers Ágio Pereira announced that Timor Leste would only negotiate the Australian plan for a regional refugee-processing center under the framework of the Bali Process. Pereira also played down recent reports that the Southern coastal town of Suai has already been chosen to host such a center.

20 September (Díli):

According to Minister for Economy and Development João Gonçalves, Timor Leste plans to launch an international public tender for the concession of new oil blocks in the Timor sea, in its exclusive zone.

22 September (Sydney):

Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão met with his Australian counterpart Julia Gillard in order to discuss the proposed refugee processing hub in Timor Leste. Both parts agreed on a follow-up visit by Immigration Minister Chris Bowen to discuss the plan with local authorities.

24 September (New York):

President José Ramos-Horta and Foreign Minister Zacarias da Costa represented Timor Leste at the 65th UN General Assembly. Costa also took the opportunity to meet with his Australian and Indonesian counterparts, Kevin Rudd and Marty Natalegawa, to discuss plans for an asylum-seeker processing center in Timor. Afterwards, he declared that Timor had no desire to become a mere transit point for boat people picked up in Australian waters.

28 September – 5 October (Lisbon):

President José Ramos-Horta visited Portugal, seeking to enhance bilateral cooperation and attract new investment flows to his country. Ramos-Horta held meetings with his counterpart President Aníbal Cavaco Silva, Prime Minister José Sócrates, Speaker of Parliament Jaime Gama and Executive Secretary for the CPLP Domingos Simões Pereira.



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