



## Portugal and the recognition of the National Transitional Council of Libya

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On July 28<sup>th</sup>, the Portuguese government recognized the National Transitional Council (NTC) “as the legitimate governing authority of Libya until the formation of a transitional authority”. The NTC had been informed on July 25<sup>th</sup> of the forthcoming decision. Portugal became the 14<sup>th</sup> member state of the European Union (EU) to recognize the NTC as the legitimate Libyan governing authority. According to the press statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Portugal’s position recognizes the role that the National Transitional Council plays in the leadership of the transition process in Libya and reflects the best balance of Portugal’s interests, whose foreign policy should take into account the future relationship with Libya”. The position taken by the Portuguese diplomacy coincides with the final statement of the fourth meeting of the

Contact Group to Libya, which took place in Istanbul. On July 15<sup>th</sup>, the Contact Group participants agreed to deal with the NTC as the “legitimate governing authority” in Libya. Since the second meeting of the Contact Group, in Rome, on May 10<sup>th</sup>, Portugal participated in the summits as an observer. (Portugal was not invited, nor did it invite itself, to the first meeting in Doha, on April 13<sup>th</sup>.) At the time, then Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Luís Amado preferred the observer status, given that since March, in the exercise of its mandate as United Nations Security Council (UNSC) non-permanent member, Portugal chaired the Libya Sanctions Committee. The same concern with a certain level of equidistance also contributed to the Portuguese decision not to participate in the military operations in Libya.

Given the notorious disagreements between the EU member states, since the Libyan crisis erupted on February 15<sup>th</sup>, Portugal has consistently sought to align its diplomatic position with the lowest common European denominator. Earlier on, the Portuguese government considered the NTC to be a “political interlocutor”, as it was referred in the declaration of the Extraordinary European Council of March 11<sup>th</sup>, at a time when France had already recognized the NTC “as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people”. Like France in March, in April

Italy also recognized the NTC “as the country’s only legitimate interlocutor on bilateral relations”. However, the majority of the EU member states, including Portugal, maintained a more cautious position regarding the NTC. The European countries did not know what the NTC was, or what it wanted. After all, if there were doubts as to its representativeness and legitimacy, then common sense advised political caution. Moreover, in March and April, the fall of Muammar Gaddafi’s authoritarian regime was far from certain. Meanwhile, political contacts between EU member states and the NTC were intensified and doubts regarding its representativeness and legitimacy started to fade away. As a result, on May 22<sup>nd</sup> the EU opened its diplomatic mission in Benghazi.

As far as Portugal was concerned, on June 1<sup>st</sup> Luís Amado received NTC emissary Abdel Rahman Shalgham in Lisbon. (Shalgham is a former Foreign Minister of Libya between 2000 and 2009, and was then the Permanent Representative at the UNSC, first under Muammar Gaddafi’s authoritarian regime, and nowadays appointed by the NTC.) By now, despite the ups and downs, the wind of political change was unavoidable. NATO, France and the United Kingdom crossed their point of no return and, as a consequence sooner or later Gaddafi would have to step down. However, since Por-



tugal had an interim Prime Minister – José Sócrates resigned on March 23<sup>rd</sup> – Foreign Minister Luís Amado thought that, under normal circumstances, the NTC recognition as the legitimate representative of Libya should be made by the next government. Still, following previous contacts with representatives of the NTC and in response to their invitation, on June 15<sup>th</sup> a diplomatic mission was sent to Benghazi, led by Bernardo Futscher Pereira, and also integrating head of the MFA Middle East and Maghreb Services Directorate João Neves da Costa.

Although there was no urgent need to recognize the NTC as the legitimate representative of Libya, Foreign Minister Luís Amado had to take into account not only the military campaign on the ground, but also the position taken by other EU member states, in particular those like Portugal with more political interest in the Mediterranean and the Maghreb. In the last decade, and in particular since 2005 with Prime Minister José Sócrates, the Maghreb increasingly became the fourth pillar of the Portuguese foreign policy. More recently, the upgrade in the bilateral relations was quite visible, with frequent state visits at the highest level, back and forth between Lisbon, Rabat, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli. Thus, *realpolitik* dictated that Portugal had to safeguard “the future relationship with Libya”. In other words, the Portuguese government had to maintain political and diplomatic relations with whomever prevailed in Libya. By then, it was quite clear that Gaddafi had no chance at all of maintaining political power, even though his demise could take some time and be quite messy.

As it was mentioned above, in March and April Paris and Rome recognized the NTC “as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people”. In the following weeks, Malta joined France and Italy, and – more importantly from the point of view of Portuguese diplomacy – so did Spain on June 8<sup>th</sup>. As always, Portuguese foreign policy

pays particular attention to the diplomatic positions taken by Madrid. In the case of the Maghreb in general, and Libya in particular, it is in the interest of Portugal to respond to any diplomatic decision that might confer an advantage to Spain. Thus, as a consequence, the Portuguese government had to take, when the moment was ripe, the same position as the Spanish government. Having done so on July 28<sup>th</sup>, current Foreign Minister Paulo Portas should go one step further and as soon as the circumstances allow it, announce that Portugal will open a diplomatic representation in Benghazi. Moreover, as did Franco Frattini and Trinidad Jimenez, Foreign Ministers of Italy and Spain respectively, in the forthcoming weeks Foreign Minister Paulo Portas should also visit Benghazi.

## Biofuels, agricultural development, and food security in Mozambique

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In late July, Mozambique saw its first export shipment of biofuel, unrefined oil from jatropha seeds produced by British enterprise Sun Biofuels in the central province of Manica and pressed and filtered nearby in Sofala. The jatropha oil was shipped to Germany, where it will be refined by the airline Lufthansa for use in a pilot program testing the viability of using a blend of biofuel and kerosene as a jet fuel. Questions remain

about the environmental impacts of jatropha cultivation and production, as well as the social and ethical impacts of growing non-edible crops in a country such as Mozambique that frequently experiences food insecurity. Jatropha oil has the potential to bring economic benefits to rural Mozambique, as well as contributing globally to a reduction in dependence on fossil fuels, but any expansion of jatropha production in Mozambique must be undertaken carefully and responsibly.

Until recently, jatropha, which originated in Central and South America but has now spread throughout the tropics, was considered a worthless plant and hardly attracted any study by botanists and agronomists. It is poisonous, and until the past decade, was used mostly by farmers as hedges and windbreaks. As the fight against global warming picked up intensity in the early 2000s, the search for biofuel feedstocks landed on jatropha, which yields about 40% oil from its seeds. Jatropha yields are still very uncertain due to the lag in research, but by some estimates, jatropha has the cheapest cost per barrel for refined biofuel of any of the major biofuel feedstocks at US\$43, beating out sugar cane, corn, and soybeans.

Driven by the promise of cheap alternative fuel, jatropha plantations have begun popping up worldwide, in countries such as India, Burma, and now Mozambique. In response to general criticisms of biofuels for diverting cropland and resources from food production and being grown on cleared forest land that was formerly a carbon sink, advocates of jatropha point out that the plant is poisonous, so its employment in biofuel production is dissimilar to the input of corn and soybeans, which divert staple crops away from food use, and that the hardy jatropha plant can be grown on wasteland and degraded agricultural land. For these reasons, jatropha will likely see increasing interest in the coming years, as the European Commission in July approved



a set of sustainability schemes for biofuel production that mandate increased environmental efficiency over fossil fuels and proscribe biofuel production on converted rainforest or grasslands as the European Union seeks to sustainably meet its renewable energy usage goals.

Among the few scientific studies available, much of the evidence does suggest that jatropha can be grown and biofuel produced in a manner with socioenvironmental impacts than conventional fossil fuels. This is contingent, however, on jatropha being grown on land that was not previously used for food production and the use of waste biomass from jatropha seed pressing for electricity generation or fertilizer. There is also the question of water use. A recent study found that jatropha is the most water-intensive biofuel feedstock crop, which belies the touting of jatropha's ability to grow in desert and drought conditions. This is a potential problem in Mozambique, where mean annual rainfall has decreased since 1960, with continued decreases projected for the central region where Manica and Sofala are located. Sun Biofuels has tried to present itself as a responsible corporate citizen in Mozambique, and it has created jobs and undertaken community development initiatives such as school construction. As it plans to expand production capacity from the current 3.000 hectares to a target of 11.000 hectares, however, Sun's plans begin to look less sustainable. Despite most of jatropha's environmental benefits coming from the ability of the plant to grow on land that would otherwise be agriculturally unproductive, Sun has announced that until it acquires the further 8.000 hectares itself, it would seek to encourage smallholding peasant farmers to cultivate jatropha. With about 80% of Mozambicans engaged in subsistence farming, jatropha would be directly substituted for food crops. Sérgio Gouveia, Sun's manager for corporate affairs in Mozambique, has suggested that this would not be an

issue, as farmers could use the income the company paid them for jatropha to purchase food.

Given the instability of world food markets, which led to price increases in Mozambique last year and contributed to the deadly riots that gripped the country, the idea that subsistence farmers should trade cultivation of their own food for reliance on imported food seems very irresponsible. Unless Mozambique develops domestic food production capacity in tandem with biofuel production capacity, the growth of production of jatropha or any other biofuel feedstock could have damaging implications for food security.

Jatropha has the potential to aid in the fight against climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions in comparison to fossil fuels and other biofuel feedstocks such as palm oil. If cultivated on wastelands and degraded agricultural land in areas with significant rainfall, jatropha can be produced without putting undue stress on food security or water supplies. In its rush to attract foreign investment, the government of Mozambique must ensure that it does not overlook these issues and should act to ensure that any new biofuel endeavors are undertaken in an environmentally and socially sustainable manner. Sun Biofuels as well must be cautious not to leap beyond its corporate social responsibility bounds in its efforts to expand. Economic development in Mozambique must not come at the expense of its citizens.



# The EU and Guinea-Bissau: always one step behind?

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Suggesting that the European Union's (EU) ongoing commitment towards the stability and security of Guinea-Bissau is not quite in tune with other international initiatives may appear at first overly dismissive of its efforts on the ground for the past few years. Indeed, one need not look much further than to the resources and manpower allocated to the late SSR mission in Guinea Bissau,<sup>1</sup> for example, to quickly be confronted with the pinnacle of a manifested pattern of interest in the normalization of this country's internal situation. A minimum of coordination between every invested foreign actor, which supported such efforts, is therefore reasonably to be expected. However, a careful observation of the EU's response to the developments in Guinea-Bissau since April 2010, and most importantly the apparent lack of coordination with other third parties, seem to suggest otherwise.

Naturally, in order to demonstrate such an argument, one must take into consideration the various public manifestations and official positions adopted by the European institutions during the timeframe in question. Perhaps more interestingly, they will also have to be cross-referenced with similar efforts by other international suitors deeply involved in Guinea-Bissau's fate, particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations (UN). Such an exercise will draw some considerations regarding the EU's influence and role amid the multiple external actions undertaken in order to bring a sense of institutional support to Guinea-Bissau's wavering ruling structures.

## The EU's approach

As one would expect, the daunting events of April 1<sup>st</sup> 2010 received widespread condemnation from several world leaders and multilateral organizations.<sup>2</sup> Speaking

for the EU, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Baroness Catherine Ashton immediately denounced "in the strongest terms the measures taken in Guinea-Bissau by some elements of the armed forces" as they constituted "an unacceptable breach of the constitutional order".<sup>3</sup> Three months later, as the coup's perpetrators appeared to consolidate their gains within the Bissau-Guinean military structures, Ashton again expressed her concerns that the situation "may constitute a violation of the engagements of the Guinea-Bissau with respect to human rights, democracy and rule of law, essential elements within the Cotonou Agreement, calling for a review of the overall engagement of the European Union in Guinea-Bissau".<sup>4</sup> However, these words of warning failed to resonate among the local leadership and it soon became clear that the EU's options to press for improvements on the ground were fading away.

For all purposes, a certain leverage was still included in the threat of suspending the then-ongoing SSR mission, but that possibility quickly lost its impact as the mission was already due to end its mandate in September 2010. What's more, the mission's overall purpose of reforming Guinea-Bissau's military sector was also directly opposed to the objectives of coup leaders António Indjai and Bubo Na Tchuto: maintaining their hold over the country's security apparatus. The choice was therefore evidently a lose-lose situation in every possible scenario: if the EU decided to approve a follow-up mission or even extend the mandate of the one on the ground, it would send a clear sign that the internal situation was apparently under control and that the events of April 1<sup>st</sup> had in no way affected its initial reforming agenda – something which obviously is not true. On the other hand, if it chose not to do so, and although such a move would naturally indicate a disapproval of recent developments, the EU

1 For more on EU SSR Guinea-Bissau, see Miguel Girão de Sousa, "The Challenges and Constraints of Security Sector Reform in Guinea Bissau: A View from the Field" (*Portuguese Journal of International Affairs*, No. 2, August/Winter 2009), pp. 15-25; and Michela Telatin, "Questioning the EU SSR in Guinea-Bissau" (*Portuguese Journal of International Affairs*, No. 2, August/Winter 2009), pp. 27-35.

2 For an overview of the events on April 1<sup>st</sup> 2010, see Paulo Gorjão, "Guinea-Bissau: The Inescapable Feeling of Déjà-Vu" (*IPRIS Policy Brief*, No 2, April 2010).

3 European Union, "Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on Guinea Bissau" [A 47/10, 1 April 2010].

4 European Union, "Statement by the Spokesperson of High Representative Catherine Ashton on Guinea Bissau" [A 125/10, 5 July 2010].



would also inevitably bow down to the ultimate agenda of the instigators of local instability, who sought nothing less than to hold back any reforming process that might affect their privileges and national sway.

At the end of the day, the EU eventually opted for the latter. Indeed, “[a]lthough the mission has achieved significant results, political instability and the lack of respect for the rule of law in the country make it impossible for the EU to deploy a follow-up mission, as originally foreseen, without compromising its own principles”.<sup>5</sup>

The only remaining card to play was to threaten to initiate an overall review of bilateral relations, with the inherent possibility of suspending development aid. That much was again implicit in Ashton’s reaction to the appointment of Bubo Na Tchuto as Naval Chief on October 8<sup>th</sup>: “[t]his decision constitutes a further setback to good governance in Guinea Bissau, shows a further militarization of politics in the country, and could entail negative consequences in the country’s relationship with the EU as it engages in a review of its overall engagement with Guinea Bissau”.<sup>6</sup>

However, much like in July, words proved hard to turn into deeds as months went by without further developments in the EU’s position towards Guinea-Bissau. Only on December 20<sup>th</sup> did European Commissioner for Development Andris Piebalgs finally propose to the 27 member states the opening of consultations under the Cotonou Agreement, given the “concern about the situation in Guinea-Bissau in terms of respect for democratic principles and the rule of law”.<sup>7</sup> Subsequently, on January 31<sup>st</sup> 2011, the EU finally initiated this process, seeking “a constructive dialogue” that could enable “Guinea-Bissau authorities to take necessary measures to remedy the situation, in particular actions to end impunity, strengthen civil authority, improve stability and reinvigorate the reform of the security sector”.<sup>8</sup> But most importantly, in a letter addressed to Guinean President Malam Bacai Sanhá and Prime Minister Carlo Gomes Júnior, both Ashton and Piebalgs clearly stated that “[p]ending the outcome of these consultations, the Commission [would] take precautionary measures in respect of development cooperation operations under way in Guinea-Bissau”.<sup>9</sup> In other words, part of the €110

million allocated through the European Development Fund (EDF) to the country for the 2007-2013 timeframe – most notably in the field of budget support and security sector reform programs – were to be suspended until further notice.

The EU’s complete 180° was clear. After months of hesitancy and tactfulness in addressing the volatile situation on the ground, the EU suddenly embarked on a tough approach towards Guinea-Bissau, using the ultimate final measure at its disposal: the actual suspension of development aid.<sup>10</sup> But Bissau-Guinean authorities were not exactly idle either and by the time of the opening meeting for consultations on March 29<sup>th</sup>, the EU had already “noted the swift response and the positive spirit demonstrated by the representatives of the Government of Guinea-Bissau”.<sup>11</sup> As such, it did not really come as a surprise when news broke on July 18<sup>th</sup> that the EU had decided to conclude consultations with Guinea-Bissau, thus opening the way for a “gradual reengagement (...) in line with concrete progress made by our Bissau-Guinean partners on their commitments”.<sup>12</sup> The lift of the suspension on development cooperation was also foreseen upon the adoption by local authorities of a series of reforms included in a structured roadmap.<sup>13</sup>

### Cross-matching reactions

At a first glance, the chronological exposition presented above would have been viewed as nothing more than standard institutional approach by a responsible/active member of the international community. The problem is, when compared to similar interventions by other actors, divergences in terms of coordinated responses are easily discernible.

The IMF’s understanding of Guinea-Bissau’s internal *status quo* in 2010, for example, is particularly interesting. In truth, this organization’s *modus operandi* is more directly dictated by a country’s immediate economic outlook. Nevertheless, local political stability also comprises a frequently crucial factor for the kind of assistance programs that it so often prescribes to beleaguered countries around the world. Still, in this case, IMF offi-

5 Council of the European Union, “The EU SSR Guinea-Bissau Mission Completes its Mandate” (1274/10, 2 August 2010). See also Farouk Chotia, “EU pull-out hits Guinea-Bissau reforms” (*BBC News*, 4 August 2010).

6 European Union, “Statement by the Spokesperson of High Representative Catherine Ashton on the appointment of Admiral Bubo Na Tchuto” (A 201/10, 8 October 2010).

7 European Commission, “Guinea-Bissau: Commission proposes opening of consultations because of failure to respect democratic principles” (IP/10/1752, 20 December 2010).

8 Council of the European Union, “EU opens consultations with Guinea-Bissau” (5750/11, 31 January 2011).

9 Council of the European Union “Opening of consultations with Guinea-Bissau under Article 96 of the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement – Letter to the authorities of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau” (5477/11, 20 January 2011).

10 This outcome would have certainly been more severe, were it not for the lobbying of countries like Portugal who managed to prevent individual sanctions over both Indjai and Na Tchuto. See “Guiné Bissau: UE decide adiar sanções contra responsáveis guineenses depois de intervenção de Luís Amado” (*Lusa*, 31 January 2011).

11 Council of the European Union, “Opening of consultations with the ACP side on Guinea-Bissau under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement – European Union Conclusions” (8405/11, 29 March 2011).

12 European Commission, “European Union sets out roadmap for the gradual resumption of development cooperation with Guinea-Bissau” (IP/11/896, 18 July 2011).

13 See Council of the European Union, “Council decision concerning the conclusion of consultations with the Republic of Guinea-Bissau under Article 96 of the partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part” (12515/11, 13 July 2011).

cialists appeared mostly oblivious to developments on the ground as first evidenced by the findings of a staff mission to Bissau on April 15-18<sup>th</sup> – right in the midst of the attempted coup fallout – , simply stating that “[t]he recent pronouncement by the President [Malam Bacai Sanhá] reiterating his determination to preserve the democratic institutions and to move the country toward greater stability bodes well for the future”.<sup>14</sup>

Moreover, despite consistent signs of tension on the ground, the IMF continued to exhibit a notorious confidence in Guinea-Bissau’s capability to pull through and continue down a path of steady economic growth. For example, on May 7<sup>th</sup> the IMF approved a package of US\$33.3 million under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) together with an additional US\$1.5 million through the Interim Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) assistance – even though it cited that “[p]olitical stability, effective governance, and strong commitment to reform are essential to the success of the program and the full engagement of donors”.<sup>15</sup> But perhaps more significantly, on December 16<sup>th</sup> the IMF and the World Bank jointly announced a US\$1.2 billion in debt relief to Guinea-Bissau, arguing that the country had succeed in several policy actions/“triggers”, including “demobilizing former combatants”. In the words of Habib Fetini, the World Bank’s Country Director for Guinea-Bissau, “[t]here is great momentum of hope and we urge the authorities and the people of Guinea-Bissau to protect it and use it for further progress in terms of political stability and the rule of law, and break the vicious circle of economic and social degradation, political instability, and institutional destruction”.<sup>16</sup>

Some context is probably in order at this point: such an authentic leap of faith by the IMF and the World Bank – both demonstrating an impressive level of confidence in Guinea-Bissau, specially given that international calls for the release of former Army Chief of Staff Zamora Induta were still ongoing in mid-December – occurred only four days before EU Commissioner Piebalgs first proposed the opening of consultations between the EU and Guinea-Bissau along with the most likely suspension

of millions in European development aid. A quick look on such discrepancies in each organization’s strategy for the handling of Guinea-Bissau, thus allows for an odd comparison, to say the least.

However, this is not the sole case as the same disconnection can be found when bringing the UN’s role into the equation of supposedly generalized multilateral coordinated efforts. Much like the remaining international community, the UN also swiftly condemned the events of April 1<sup>st</sup> while calling for “military and political leadership of Guinea-Bissau to resolve differences by peaceful means and to maintain constitutional order and ensure respect for the rule of law”.<sup>17</sup> Through the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) and the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Guinea Bissau Joseph Mutaboba, the UN was in a privileged position to interact with national authorities and coordinate with other international partners. To that end, a series of official reports presented to the UN Security Council (UNSC) consistently presented a crude but realistic view of the evolution of the country’s latest predicaments.

Among these, one in particular – dating back to February 15<sup>th</sup> 2011 – is quite useful for the argument here at hand. Although acknowledging some persistent concerns and structural flaws, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon states that “[d]uring the reporting period, the political leadership of Guinea-Bissau and major Government institutions made significant efforts to improve the political and security environment, as well as the country’s relationship with regional and international partners. (...) I am encouraged by the noticeable progress that Guinea-Bissau has made to reverse the negative effects of the civil-military events that took place on April 1<sup>st</sup> 2010 (...) [and] take note of the recent efforts to improve the security environment in Guinea-Bissau, especially those of the civilian leadership of the country, to assert its control over defense and security institutions”.<sup>18</sup>

Once again, the main issue worth mentioning here regards the timing of these developments. Indeed, just two weeks after the EU formally announced the beginning of consultations with Guinea-Bissau, the UN came out and publicly recognized the significant improvements in the country’s political scenario. The implicit contradiction between the reasoning behind each organization’s approach is clear: from the EU’s point of view, the local situation had finally reached a point worthy of debating the Article 96 process; but from the UN’s perspective, Guinea-Bissau had already undertaken important steps – albeit clearly not yet enough – for the gradual return to a normalized internal context.

14 International Monetary Fund, “IMF Concludes Staff Visit to Guinea-Bissau” (Press Release No. 10/158, 19 April 2010).

15 International Monetary Fund, “IMF Executive Board Approves US\$33.3 Million Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility and Additional US\$1.5 Million in Interim HIPC Assistance for Guinea-Bissau” (Press Release, No. 10/185, 7 May 2010). Afterwards, in May 2011, the Club of Paris also announced another US\$283 million in debt relief. See Lassana Cassamá, “Clube de Paris’ perdoa dívida da Guiné-Bissau” (VOA News, 12 May 2011).

16 International Monetary Fund, “IMF and World Bank Announce US\$1.2 Billion in Debt Relief for Guinea-Bissau” (Press Release N. 10/498, 16 December 2010). In all fairness, it should be noted that although “Guinea-Bissau faces significant risks, (...) risks to the IMF’s resources are moderate”, specially because “[t]he country’s capacity to repay the IMF is reasonably sound”. See International Monetary Fund, “Guinea-Bissau: Second Review Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility and Financing Assurances Review” (10 May 2011): p. 11.

17 UN Secretary-General, “Statement attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General on Guinea Bissau” (Office of the Spokesperson, 1 April 2010).

18 UN Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in that country” (S/2011/73, 15 February 2011).



Such opposing views reflected their preferred course of action for addressing this issue. It thus came as no surprise that some loosely targeted but extremely subtle criticism towards 'certain external actors' emerged when a follow-up report by the Secretary-General was presented to the UNSC on June 28<sup>th</sup>. For example, Brazilian ambassador Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, as Chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission, pointed out that "international partners should look beyond the setbacks of the past and should support long-term political and economic stability in the country" instead. Furthermore, Angolan Secretary of State for Political Affairs Manuel Domingos Augusto, on behalf of the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP), reminded that it is imperative "that Guinea-Bissau's partners [do] not isolate or alienate the country, but act with understanding to support and participate in this massive effort to rebuild the country and forge unity and national reconciliation".<sup>19</sup> In each case, the EU evidently ranked as the most probable target for such considerations.

### Final considerations

When analyzing the above pattern of international response, it is perfectly clear that the rationale behind the EU's approach to the Bissau-Guinean conundrum was not entirely shared by the other multilateral organizations mentioned here. Moreover, when looking closer, it is possible to immediately identify December 2010 as the starting point for a rather 'autonomous' pattern of interaction between the EU and Guinea-Bissau, in which the latter undeniably assumed a much harsher posture and tone towards the former.

One could rightfully point out that, by that time, most of the EU's hands had already been played. After the end of the SSR mission in the country, the EU's range of options was inherently shortened, and consequently opening consultations under the Cotonou Agreement framework was considered the ultimate measure to adopt and was consistently pushed back in the hope that it would not be required. It could be then speculated that the EU eventually found itself backed into a corner, as its only formal option of dealing with Guinea-Bissau involved proceeding with a review of bilateral relations which necessarily implied 'raising the heat' on the country's authorities.

Be that as it may, an evaluation of the impact of such a decision is very much up in the air. True, after an all-out scramble of Bissau-Guinean authorities to European capitals in early 2011, even Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon recognized "the unity of purpose shown by the State institutions in preparing for the important

consultations in March with the European Union under article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, and the inclusion of civil society and the military leadership in that process".<sup>20</sup> But beyond that, the actual process of consultations appeared from the start to generate a rather expectable outcome, as international calls for greater engagement with Guinea-Bissau instead of greater isolation and increased confidence in the country's political-economic stability already provided glimpses of the 'benefit of the doubt' afforded to Guinea-Bissau at this stage. Indeed, when billions are being pardoned and national progress is being commended, a formal process for the review of bilateral relations along with the suspension of development aid inevitably stands out as the unexplained factor in the equation.

At the heart of this disparity may lie the fact that the EU growingly recognizes that, when it comes to Guinea-Bissau, it "has the capacity to inflict damages but it does not possess the power to change the course of developments".<sup>21</sup> This in turn inevitably leads to occasionally erratic approaches, with either a considerable delay in adjusting to evolving developments or difficulty in adapting to other players' own interactions with Guinea-Bissau. Amid such a context, it is no wonder that open calls by some EU state members for an increased political detachment are given a second thought, as the continent inevitably finds it harder and harder to remain invested in the country's stability and development. As such, the EU would do well to carefully weight the pros and cons of such inconsistency as it appears to have been trailing one step behind the remaining international quorum on Guinea-Bissau in the last few months. Despite the political significance of the recently adopted road-map, the lack of coordination between the EU and other meaningful actors not only harms a supposedly collective effort to support/assist Guinea-Bissau but hampers the continent's own *raison d'être* for its continuing assistance strategy to the country. A careful recalibration of the EU's approach towards Guinea-Bissau is thus in order before further endeavors take place.

20 UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in that country" (S/2011/370, 17 June 2011).

21 Paulo Gorjão, "Guiné-Bissau: o falso dilema europeu" (*li*, 8 February 2011).

19 UN Security Council, "Record of the 6569<sup>th</sup> meeting" (S/PV.6569, 28 June 2011).

Back in February, ambassador Viotti had also expressed her doubts regarding any possible sanctions on Guinean authorities that, at the time, loomed in the EU's horizon. See "'Sanções não são o caminho" no Conselho de Segurança" (*Lusa*, 2 February 2011).



# Timeline of Events

## Angola

### 1 July (Malabo):

Vice-President Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos 'Nandó' attended the 17<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Summit of the African Union.

### 1 July (Luanda):

Former Brazilian President Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva visited Angola to attend the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Center for Strategic Studies.

### 3 July (Malabo):

Vice-President Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos 'Nandó' was received by President of Equatorial Guinea Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, to whom he handed a congratulatory message from President José Eduardo dos Santos on the hosting of the 17<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Summit of the African Union.

### 6 July (Luanda):

National Assembly Speaker Paulo Kassoma received new EU ambassador to Angola Javier Puyol, who stated the EU's intention to intensify cooperation with Luanda, which currently stands at some US\$40 million per year.

### 6-7 July (Algiers):

Oil Minister José Maria Botelho de Vasconcelos traveled to Algeria to reinforce the historic cooperation between both countries, particularly in the oil and gas sector. Angola hopes to learn with Algeria's experience in the liquefied natural gas area.

### 7-10 July (Luanda):

Guinea-Conakry's Budget Minister Diare Mohamed visited Angola and signed a memorandum of understanding on the finance sector.

### 10 July (Luanda):

Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federation Council of Russia Mikhail Margelov was received by President José Eduardo dos Santos and took the opportunity to review bilateral cooperation programs signed during President Dmitry Medvedev's visit to Angola in 2010.

### 12 July (Geneva):

The UN reckons it will need some US\$21 million to assist an estimated 60.000 Angolan refugees returning home from Botswana,

the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Republic of the Congo, Namibia and Zambia.

### 12-13 July (Luanda):

German Chancellor Angela Merkel paid her first visit to Angola. Merkel's visit aimed to boost bilateral relations and diversify trade relations. Germany seems to arrive rather late in this market given the strong presence of Portuguese, Brazilian, Chinese but also Spanish, French and South African firms. This visit came at the invitation of President José Eduardo dos Santos, who visited Germany in 2009.

### 13 July (Luanda):

São Tomé and Príncipe's Foreign Minister Manuel Salvador dos Ramos assessed the current state of bilateral relations and cooperation between the two countries.

### 19 July (Conakry):

Angolan ambassador Brito Sozinho met with President of Guinea-Conakry Alpha Condé, to whom he expressed the solidarity and support of Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos after an assassination attempt.

### 21 July (Luanda):

President José Eduardo dos Santos and Foreign Minister George Chicoty met with Portuguese Foreign Minister Paulo Portas. On the Angolan side, there was a keen and public interest in the privatization processes of several Portuguese public companies.

### 21 July (Luanda):

Foreign Minister George Chicoty met with his Brazilian counterpart Antônio Patriota. The bilateral Strategic Partnership, Brazilian investments in Angola and international coordination over Guinea-Bissau were high on the agenda.

### 22 July (Luanda):

Foreign Minister George Chicoty hosted the 16<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Meeting of the CPLP Council of Ministers. The situation in Guinea-Bissau concerning culture and the international coordination of Portuguese language, Equatorial-Guinea's membership process and the CPLP's stance in the UN were high on the agenda.

### 24-27 July (Luanda):

Ambassador Liberata Mulamula, the Executive Secretary of the regional UN-

backed International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, met with high-ranking Angolan authorities - including President José Eduardo dos Santos, National Assembly Speaker Paulo Kassoma, Foreign Minister George Chicoty and Defense Minister Cândido Pereira Van-Dúnem among others - in order to prepare the next summit of the Inter-Regional Commission for the Great Lakes Region, scheduled for December, in Kampala, Uganda.

## Brazil

### 5 July (Caracas):

Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota represented the Brazilian government during the bicentennial celebrations for Venezuela's Declaration of Independence.

### 8 July (Buenos Aires):

Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota traveled to Argentina where he attended the twenty-year anniversary commemorations of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC).

### 11 July (Port-au-Prince):

Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota traveled to Haiti where he met with the newly appointed head of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the Chilean Mariano Fernández Amunátegui. He also met with Haitian President Michel Martelly and addressed the issue of reducing MINUSTAH military components.

### 12 July (New York):

Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota took part in a UN Security Council meeting on Sudan.

### 14 July (Brasília):

Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota met with his counterpart from Nicaragua Samuel Santos López, seeking to increase bilateral cooperation in a number of areas including in agricultural and environmental projects.

### 15 July (Quito):

Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota traveled to Ecuador where he met with the Minister for





External Relations, Trade and Integration of Ecuador Ricardo Patiño, and with President Rafael Correa Delgado. Among other agreements, a Memorandum of Understanding establishing a Bilateral Political Consultation Mechanism was signed with a view to strengthen dialogue and foster cooperation between Brazil and Ecuador. Patriota also took the opportunity to visit the provisional headquarters of the Secretariat-General of UNASUL, meet with Secretary-General of the Organization María Emma Mejía, and deposit the UNASUL Constitutive Treaty Letter of Ratification.

### **17 July (Itaguaí):**

President Dilma Rousseff, accompanied by Defense Minister Nelson Jobim and French Defense Minister Gerald Longuet, attended the launching ceremony of the construction of the first S-BR Scorpene class submarine under the Brazilian submarine program.

### **17-18 July (Brasília):**

Slovenian Defense Minister Ljubica Jelusic met with her Brazilian counterpart, Nelson Jobim, with the development of bilateral defense and military cooperation high on the agenda.

### **19 July (Brasília):**

Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota met with Syria's Deputy Foreign and Expatriates Minister Fayssal Mikdad to discuss bilateral ties. Patriota took the opportunity to express his country's belief that political dialogue is the best way to solve the ongoing political crisis in Syria.

### **20 July (Bissau):**

Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota traveled to Guinea-Bissau where he met with his counterpart Adelino Mano Queta, acting President Raimundo Pereira and with Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior. Cooperation on education, health, professional training and agriculture, as well as the restructuring of the security and defense areas of Guinea-Bissau, were high on the agenda.

### **21 July (Luanda):**

Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota met with his Angolan counterpart George Chicoty to review the current Strategic Partnership between the two countries as well as economic affairs such as Brazilian investments in Angola, and African political affairs such as the coordination between both countries to support Guinea-Bissau, within CPLP.

### **22 July (Luanda):**

Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota took part in the 16<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Meeting of CPLP's Council of Ministers.

### **23 July (Windhoek):**

Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota met with his counterpart Utoni Daniel Nujoma during a visit to Namibia, with a focus on food security and Brazilian support for the organization of local elections.

### **24 July (Pretoria):**

Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota traveled to South Africa where he met with Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, in order to review cooperation under the current bilateral partnership and within the IBAS and BRICS framework. The upcoming visit by President Dilma Rousseff to South Africa in October was also discussed.

### **25 July (Conakry):**

Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota paid a visit to Guinea-Conakry, where he met with his counterpart Edouard Lama and President Alpha Condé. Bilateral cooperation and the support for the local democratization process were high on the agenda.

### **26-28 July (Brasília):**

Portuguese Foreign Minister Paulo Portas met with his Brazilian counterpart Antônio Patriota. Preparations for the upcoming X Portugal-Brazil Summit and Portugal's privatization plans were high on the agenda.

### **28 July (Lima):**

President Dilma Rousseff attended the inauguration of Peruvian President Ollanta Humala. Afterwards Rousseff also took part in UNASUL's Heads of State and Government Summit.

### **29 July (Brasília):**

Argentinean President Cristina Fernández Kirchner paid a working visit to Brazil where she met with President Dilma Rousseff, to review bilateral cooperation projects between the two countries in a number of areas such as nuclear energy, defense, science and technology and transports, among others.

## Cape Verde

### **1 July (Malabo):**

President Pedro Pires, together with Foreign Minister José Borges, led the Cape Verdean delegation to the 17<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Summit of the African Union, with the situation in Libya unofficially high on the agenda.

### **5-8 July (Praia):**

Timorese President José Ramos-Horta met with Cape Verdean President Pedro Pires and with Prime Minister José Maria Neves. His visit aimed to improve relations between the two Lusophone countries.

### **18-22 July (Luanda):**

Foreign Minister Jorge Borges traveled to Angola to take part in the 16<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Meeting of the CPLP Council of Ministers.

### **20-21 July (Praia):**

Luxembourg's Minister for Cooperation and Humanitarian Action Marie-Josée Jacobs paid a two-day official visit to Cape Verde, where both she and the Cape Verdean authorities signed the Indicative Cooperation Programme (PIC) for the 2011-2014 period, involving a financial package of around €60 million. Jacobs also attended a meeting of the 12<sup>th</sup> Cape Verde-Luxembourg Partnership Commission and signed other bilateral instruments, including the Bilateral Agreement on execution of budgetary aid directed at the professional training sector in the 2011-2015 period and an Air Services Agreement.

## Guinea-Bissau

### **1 July (Malabo):**

President Malam Bacai Sanhá attended the 17<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Summit of the African Union.

### **18 July (Brussels):**

The EU Council adopted a road map to gradually resume development cooperation with Guinea-Bissau while also revising the conditions for full resumption of EU cooperation with Bissau. The decision acknowledges Guinea-Bissau's progress in the implementation of the road map adopted by the EU in July 2009.

### **19 July (Luanda):**

Executive Secretary of the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP) Domingos Simões Pereira praised the support extended by member states to Guinea-Bissau under the Angolan Military and Security Mission (MISSANG). The achievements in Guinea-Bissau were reviewed during the 16<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Meeting of the CPLP Council of Ministers.

**20 July (Bissau):**

Foreign Minister António Patriota traveled to Guinea-Bissau where he met with his counterpart Adelino Mano Queta, acting President Raimundo Pereira and with Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior. Cooperation on education, health, professional training and agriculture, as well as the restructuring of the security and defense areas of Guinea-Bissau was high on the agenda.

**22 July (Luanda):**

Foreign Minister Adelino Mano Queta attended the 16<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Meeting of the CPLP Council of Ministers.

**24-25 July (Bissau):**

A business delegation from the permanent secretariat of the Forum for the Economic Cooperation between China and Portuguese Speaking Countries (which does not include São Tomé and Príncipe) – known as Forum Macau – visited Guinea-Bissau with the goal of strengthening commercial ties with China.

## Mozambique

**1 July (Malabo):**

President Armando Guebuza and Foreign Minister Oldemiro Balói attended the 17<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Summit of the African Union.

**15 July (Maputo):**

The International Finance Corporation (IFC), an organ of the World Bank for financing the private sector, has signed an agreement with Mozambique's Unit for Implementation of the Project to Support Competitiveness (Pacde) to expand access to its training tools to small and medium-sized companies in Mozambique.

**21-22 July (Luanda):**

Foreign Minister Oldemiro Balói traveled to Angola where he met with President José Eduardo dos Santos to review the most pressing issues for the CPLP. Afterwards, Balói attended the 16<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Meeting of the CPLP Council of Ministers.

**21-23 July (Maputo):**

President of Botswana Seretse Khama Ian Khama paid an official visit to Mozambique, where he met with President Armando Guebuza. Both rulers signed a total of ten investment agreements that will give Botswana access to the Indian Ocean –

including a US\$7 billion deep water port in the Techobanine region, a 1.100km railway to link the southern region of Mozambique to Botswana, passing through Zimbabwe, and an oil pipeline between the two countries.

**24-25 July (Maputo):**

Portuguese Foreign Minister Paulo Portas held meetings with Portuguese businessmen in the country and met with his counterpart Oldemiro Balói and President Armando Guebuza. The Mozambican media focused on the non-augmentation of Portuguese credit lines and allegations on late payments under the current ones.

## Portugal

**1 July (Lisbon):**

Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho, along with Foreign Minister Paulo Portas, met with Timorese President José Ramos-Horta, who reaffirmed his country's wish to invest in Portuguese sovereign debt.

**5 July (Lisbon):**

Foreign Minister Paulo Portas met with his Cape Verdean counterpart José Borges to review bilateral relations and express Portugal's support for the deepening of the EU's Special Partnership with Cape Verde.

**8 July (Lisbon):**

Foreign Minister Paulo Portas met with Malta's Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Tonio Borg to review current bilateral relations.

**9 July (Juba):**

Former ambassador and former Foreign Minister, as well as former member of the UN Panel tasked with monitoring the Sudanese referendum António Monteiro, represented Portugal at the ceremonies marking the independence of the Republic of South Sudan.

**12 July (Lisbon):**

European Council's President Herman van Rompuy met with President Aníbal Cavaco Silva and Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho.

**12-13 July (New York):**

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Luís Brites Pereira attended the UN Security Council high-level discussions

organized by Germany, which holds the Security Council's rotating presidency during the month of July.

**15 July (Istanbul):**

Foreign Minister Paulo Portas attended the 4<sup>th</sup> Libya Contact Group meeting.

**21-22 July (Luanda):**

Foreign Minister Paulo Portas traveled to Angola where he met with President José Eduardo dos Santos and Foreign Minister George Chicoty, in order to review bilateral relations. Possible solutions for the visa issue between the two countries, as well as eventual common regional actions were high on the agenda. Portas also took the opportunity to visit the 28<sup>th</sup> edition of the Luanda International Fair (Filda).

**22 July (Luanda):**

Foreign Minister Paulo Portas attended the 16<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Meeting of the CPLP Council of Ministers.

**24-25 July (Maputo):**

Foreign Minister Paulo Portas traveled to Mozambique where he held meetings with Portuguese businessmen in the country and met with his counterpart Oldemiro Balói and President Armando Guebuza. The sale of the Portuguese participation (14%) in the Cahora Bassa dam dominated talks, as well as the progressive erosion of Portuguese credit and commercial lines to Mozambique.

**26-28 July (Brasília):**

Foreign Minister Paulo Portas met with his Brazilian counterpart António Patriota, to review preparations for the upcoming X Portugal-Brazil Summit and to present Portugal's privatization plans.

**28 July (Lima):**

Foreign Minister Paulo Portas attended Peruvian President Ollanta Humala's inauguration.

**28 July (Lisbon):**

Portugal recognized the Libyan National Transitional Council as the legitimate governing authority of Libya until the formation of a transitional authority.



# São Tomé and Príncipe

## 1 July (Malabo):

President Fradique de Menezes attended the 17<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Summit of the African Union.

## 13 July (Luanda):

Foreign Minister Manuel Salvador dos Ramos traveled to Luanda to assess the current state of bilateral relations and cooperation endeavors between the two countries.

## 17 July (São Tomé):

São Tomé and Príncipe held presidential elections. Ten candidates disputed the votes of the São Toméans in order to take over from President Fradique de Menezes.

## 20 July (São Tomé):

São Tomé and Príncipe's National Electoral Committee released the final results from the presidential elections. Former President Manuel Pinto da Costa secured 35.58% and candidate Evaristo Carvalho took 21.74%. A second round will take place on August 7<sup>th</sup>.

## 21 July (São Tomé):

The PCD's former presidential candidate Delfim Neves, placed at 3<sup>rd</sup> in the first round of the presidential elections, threw his support behind Manuel Pinto da Costa's candidacy for the upcoming second round.

## 21-22 July (Luanda):

Foreign Minister Manuel Salvador dos Ramos traveled to Angola where he met with President José Eduardo dos Santos to review the CPLP agenda. Afterwards, Salvador dos Ramos represented São Tomé and Príncipe at the 16<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Meeting of the CPLP Council of Ministers.

## 22-24 July (São Tomé):

Angolan Armed Forces' Chief of Staff Geraldo Sachipengo Nunda led a high-ranking entourage to São Tomé and Príncipe, where he met with his local counterpart Idalécio Pachire and with Prime Minister Patrice Trovoada.

## 23-24 July (São Tomé):

Both Maria das Neves (placed fourth) and Aurélio Martins (placed seventh) announced their support for Manuel Pinto da Costa's presidential bid.

# Timor Leste

## 1 July (Díli):

Portuguese energy company Galp Energia's CEO Manuel Ferreira de Oliveira signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Timorese officials regarding technical assistance to the development of the country's National Company on Oil and Natural Gas.

## 1 July (Lisbon):

President José Ramos-Horta met with Portuguese Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho, to whom he restated Timor Leste's willingness to invest in Portuguese sovereign debt.

## 5-8 July (Praia):

President José Ramos-Horta paid an official visit to Cape Verde, where he was welcomed as a guest of honor for the country's 36<sup>th</sup> independence anniversary. Afterwards, Ramos-Horta also held meetings with his Cape Verdean counterpart Pedro Pires and with Prime Minister José Maria Neves. He also took the opportunity to lobby for the

immediate entry of Equatorial-Guinea into the CPLP.

## 12 July (Díli):

Prime Minister José Alexandre 'Xanana' Gusmão unveiled Timor Leste's Strategic Development Plan for 2011-2030 during the Development Partners Meeting.

## 18 July (Manila):

According to the latest issue of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) Pacific Economic Monitor, Timor Leste's economy is expected to maintain a 10% growth in 2011, driven by a rise in oil prices and public investment.

## 18-23 July (Bali):

Foreign Minister Zacarias da Costa led the Timorese delegation to the 44<sup>th</sup> ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), the Post Ministerial Conferences (PMCs), and the 18<sup>th</sup> ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) including the Southwest Pacific Dialogue in Bali, Indonesia. Timor Leste's readiness to join ASEAN and the strengthening of regional cooperation were high on the agenda.

## 22 July (Luanda):

Vice Foreign Minister Alberto Carlos took part in the 16<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Meeting of the CPLP Council of Ministers.

## 25 July (Darwin):

President José Ramos-Horta traveled to Darwin to speak at the Property Council of Australia 2011 Congress alongside former Defense force chief General Peter Cosgrove and for the launch of Timor Leste's international airline, Timor Air.

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