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Prospects for a PJD – USFP alliance in Morocco

EVA WEGNER AND MIQUEL PELLICER

Researcher and Senior Lecturer, University of Cape Town

independence history, oppositional mutually supported each other's by what they view as a regime attack challenges have been successfully mayoral candidates in numerous against the PJD's rise, the party's managed by the monarchy, employing cities, including tourist destinations local leaders endorsed and voted last co-optation and divide and rule such as Agadir. The regime's strong December for a continuation of the tactics. building by opposition groups, the - proof of their potential - became Ultimately, it is the USFP that is Moroccan democratization process evident by its clumsy and sometimes hesitant. USFP leaders will have to - inexistent so far but cited tirelessly violent attempts to prevent them. make a choice between the - private by regime and international actors - In Larache for instance, a first vote - spoils of office and the reform is unlikely to come about. Recently, to bring to power a new coalition potential and possible recovery of a possible alliance of the Left with between the PJD, USFP, and Istiqlal its programmatic appeal that would the Islamists has garnered attention. was circumvented by troublemakers result from an alliance with the However, co-optation by the regime who stormed the city hall, destroying Islamists. Programmatic appeal and seems once again to be the stumbling the ballot box while the police stood credibility have indeed suffered much block.


Among Moroccan party system, the leftist what is needed to push it further? government, not the least because an increase in power of elected at various levels since 2003. While electoral losses and lack of political institutions vis-à-vis the authoritarian recognizing the profound ideological progress. Once the dominant choice

a strong government.

invested much energy in fighting changed the position of many. each other because of their opposed Founded in 2007 by "friend of the visions of society. Yet after the 2009 king" Fouad Ali El Himma, the PAM municipal elections, the first alliances has since absorbed large chunks of at the local level emerged. Following other parties' MPs and won most For most of Morocco's post- these elections, the PJD and USFP seats in the 2009 elections. Angered Without serious alliance resentment against these coalitions alliance with the USFP. idly by.

monarchy. Independently, they have differences between the two parties, been too weak to push through PJD leaders believe that an alliance political reform. The USFP faces a with the USFP is necessary and that drastic electoral decline since it has consensus about democratic reform been part of weak and unsuccessful is a sufficient basis for it. The PJD governments since 1998. The PJD has rank-and-file has been the most been the rising political actor during troubled by the ideological divide. The the last decade but has ultimately attempt by the regime to take much failed to gain sufficient power to lead tighter control of elected institutions via the Party of Authenticity and The Left and the Islamists have Modernity (PAM) has, however,

in the twelve years during which the the highly fragmented If such an alliance is the way forward, USFP has participated in national USFP and the Islamist PJD are the only The PJD leadership has attempted of the rather undignified way the large parties whose agenda includes to forge cooperation with the USFP party hangs on to its place in spite of



Most aware of and angry about these developments is the USFP's rankand-file. Experiencing the losses, but not the gains of co-optation, it was them who pushed through local coalitions with the PJD against the will of the leadership. The latter had already agreed with its partners in national government to set up the same alliances at the local level. For northern towns, this deal was supposed to yield Tetouan for the RNI, Chefchauen for the Istiqlal, and Larache for the USFP. In spite of an intervention by the executive bureau, the USFP's rank-and-file refused and went for coalitions with the PJD instead. Bound by a 2008 National Council decision on the decentralization of local coalition building, the leadership could now hardly forbid these coalitions. In the event of a democratization of the USFP's party structures, further alliance building could thus follow When former general Mohammed from pressure by the rank-and-file, wanting to uphold the programmatic identity of the USFP.

usually insists that an alliance with a suit for good and only very few civilian candidates and handed over with the PJD is impossible for international observers continued to power to the successful presidential ideological reasons: the USFP stands question his democratic legitimacy. candidate in April 2007. Despite for modernity, secularism, and progress, while the PJD represents the new President as one year later, the traditional elite were still well the Stone Age, the abuse of religion in June 2010, international donors attached: and has questionable democratic offered a total aid package of €2.5 Ould Cheikh Abdallahi, a political credentials. In recent years, however, billion over the next three years. This nobody, owed his victory solely to USFP leaders have made headlines support is in sharp contrast with the support by the military and was not for debates about platforms the widely expressed sentiments henceforth tightly monitored and and policies, but for arguments - even taking the form of boycotts constrained by a growing number of surrounding political office. Deals - international actors (e.g. African influential independent' members of with the PAM to gain office are not a Union, European Union or the United parliament. Attempts to strengthen hindrance. USFP leader Abdelwahed States) have displayed after the his own stance and to loosen the Radi was elected parliamentary country's 2007 democratically elected military's grip on power eventually speaker with the support of the PAM; President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi led to another coup in August 2008,

The show must go on: Questions of legitimacy give way to more pressing issues in Mauritania

HANNES BAHRENBURG AND THOMAS RICHTER

Research Assistant and Research Fellow, GIGA Institute of Middle East Studies, Hamburg

Ould Abdel Aziz was sworn in as President of the Islamic Republic of council seized control, gave the Mauritania on August 5th 2009, he had presidency a definite term limit, Patience had eventually paid off for these achievements, strings by

of democratization in Mauritania has been a process orchestrated for international observers, which did not touch the substance of the traditional social and political order. However, today one aspect in particular trumps the question of legitimacy in Mauritania: al-Qaeda is on the rise in the Western Sahara region.

After single-party dominion until 1978 and consecutive military rule, the first official step towards democratization in Mauritania was already taken in 1991. Led by then strong man Colonel Ould Taya, Mauritania had been previously cut off from international financial support due to dodgy diplomacy and human rights abuses. While on paper the political system was turned into a multiparty democracy, elections were rigged, the opposition persecuted, and human rights violations continued. This first wave of Mauritanian democratization has therefore rather helped Ould Taya to renew his authoritarian grip over the country. In August 2005 a bloodless coup from within the military initiated - at first glance - a more sophisticated phase of democratization: A military The USFP's national leadership finally swapped his military uniform organized elections with exclusively President-elect Sidi

when a military council once again uncontrolled felt it had to 'safeguard' Mauritania's southern Europe as well as the rising the times of decolonisation in the path towards transition phase that followed was resources, alerts on increasing the newly independent countries of a poor imitation of the period from activities of Jihadist groups have the Maghreb, with the exception of 2005 to 2007. From the start it was formed the understanding that Mauritania, where even nowadays obvious that General Abdel Aziz, Mauritania must not turn into Italy does not have an embassy and pulling the strings behind both coups, an ungovernable, failed state. entrusts diplomatic and consular intended to assume the presidency. Unfortunately this type of political relations to its embassy in Dakar, After his election in July 2009, heavily stabilization comes with the cost of a Senegal. Nowadays, the disputed by the opposition, Abdel Aziz lasting political disenfranchisement Maghreb countries play a key role in continues to govern in a Big Man Rule of the majority of the Mauritanian Italy's foreign policy and its external fashion. Just like he recently stated in people. Jeune Afrique: "Je dois tout contrôler moi-même".

Why have Western actors like the European Union and the United States turned a blind eye to this democratization 'theatre'? One of the main reasons is the renewed rise of Jihadi terrorist groups operating in the Western Sahara region. Recently, terrorists affiliated with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have focused on attacking Mauritanian army posts and abducting foreign nationals. A first suicide attack was carried out in Nouakchott in August 2008. The United States already started to offer training to parts of the Mauritanian army in 2005. Since 2008, both France and Spain have also provided training, arms Just a few nautical miles separate security as well, even if in the 1990s and intelligence and a first franco- Italy from Africa, and in particular the terrorist threat emanating from mauritanian raid on AQIM in the from the Maghreb area. Despite this, radical-Islamist terrorist networks border region between Mauritania to the average Italian, the Maghreb is was not foreseen at all. Against and Mali was made public in June a "mysterious object", an indefinite this backdrop, Italian diplomacy 2010. While the taking of European land where men wear turbans, where considered it increasingly a priority to hostages may have played a key women are veiled, and where everyone stabilize the region through bilateral role, there are two more aspects speaks Arabic and eats couscous and multilateral agreements with motivating external actors to support or dates. In fact, migrants coming a view to contribute to the latter's the current regime: First, the fact into Italy from outside the European economic and political integration, that a recently killed terrorist with Union are disrespectfully nicknamed assuming that greater integration Mauritanian nationality was the son "marocchini" of a prominent figure of the country's great majority of Italians ignore "security area" of sorts beyond the Moorish business elite challenges not only the differences between Italy's borders. the widespread assumption that each Maghreb country, but are also In recent years, growing migration AQIM is of negligible attractiveness unaware of the Berber element. The pressures have led Italy to increase for the country's elite. Second, a reason for such ignorance is that Italy its development aid to Maghreb number of events relating to the rise has only had a short colonial history countries, with the effect that by in drug trafficking suggest that there with Libya and never developed 2009 Italy was the second largest may be no clear line between Islamist any real and meaningful cultural contributor as regards financial terrorists and organized criminal links with the countries of the donations: Tunisia received €19 networks.

In

immigration democracy. The demand for Mauritania's vast natural 1960s in order to get in touch with

Italy and the Maghreb: So far and yet so close

FRANCESCO TAMBURINI

Professor of Political Science, Università di Pisa

(Moroccans).

to diplomacy has worked a lot since four economic agenda, although the Maghreb region as such is of course not far from being a homogenous political and economic entity. Undoubtedly, in the last twenty

years the whole region has grown in importance. After the end of the Cold War, North Africa, and consequently the Maghreb, received the attention of the West simply because of a possible "double clash": the economic clash between the northern and southern parts of the world on the one hand, and the emerging cultural and religious conflict between Islam and the Western world on the other hand. Almost from the beginning, Italy was concerned about the fact that an unresolved security problem in the region could deeply affect Italian The could lead to the development of a

Greater Arab Maghreb. In contrast, million, Morocco €17 million, Algeria combination with fears of it is interesting to note that Italian €3 million, and Libya €1 million. It is appreciated by Washington.

migration flows coming mainly from out as one of the most important GALSI (Gasdotto Algeria Sardegna sensitive to potential infiltrations by and Italy. In 2009 the total volume construction and will link Algeria radical-Islamist terror networks, and of this growing Italian-Maghrebian directly with Sardinia by 2014. ENI, aware of potentially emerging hard interdependence amounted to nearly ENEL and EDISON are certainly the security threats – even if nowadays €40 billion in 2009, thus putting Italy biggest Italian companies operating this is hardly considered to be likely -, in second place after France as the in Algeria. Yet, in recent years when two Libyan Scud SS-1 missiles for the Maghreb as a whole. almost hit the island of Lampedusa Currently, Italy is trying to become public contracts with the Algerian in the wake of "Operation El Dorado the main, or perhaps the first hub government. Canyon". But even if the probability through which North African energy The Italian-Moroccan relationship is of a military attack is rather low, the supplies flow to Europe, not least with very close, and Rabat is considered risk that terrorist networks, such a view to decrease its dependence a strategic economic partner by Italy, as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb on Russian gas supplies that pass even if Morocco is outside the "inner-(AQIM), which gathered all the Islamic through the Ukraine. But it is not just circle" of energy suppliers. Although terrorist groups in the area and the gas or crude. Due to its comparatively Italy ranks only in eleventh place Sahel region, and which managed cheap labor force, the Maghreb is of all countries that are investing to spread its influence in Mali, Niger increasingly seen also by small and in Morocco, the absence of major and Chad, infiltrate Italy and use it as medium-sized Italian companies as macro-economic risks and the

Apart from the immigration and of) their production: for example, government have recently helped security topics, Italy tends to regard the Italian clothing multinational almost 300 Italian companies to the Maghreb as being of vital and Benetton invested €20 million into outsource their production and invest essential importance for its economy, the construction of a brand new in Morocco. The country's growing According to the Italian Foreign production facility in Tunisia. This, relevance as a market for Italian Ministry, the Maghreb nowadays and other recent investments, were exports is a direct consequence of absorbs 11% of Italian exports and facilitated by the existence of rather the establishment of the Tangier Free in 2008 the total economic exchange favorable commercial agreements Zone and the expansion of the Tangier with the region amounted already that are nowadays blossoming harbor. The importance assigned to €39 billion. As a matter of fact, thanks to Italian diplomacy and the to the Kingdom goes hand in hand the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) is a efforts of SIMEST (Società Italiana with the granting of an advanced paralyzed regional organization and per le Imprese all'Estero), a company status in late 2008 by Brussels to has failed to create a common market that was established in 1990 and is Morocco and is underpinned by the for the Maghreb, thus reinforcing owned partially (76%) by the Italian large number of Moroccan migrant absence of any meaningful government. the and effective regional cooperation As regards the relevance of Italy Italy. In fact, this community consists scheme. Moreover, Italy regards the for each Maghreb country, Rome is of more than 300.000 Moroccans entire area as being exposed to a nowadays Libya's most important and represents the biggest nonnumber of security concerns caused business partner. Hydrocarbons European community in Italy. This


Tunisia, are also those that generate kidnapping, drug trafficking and arms and machinery. the largest migration flows towards smuggling. This is why subsequent Algeria is the first supplier of natural

a platform is being taken seriously. an attractive area to outsource (parts openness displayed by the Moroccan

no coincidence that the two countries mainly by AQIM, an organization represent 99% of Italian imports from that received the lions' share of that survives thanks to multiple Libya, whereas Italy, on the other financial assistance, i.e. Morocco and illegal activities such as banditry, hand, exports refined oil products

Italian coasts. As Italy has always had Italian governments have decided to gas, and a pipeline connecting the somewhat of a pro-Arab policy, which cooperate separately with each state Algerian territory with Italy (the differed from Spain's or France's rather than with the AMU, the latter Transmed) can provide up to 35% approaches, it was relatively easy does not have any competencies in of Italy's domestic energy needs. for Rome to intensify relations with the security field anyway. Imports- The Transmed pipeline, also called Maghreb countries, even if this type exports, direct investments, energy the "Enrico Mattei pipeline", links of intensification was not completely supplies, telecommunications and Algeria with Sicily through Tunisia the transferral of remittances and delivers 34 billion cubic meters Italy, more than many other from migrant communities to their of gas each year. A new connection of countries, is exposed to uncontrolled local communities can be singled up to 840 km of length, the so-called sub-Saharan countries, is highly interactions between the Maghreb Italia) pipeline, is currently under such as the one that occurred in 1986 most important commercial partner almost 150 small and medium-sized companies have been able to sign

communities that reside legally in



In contrast, Tunisia, for obvious since the Libyan revolution in 1969, a fresh wave of criticism. geographical reasons, has always when Colonel Gaddafi came to power. In a way, the same ambiguous policy had a close relationship with Italy It was only when the bilateral treaty is applied to Morocco and the Western and is a natural partner since on "friendship, partnership and Sahara. Italy is host to hundreds of its independence in 1956. Like cooperation" was signed on August NGO's and civil society organizations Morocco, Tunisia also boasts of a 30th 2008 that the Italian government that work towards the promotion of migrant community in Italy, though decided to admit the crimes that took greater solidarity with the Saharawi the number of Tunisian migrants place during the colonization of Libya. people, but no government has ever residing legally in Italy only amounts Nonetheless, and in spite of an explicit taken a firm stand on the Western to 70.000. In 2009, Italy was rated mention of the respect of human Sahara issue as such, or went beyond Tunisia's second most important rights and fundamental freedoms in mere rhetorical statements in which economic partner while Tunisia is the the treaty, Italy has never intervened they expressed their support for a second most important market for when Libyan authorities detained "peaceful solution". All in all, this Italian products in the entire southern migrants coming from sub-Saharan behavior reflects the weakness of Mediterranean. Today, approximately Africa, as was the case just recently Italy and its current and past foreign 680 small and medium-sized Italian when Libyan authorities decided to policy and, most of all, Rome's companies operate in Tunisia detain Eritrean refugees and put continuous aversion to upseting employing more than 55.000 Tunisian them the al-Abraq detention camp. other international heavyweights workers and investing close to €216 It remains subject to speculation and, above all, the United States of billion. From the perspective of whether this non-intervention is America. Italian businesses, this activism can due to a strict interpretation of the be explained by the simple fact that treaty, the latter containing a non-Tunisia is predominantly considered interference clause in the domestic an ideal country to invest in and affairs of the relevant other, or praised for its alleged social and because of a silent approval of such political stability, its geographical practices by Italian authorities, who, vicinity and the comparatively low in fact repel migrants off the Italian costs of production.

The growing interdependence can however not hide that Libyan cooperation does play the fact that Italy has always conducted an increasingly important role in a multifaceted, yet often contradictory preventing illegal migration to Italy, policy toward the Maghreb countries. and it is not least due to Libya's In order to increase its balance of support that the rate of illegal trade, Italian diplomacy deliberately migrants entering Italy was curbed closed its eyes with respect to the by 90% in recent years. This is the lack of real democratic process reason why the Italian government in the region. Pursuing a rather signed a protocol of cooperation disturbing realpolitik at times, Italian in 2007 and provided the Libyan governments tend to forget that they navy with six modern patrol boats are promoting trade and economic (three "Bigliani class" and three cooperation, in the best cases, with "5000 class"). Unfortunately, one unfinished democracies or what are of these patrol boats (paradoxically often coined hybrid regimes. In other with Italian instructors and advisors words, states combining democratic on board) was used some weeks elements with governance such as Bouteflika's Italian fishing boat working in the Algeria and Ben Ali's Tunisia, or the Gulf of Sidra, which is considered Moroccan "theocratic democracy" led by Libya to be a "historic bay" since by Mohammed VI are being considered 1973, despite being classified by

of the bilateral relationship, as Italian A somewhat different case is Libya, of international waters. In a way, this has become compulsory as a second which is not comparable to any Arab episode encapsulates the ambiguity foreign language in 20 Moroccan high regime, and with which Italy has of Italian foreign policy vis-à-vis a rather complicated relationship Libya and, unsurprisingly, generated coast themselves.

> economic What is obvious however is the fact authoritarian ago to chase and machine-gun an

does also affect the cultural aspect as reliable and trustworthy partners. international maritime law as part

Spain and Morocco: Good partners and badly matched neighbors

ISAÍAS BARREÑADA

Associated Researcher, Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Complutense de Madrid (ICEI-UCM)

Sparks are flying in the Strait of Gibraltar and not because of friction over tectonic plates. While business cooperation is thriving between Morocco and Spain political relations are not at their best. The authorities of both countries persistently say that their relationship is excellent and that the recurring spats are small disagreements that are

simple to resolve. However, m is understandings continue to occur, and everything indicates that it is not simply a matter of a love-hate relationship based on anthropological Mediterranean roots, but rather a more serious and structural problem.

In the last year, various events have occurred that illustrate the complex relations that exist between the two countries. The cases that have attracted the most attention include the irregular expulsion of Saharawi activist Aminatu Moroccan Haidar by authorities in late 2009 while en route to the Canary Islands, which put the Spanish government in a highly embarrassing Despite the profound development gap that exists between Europe and the Maghreb, Spain desires to be as much of a solid economic anchor with its southern neighbors as it is with its immediate European neighbors. Trade with Morocco has intensified and is greater than that with Spain's historic Latin-American partners, or than that with the more dynamic Asian powers.

situation until Morocco reluctantly allowed her to return, or Rabat's decision just a few months later, and bordering on provocation, to appoint a recent Saharawi deserter as new ambassador to Madrid. Moreover, in June the antenna of the Spanish Intelligence Service (CNI) was dismantled in the north of Morocco at the same moment that the Moroccan nationalist discourse focused on alleged residual Francoism in the Spanish army; in August incidents took place at the border with Melilla, with the passage of merchandise being blocked, supposedly by civil society out of protest against the ill-treatment

> of Moroccan citizens and Sub-Saharan migrants by the Spanish police; around the same time, Morocco protested because Spanish military helicopters flew over the monarch's yacht while bringing provisions to the garrisons that were located on small rocks and islands along the North African coast; also in August, some Spanish pro-Saharawi activists in El Aaiún were first beaten up by Moroccan security forces dressed as civilians, then detained and expelled; in September, a visit to Melilla by Mariano Rajoy, the leader of the Spanish opposition party, was perceived as a highly provocative act, and citizens of Melilla and Ceuta were hindered by Moroccan authorities

from undertaking sightseeing activities along the northern coast of Morocco. Taken together, these events have led to a disconcerting image of the supposedly "excellent relationship" between the two neighboring countries. Are these misunderstandings unimportant, spontaneous and inevitable? There is no doubt that there could have been a lack of tact on both sides, and that non-governmental actors have intervened with their own agendas. As far as Morocco is concerned, the undemocratic political system means that some civil servants and politicians exceed in their nationalist and patriotic zeal and in their clumsiness generate conflicts that have consequences on the bilateral relationship as such. The Spanish government has decided not to create any controversy and instead to try to resolve these tensions discretely, with the least possible coverage in the media. The reasons that explain this approach include the fact that Morocco is a strategic partner and a solid ally, that the geographic proximity of the two countries implies a need for friendly relations, and that in sum Morocco is vital for Spanish interests. In fact, both governments insist, and based on the same formula, that they have shared economic, migrationrelated and security interests.

It is obvious that Spain, despite the profound development gap that exists between Europe and the Maghreb, desires to be as much of a solid economic anchor with its southern neighbors as it is with its immediate European neighbors.

In the last fifteen years, trade with Morocco has intensified and is currently greater than that with Spain's historic Latin American partners, or than that with the more dynamic Asian powers. Trade with Morocco accounts for a modest 1.5% of Spain's total foreign exchange, but apart from the hydrocarbonexporting countries Morocco is Spain's leading Arab trade partner, with a trade balance in favor of Spain. Spanish investment in the country

Madrid is determined to play an active role as the legitimizer of the Moroccan regime through symbolic goodwill gestures and through representing the Spanish-Moroccan relationship as a solid alliance.

has grown, although it is still on a rather low level (0.6% of the FDI total in 2005-2009), which limits the transaction to a type of subcontracting, rather than a more productive integration. For Morocco as well, the north is key; Spain is its second most important commercial partner and its second biggest foreign investor. Spain actively participates in numerous modernization projects in Morocco, it has important interests in the fishing sector, and the two countries are linked through a unique electrical interconnection.

Madrid also wants to maintain and deepen cooperation in migration and security matters, such as anti-terrorist cooperation, and the fight against drug-trafficking – fields in which there have been substantial advances in recent years – and thus develop and intensify good relations with the country of origin of its largest group of non-European immigrants (in June 2010 around 760.000 Moroccans legally resided in Spain). And all that without negatively affecting its relations with Algeria, a key partner in the area of energy supply.

Also, Morocco is the first Arab recipient of Spanish development aid, and one of the few Arab countries that periodically maintain regular high-level ministerial meetings, the next of which will be held in Rabat at the beginning of 2011.

In addition to these elements, there is another factor related to domestic Spanish politics that underpins Spain's relationship with Morocco. Madrid is determined to play an active role as the legitimizer of the Moroccan regime through symbolic goodwill gestures and by representing the Spanish-Moroccan relationship as a solid alliance. Two examples: since the days of the Spanish transition to democracy, it is an established tradition that the first foreign visit of the President of the Spanish government is to Rabat. More recently, Spain has become a permanent guarantor of Morocco in the European Union (EU) and in the context of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. Undoubtedly, one of the highlights of this patronage was the granting of EU Advanced Status to Morocco (2008) and

> the holding of the first EU-Moroccan summit during the Spanish EU Presidency (Granada, March 7th, 2010). There is good reason to ask not only to what extent these gestures are justified - and are reciprocated by Rabat but also what the political costs for Spain are in dealing with a partner that exhibits serious shortfalls in its democratic structure, and with whom there are both contentious issues and serious disputes.

Repeated incidents of more or less significance and transcendence point to the existence of more serious problems that are silenced by both sides, for the sake of business and security for Madrid, and in the name of stability and legitimization for Rabat. Without disregarding the existence of mutual ignorance, suspicion and distrust – or what some consider arrogance and lack of respect on the Spanish side (according to Hispanist and ex-ambassador Larbi Messari: "the relationship has to be decolonized") - there are profound differences which neither side wants to make apparent, but that necessarily condition their relations. The four main issues are: the question of the Western Sahara (on which the Spanish people and the Spanish government diverge); the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla; competition with France and the interferences of Algeria; and the

profound distrust of Spanish actors towards the regime and the Moroccan political class.

The main aspect of the bilateral discord is definitely the Western Sahara question. The international community and the Spanish public opinion disagree with the ambiguous and contradictory Spanish government policy; officially Spain abides by international law, supports the right of self-determination of the ex-colony and backs up the United Nations' efforts. However, at the same time it refrains from taking a leading role in the solution of the conflict, insists on supporting "a mutually-accepted solution" (which means that Spain agrees with the Moroccan veto to a self-determination referendum) and considers the Moroccan proposal of autonomy positive. By doing this, Madrid has alienated itself from

the Saharawis, but, in fact, this so-called "constructive neutrality" does not make sense any more. The growing distance from the American position on this issue that became increasingly apparent during the last few months, leaves Madrid uncomfortably alone with Paris in defending Rabat.

The enclaves of Ceuta, Melilla and several small rocks are territorial residues of a time when they had a profoundly different geo-strategic value. Although the United Nations do not consider them to be nonself governing territories (colonies), they have The illusion of Spanish-Moroccan relations, i.e. the determination of both sides to portray them as a "splendid relationship", has prevented a public and transparent debate about the most serious questions and resulted in a foreign policy that is largely incoherent with the discourse that is usually maintained in other settings.

become a permanent issue of Moroccan agitation, to the point that no Spanish head of government has visited these places for three decades (except for José Luiz Rodríguez Zapatero in 2006). The future of the two cities is uncertain and the current economic system that makes them the center of informal commerce and of smuggling in Northern Morocco is increasingly unsustainable. A new approach is therefore needed, taking into consideration the will of the inhabitants and the development of the whole region. This implies trans-border cooperation, yet, this is a prospect that clashes with the nationalist Moroccan rhetoric.

Moreover, there is a conflict of economic and geostrategic interests in which other parties, mainly France and Algeria, are involved, transforming these bilateral relations into a more complex affair of three and four participants. Rabat, which has bad relations with its Algerian neighbor, does not hesitate to use French support and protection. Owing to the French role, Spain cannot rely on the European Union in any serious dispute with Morocco, as became evident during the Perejil/ Parsley Island crisis (2002) when France prevented Brussels from taking a clear stand against Rabat, thus leaving it to Washington to intervene diplomatically. On the other hand, for economic and political reasons, Madrid has similar interests in maintaining a fluid understanding with Algeria.

Finally, it is noteworthy to point to the ballast of Moroccan politics that contaminates all economic, political and even civil society relations. There is widespread distrust among

> the Spanish political class and civil society about the Moroccan political system: political reforms that have been applied for almost two decades are seen as very limited and reformists have proven to be impotent vis-àvis the forces in power; the political transition is endless and the system has been disjointed, as the Royal Palace continues interfere regularly; to authoritarianism prevails, the human rights situation is not promising, and freedom of the press is violated. Eventually, these factors hinder the establishment of normal bilateral relations based on dialogue and trust. Ironically, crises are

usually resolved through the Kings' intervention, who, in an effort to reach out to the Moroccan public, tends to resort to drama-like demonstrations of goodwill, thereby emphasizing the close relations with Spain. This practice, however, confuses Spanish society to a great extent.

The illusion of Spanish-Moroccan relations, i.e. the determination of both sides to portray them as a "splendid relationship", has prevented a public and transparent debate about the most serious questions and resulted in a foreign policy that is largely incoherent with the discourse that is usually maintained in other settings. It contributes to the perpetuation of tensions, deepens problems and gives protagonism to other non-governmental actors. The crisis is contained, but it is neither resolved nor clarified. As a result confusion

and distrust are reinforced, generating accumulated resentment.

On the Spanish side, with the exception of the business class, there is widespread public disagreement as regards the management of the bilateral relationship: the center-right asks for a firmer diplomacy in a rather nationalistic fashion, while civil society demands the upholding of democratic conditionality and mutual benefits. In addition, a large part of the population sympathizes with the demands for self-determination of the Saharawis. Curiously however, the major political forces simply ignore their neighbor in the South; proof of this is that the largest political parties barely maintain relationships with their Moroccan counterparts.

On the Moroccan side exists a panoply of positions. While society as such has gradually developed a new and more positive perception of its northern neighbor,

any public initiative stems from the political parties and certain media outlets that continue to emphasize the old nationalist discourse and that indulge in the logic of inconclusive decolonization. The dissatisfaction of Moroccan nationalist forces with Spain dates back to the days of independence. In contrast to France, Spain withdrew gradually from the African territory over a period of twenty years, maintaining only Ceuta, Melilla and some tiny islands and rocks where the presence of military garrisons are still seen by Rabat as pending issues. The latter is used by Morocco to reproach Spain for making

national unity difficult, and by extension for contributing to the backwardness and under-development of the country – these being issues which are not compensated for by the privileged treatment and the close collaboration that has emerged in other areas.

Despite that, the determination of the Spanish Socialist government has always been to limit conflicts and to defuse tensions by means of a diplomacy that can be described as "firm, but intelligent and sensible". Rabat is perfectly aware that Madrid wishes to consolidate its relations, as it has very important economic interests and needs effective cooperation on matters of security in the south of the Mediterranean. As Spain, for the reasons mentioned above, cannot rely on the EU in resolving bilateral disputes with Morocco, the latter, in exchange for cooperation on security and economic matters,

Spanish-Moroccan relations exemplify impressively that in an inter-dependent world, good neighborly relations cannot be based on tricks and ruses, demands for unconditional support, mere economic interest or the desire to externalize security tasks.

demands Spanish backing of the regime, understood as a maintenance and acceptance of the *status quo*. In turn, this means explicit support of the Moroccan position on the question of the Western Sahara, support of the proposal for autonomy and thus a de facto abolition of Spain's "constructive neutrality" approach towards its "ex-colony". In view of this order of priorities, Ceuta and Melilla do lose some of their importance as contentious issues and barely serve as a pretext for nationalists on both sides to react instantly to potential offences to their respective nations.

In some ways the bilateral relationship is based on the logic of a veiled threat on the Moroccan side and of explicit interests on the Spanish side. Morocco does not hide the fact that an eventual destabilization would endanger the position of Spanish businesses in the Moroccan market, and would create security problems for Europe and, more

importantly, for Spain itself. By accepting the political status quo in Morocco and by having decided to engage itself in the country's modernization process, Madrid has fully accepted this discourse and simply focuses on security and economic cooperation; although this position implies that it has to put up with continuous incidents and embarrassing situations, act in contradiction to international law as far as the Western Sahara is concerned, provide a non-democratic regime with favorable deals, and turn a blind eye to the perpetuation of authoritarian practices. The nature of the Moroccan

regime also contributes to the

fact that numerous issues are not being debated openly and that a meaningful involvement of the political and social organizations of the two countries is systematically prevented. The result is a serious lack of transparency that adds to confusion and to the deterioration of mutual perceptions. It is hence unsurprising that otherwise meaningless episodes of misunderstanding become suddenly important and place the two partners in extremely uncomfortable situations, which all too often have domestic political implications as far as Spain is concerned and which repeatedly highlights the obsolescence of this particular relationship model.

In various African countries like Morocco, Tunisia and Equatorial Guinea, the political coherence of Spanish foreign policy is seriously in doubt. Spain has characterized itself to be at the heart of the EU - to the surprise of many – as being one of the least demanding governments with respect to attempts to condition cooperation and privileged deals and link them to advances in democratization. Madrid has given preeminence to security and to the interest of economic groups in its foreign policy, and in so doing it has seriously put in doubt other clearly progressive and daring initiatives in matters of multilateralism, the Alliance of Civilizations and of human development on a global level. Spanish-Moroccan relations exemplify impressively that in an inter-dependent world, good neighborly relations cannot be based on tricks and ruses, demands for unconditional support, mere economic interest or the desire to externalize security tasks. Today, more than ever, dialogue is a necessary step towards the expression of mutual demands, the respect for the right to development for all, and upholding international law.

Timeline of Events

Algeria

2 August 2010 (Algiers):

The Emir of Qatar Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani met President Abdelaziz Bouteflika to discuss bilateral relations and ways of enhancing them. Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci and Deputy Minister of National Defense Abdul-Malik Guenaizia also attended the talks.

16 August 2010 (Algiers):

According to the company's annual report, Sonatrach is the most profitable oil company in Africa with a turnover of \notin 42.3 billion.

16 August 2010 (Algiers):

President Abdelaziz Bouteflika said that Algeria needs to step up investment and exploration in its energy sector. Bouteflika called for a "reevaluation of petrochemical industry projects" with the purpose of creating "a downstream industry".

17-19 August 2010 (Hanoi):

Deputy Foreign Minister Abdelkader Messahel led the Algerian delegation to the 2nd Africa-Vietnam Forum, held under the theme "Cooperation for a sustainable development". The Deputy Minister in charge of Maghreb and African Affairs Abdelkader Messahel urged for a new economic dimension in the African-Vietnam cooperation. Messahel met with President of Vietnam Nguyen Minh Triet.

18 August 2010 (Algiers):

Algeria decided to donate US\$1 million to Pakistan in order to assist the country after the recent floods.

26 August 2010 (Algiers):

The President of the National Consultative Council for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights Farouk Ksentini announced that Algeria had invited the United Nations to assess the state of human rights in the country. Organizations operating in the field of human rights dismissed the initiative and considered it an attempt to promote Algeria's image overseas.

2 September 2010 (Tripoli):

Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia attended the 5+5 dialogue group meeting. Ouyahia was accompanied by Deputy Minister of Maghreb and African Affairs Abdelkader Messahel.

6 September 2010 (Algiers):

Algeria requires any foreign company seeking a share of its US\$286 billion infrastructure budget to form a joint venture with an Algerian firm to qualify for state contracts.

8 September 2010 (Paris):

Former French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin was appointed by President Nicolas Sarkozy on a mission of economic cooperation between France and Algeria aiming to develop investments in both countries.

8 September 2010 (Algiers):

Hassan Hattab, founder of Algeria's Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), urged clerics and religious scholars to contribute to the end of violence and to support the peace effort in Algeria. Hattab promoted a new initiative entitled "Appeal for Truce, Peace and Reconciliation", signed by a number of emirs and founders of armed groups in Algeria.

15 September 2010 (Algiers):

Intelligence services from Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger met to launch a Sahel-Saharan "intelligence cell". The new unit, which supports the Tamanrasset joint military command established last April, aims to contain the activities of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) by drying up the terror organization's funding from illegal smuggling networks and ransom payments.

16 September 2010 (Algiers):

The Deputy Minister of Maghreb and African Affairs Abdelkader Messahel met Spanish Foreign Affairs Secretary of State Juan Pablo de la Iglesia to discuss ways of deepening bilateral ties.

16 September 2010 (Cairo):

Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci attended the 13th session of the Council of the Arab League.

16 September 2010 (Algiers):

President Abdelaziz Bouteflika met with Brazilian Minister for Development, Industry and International Commerce Miguel Jorge. The meeting focused on addressing potential business areas in which Brazil could play a role.

18 September 2010 (Algiers):

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad held two hours of talks with his Algerian counterpart Abdelaziz Bouteflika during a stopover in Algiers on route to New York for the UN General Assembly.

19 September 2010 (Algiers):

French Secretary of State for Foreign Trade Anne-Marie Idrac met with Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia for talks on strengthening Franco-Algerian economic cooperation. Idrac also met with Minister of Finance Karim Djoudi and Minister of Commerce Mustapha Benbada.

20 September 2010 (New York):

Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci met with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.

21 September 2010 (Algiers):

The Minister-Delegate for Maghreb and African Affairs Abdelkader Messahel called on Western countries not to pay ransoms for the release of their abducted nationals in the sub-Saharan region, saying that ransoms stand for 95% of the funds obtained by terrorists in the region.

23 September 2010 (Algiers):

Algeria launched its third oil and gas licensing round hoping that it will obliterate the scandal in the energy industry after a purge of top officials in what was seen as a political power struggle.

23 September 2010 (New York):

Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci met with the UN Secretary General's Special Envoy to the

Western Sahara Christopher Ross. Medelci also took part in the Africa-China meeting that comprised several African Foreign Ministers and their Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi.

27 September 2010 (New York):

Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci addressed the UN General Assembly, where he read a speech from President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Medelci called for reform of the world economic system, including debt relief for developing countries, a reinforced role for the United Nations in protecting biodiversity, and full international engagement in combating climate change. On the sidelines of the UN's General Assembly, Medelci met with his Cuban counterpart Bruno Eduardo Rodriguez Parrilla and with Mauritanian Prime Minister Moulaye Ould Mohamed Laghdaf.

29 September 2010 (Algiers):

Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger intelligence services met to open a joint Sahel-Saharan intelligence centre. The facility will gather information on AQIM activities in the Sahel region.

29 September 2010 (Algiers):

Algeria and Saudi Arabia signed an accord for mutual assistance in criminal investigations. The agreement concluded at the Justice Ministry in Algiers intends to promote cooperation in the fight against crime.

Libya

3 August 2010 (Tripoli):

Maltese opposition leader Joseph Muscat met with Muammar Gaddafi. Both parties noted the good relations between Malta and Libya. According to some Maltese media, Muscat expressed his concern about the plans for drilling oil in the Mediterranean Sea.

4 August 2010 (Tripoli):

Libyan and Chinese businessmen signed an agreement to establish a joint Libyan-Chinese Business Council. The agreement is between the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade and the Libyan Businessmen Council.

4 August 2010 (Tripoli):

President of Sudan Omar al-Bashir met Muammar Gaddafi to discuss the conflict in Darfur. At his arrival, Prime Minister Baghdadi Mahmudi and Foreign Minister Mussa Kussa received al-Bashir. The following day in Khartoum, Sudan's Foreign Minister Kamal Hassan Ali said Tripoli agreed to restrict the activities of Khalil Ibrahim, the Sudanese rebel leader living in Libya since last May.

8 August 2010 (Tripoli):

Libya agreed to donate €60 million to Mauritania for investments including a university named after Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi.

9 August 2010 (Tripoli):

A Israeli-Tunisian man imprisoned in Libya since last March after photographing Jewish sites returned to Israel after being freed in a deal brokered by Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman. Libyan authorities suspected Rafael Hadad was a spy. According to the international media, this deal involved Israeli authorization for 20 prefabricated houses transported by a Libyan-sponsored ship which tried to reach Gaza in July to be delivered after the ship was diverted to Egypt.

9 August 2010 (Amman):

The Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation, headed by Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) signed a US\$50 million agreement to rebuild 1250 refugee homes in the Gaza Strip.

12 August 2010 (Tripoli):

British oil company BP announced a delay in its oil exploration in deep waters off the coast of Libya to ensure precautionary measures are in place for the drilling process to occur.

12 August 2010 (Tripoli):

The Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation and the UNRWA signed three additional agreements to the one reached on August 9th. These agreements involve a mobile health clinic for the West Bank; a support program for a school in Gaza; and a microfinance project meant to support 800 families.

13 August 2010 (Tripoli):

Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs Odein Ajumogobia met with Prime Minister Baghdadi Mahmudi in order to mend bilateral ties between the two countries.

16 August 2010 (Tripoli):

Shokri Ghanem, Chairman of Libya's National Oil Corporation, stated that BP is expected to start its deep water drilling operations in Libya by October at the latest.

20 August 2010 (London):

The United Kingdom warned Libya against celebrations marking the one-year release of convicted Lockerbie bomber Abdelbaset al-Megrahi. After reinforcing that al-Megrahi's release was a mistake, the UK's Foreign Office added that "any celebration of Megrahi's release will be tasteless, offensive and deeply insensitive to the victims' families".

20 August 2010 (Tripoli):

Libya refrained from publicly celebrating the one-year anniversary of the arrival of Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, contrary to what happened on August 20th 2009.

20 August 2010 (Rome):

Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi denied "any kind of business" ties to Libya or its ruler Muammar Gaddafi, even though some documents show that stakes in a Paris-based film company link the two leaders.

28-30 August 2010 (Rome):

Muammar Gaddafi visited Italy to commemorate the second anniversary of the signing of an accord worth €5 billion under which Rome agreed to pay reparations for its colonial rule. The agreement also contemplates an Italian commitment to build a highway along the Libyan coast, and cooperation between Libyan and Italian navies to stop African immigrants reaching Italian soil by boat from the North African coast. Muammar Gaddafi asked the European Union to pay Libya "at least €5 billion a year" for Tripoli to stop the waves of clandestine African migrants who sail from Libya's Mediterranean shores toward Western Europe.

1 September 2010 (Tripoli):

Libya released 37 men imprisoned for Islamist terrorist offenses, mostly members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Among

the released was an ex-Guantanamo detainee, the alleged former driver of Osama bin Laden.

1 September 2010 (Tripoli):

Libya celebrated the 41st anniversary of the Great Revolution. The Prime Ministers of Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Portugal attended the ceremonies, respectively Moulaye Ould Mohamed Laghdaf, Abbas El-Fassi, Ahmed Ouyahyia, Mohamed Ghannouchi and José Socrates.

2 September 2010 (Tripoli):

The political consultation meeting of the 5+5 dialogue group that focuses on promoting cooperation between Western Mediterranean states was held. The second 5+5 summit to be held next year in Malta was also discussed.

3 September 2010 (Beirut):

The Leader of Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah says that the Shia cleric Imam Moussa al-Sadr and his two companions are "alive and in custody in Libya". Nasrallah called on Libya to release them. Imam Moussa al-Sadr was kidnapped during an official visit to Tripoli to meet with officials from the government of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi in August 1978. In 2008, the government in Beirut issued an arrest warrant for Gaddafi over Sadr's disappearance. Libva has denied involvement, ignoring calls for more information on the case.

3 September 2010 (New York):

Libya initiated an action in the United Nations General Assembly to adopt a resolution requesting an international investigation into the occupation of Iraq by US troops and the execution of Saddam Hussein.

4 September 2010 (Tripoli):

The President of the Palestinian Authority **12 September 2010 (Tripoli):** Mahmoud Abbas met with senior Libyan A Libyan motor boat - one of the six Italy officials.

6 September 2010 (Damascus):

Foreign Minister Moussa Kossa met Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to discuss ways for Arab states to use Libya's position in North Africa and economically expand into the continent.

7 September 2010 (Tripoli):

Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, son of leader Muammar Gaddafi, said Libya will fight any claims for compensation by the families of people killed

by IRA bombs. Libya supplied explosives to the Irish terrorist organization, and for that reason the families of the victims have been fighting for compensation from Tripoli.

7 September 2010 (London):

It became public that British Prime Minister David Cameron wrote to Muammar Gaddafi over the stalled probe into the death of Yvonne Fletcher, who was killed in 1984 by a gunman believed to be inside Libya's embassy in London. It was part of a series of "intense representations" which resulted in a UK delegation visiting Tripoli in August.

7 September 2010 (Tripoli):

Libya's government denied having any investments in foreign oil companies, in an apparent rebuff to the country's top energy official who said buying shares in BP would be a good deal.

8 September 2010 (Tripoli):

The chairman of Libya's National Oil Corporation Shokri Ghanem said OPEC needs a higher oil price of US\$100 a barrel because the rising costs of imports such as food have eroded OPEC members' income.

8 September 2010 (Tripoli):

Muammar Gaddafi met Malian President Amadou Toumani Touré. The talks focused on the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) and its institutions.

9 September 2010 (Karlsruhe):

The Federal Prosecutor's Office in Karlsruhe, Germany, said that two Libyan men were charged with spying on members of the Libyan opposition in Germany.

donated to Tripoli - fired with machine guns on a Sicilian fishing boat with 10 men on board about 30 miles off the Libyan coast. Italy classified it as a "serious incident", despite its efforts to downplay it as a mistake.

14 September 2010 (Rome):

Italy's Interior Minister Roberto Maroni said Libya had apologized for opening fire on an Italian fishing boat off its coast using a vessel supplied by Rome and promised an investigation.

16 September 2010 (Rome):

The Italian government asked Libya to clarify the nature of the stakes held by its sovereign wealth fund and central bank in Italy's biggest bank, UniCredit.

17 September 2010 (Tripoli):

Libya bought a further 0.5% of Italy's biggest bank UniCredit to take its overall stake to 2.59%.

19 September 2010 (Geneva):

It became public that a Swiss soldier entered Libya on a covert mission in 2009 to make plans to whisk across the border two Swiss citizens that were being held by Libyan authorities.

20 September 2010 (Tripoli):

Libya fired the navy commander who opened fire on an Italian trawler in the Gulf of Sirte.

20 September 2010 (New York):

In his first UN appearance, Muammar Gaddafi attacked the Security Council for being ineffective.

Mauritania

4 August 2010 (Nouakchott):

President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz said Mauritania is not fighting al-Qaeda, but a local form of terrorism based in the Sahel, adding that the country's Treasury has allocated US\$50 million for equipment and the modernization of the Armed Forces.

23 August 2010 (Nouakchott):

Albert Vilalta and Roque Pascual, taken hostage by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb while on a relief mission through Mauritania in November last year, were released in Mali.

25 August 2010 (Nouakchott):

Mauritania and Mali signed a four-year partnership agreement for the supply of refined hydrocarbon products. Mauritanian Energy Minister Ibrahima Lamine Wane supervised the signing ceremony in Nouakchott.

31 August 2010 (Nouakchott):

Said Jinnit, the UN Secretary General's Special Envoy to West Africa, visited Mauritania to restart an inclusive and open dialogue between the country's ruling party and the opposition.

9 September 2010 (Nouakchott):

President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz pardoned and freed from prison 15 convicted Islamist terrorists to mark the end of Ramadan. Twenty Islamist prisoners awaiting trial were also pardoned as a gesture to celebrate Eid al-Fitr, the feast after the holy month of fasting.

12 September 2010 (Nouakchott):

The main opposition party, the Rally for Democratic Forces, recognized the election of President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz after disputing the result for more than a year.

15 September 2010 (Nouakchott):

President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz met with Malian Foreign Minister Badra Aliou Makalou, who relayed a message from President Amadou Toumani Touré focused on strengthening counterterrorism cooperation.

19 September 2010 (Nouakchott):

According to a Mauritanian military official, Mauritania's Air Force bombarded positions held by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in northern Mali. AQIM accused Nouakchott of killing civilians and being a French agent in the region.

21 September 2010 (Bamako):

President Mohammed Ould Abdel Aziz visited Mali to discuss his country's recent crossborder military incursion. Defence Minister Hamady Ould Hamady was also in the Mauritanian delegation.

22 September 2010 (New York):

On the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, Prime Minister Moulaye Ould Mohamed Laghdaf met with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

25 September 2010 (New York):

While addressing the UN General Assembly, Prime Minister Moulaye Ould Mohamed Laghdaf warned against associating Islam with terrorism.

Morocco

2 August 2010 (Rabat):

Foreign Minister Taib Fassi Fihri met with Spanish ambassador Luis Planas Puchades to protest against what Rabat perceives as physical abuse inflicted on Moroccan citizens once again by Spanish police at the crossing point between Morocco and the Spanish city of Melilla.

8 August 2010 (Bogotá):

Foreign Minister Taib Fassi Fihri represented King Mohammed VI at the inaugural ceremony for Colombia's newly elected President Juan Manuel Santos.

11 August 2010 (Rabat):

Spanish King Juan Carlos spoke on the telephone with King Mohammed VI to attempt to smooth over a diplomatic row between the two countries concerning the alleged physical abuse perpetrated by Spanish police on Moroccan citizens in Melilla.

11 August 2010 (Rabat):

King Mohammed VI sent US\$1 million and humanitarian aid worth the same amount to Pakistan, in order to provide relief to the victims of the floods.

18 August 2010 (Melilla):

After a commercial blockade of Melilla by Moroccan protesters due to alleged practices of violence and racism on the part of the Spanish police, former Spanish Prime Minister José Maria Aznar visited the Spanish enclave of Melilla, an event that led the current Spanish government to accuse Aznar of disloyalty toward Madrid's current foreign policy.

18 August 2010 (Melilla):

Moroccan protesters who challenged Spain's authority over Melilla said they would suspend their actions to leave the way clear for a diplomatic solution.

18-19 August 2010 (Hanoi):

During the 2nd Africa-Vietnam Forum, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Mohamed Ouzzine restated Morocco's commitment to regional development and the importance of South-South solidarity.

20 August 2010 (Rabat):

King Mohamed VI reaffirmed his autonomy plan for Western Sahara. Mohammed VI stated that his government's proposals for the autonomy of Western Sahara have "more international support" than "the despairing maneuvers" of its adversaries.

23 August 2010 (Rabat):

Following a phone conversation between Spanish King Juan Carlos and King Mohammed VI, Interior Minister Taib Cherkaoui met with his Spanish counterpart, Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba with the purpose of resolving the dispute over Melilla. The two Interior Ministers signed an agreement aimed at strengthening police cooperation between Spain and Morocco.

27 August 2010 (Rabat):

Grenada's Foreign Minister Peter David demonstrated his support for Morocco's West Sahara autonomy plan in a meeting with Foreign Minister Taib Fassi Fihri.

7 September 2010 (Rabat):

Foreign Minister Taib Fassi Fihri met the Spanish Foreign Affairs Secretary of State Juan Pablo de la Iglesia to discuss ways of deepening bilateral ties.

14 September 2010 (Casablanca):

As part of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue Program, five NATO vessels took part in a three day joint training operation with the Moroccan navy. The exercise aimed at strengthening cooperation in the fight against terrorism.

14 September 2010 (Rabat):

Foreign Affairs Secretary of State Latifa Akharbach met a delegation of French Senators from the Senate's France-Morocco Friendship Group. The Senators visited the country between the 13th and the 18th September.

20 September 2010 (New York):

King Mohammed VI addressed the UN General Assembly where he called upon other partners to seize the historic opportunity of the autonomy initiative proposed by Rabat on Western Sahara. Morocco was awarded the 2010 UN Habitat Award.

20 September 2010 (New York):

At UN headquarters, King Mohammed VI met with Prime Minister of Spain José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. Zapatero reiterated Madrid's support to the multidimensional partnership between Morocco and the European Union, within the framework of the "advanced status".

20 September 2010 (New York):

At the Moroccan embassy in New York, King Mohammed VI met with French President Nicolas Sarkozy. The meeting focused on Morocco's "advanced status" with the European Union, the Middle East and the Maghreb. Sarkozy reiterated France's support for Morocco's autonomy initiative to reach a final solution to the regional dispute over the Western Sahara under the aegis of the UN.

23 September 2010 (Rabat):

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Mohamed Ouzzine met with Guinea-Bissau's Minister of Interior Hadja Satu Camara with the purpose of discussing and deepening bilateral ties.

27 September 2010 (Rabat):

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Latifa Akharbach met with the Bulgarian Minister of Economy, Energy and Tourism Traytcho Traykov on the occasion of the 9th session of the intergovernmental Bulgaria-Morocco economic commission.

Tunisia

1-2 August 2010 (Tunis):

During the 22nd ordinary session of the Arab Atomic Energy Agency, the general congress examined the issues submitted to it by the executive council and related to the activity of the Agency during 2009-2010.

2-4 August 2010 (São Paulo):

A Tunisian delegation of businessmen paid a visit to Brazil as part of a mission organized by the Tunisian Industry, Commerce and Handicrafts Union. The meetings focused on cooperation in the agricultural food sector, textiles and clothing industries, automotive components, information and communication technology and tourism.

5-7 August 2010 (Tunis):

Foreign Minister Kamel Morjane opened the annual conference of Heads of Diplomatic and Consular Missions. Morjane restated that the 9th item on the presidential program for 2009-2014 is dedicated to Tunisians abroad. President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali closed the event.

12 August 2010 (New York):

United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon received Minister of Youth, Sports and Physical Education Samir Laabidi. Ban Ki-moon showed appreciation for President Ben Ali's initiative to proclaim 2010 International Year of Youth.

14-15 August 2010 (Brazzaville):

At the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Democratic Republic of Congo's independence, Secretary of State for Maghreb, Arab and African Affairs Abdelhafidh Harguem conferred with the Congolese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Basile Ikouébé.

16 August 2010 (Ras Jedir):

Tunisian protesters clashed with the police over new restrictions and border crossing fees between Tunisia and Libya. The Ras Jedir border crossing was blocked.

17 August 2010 (Tunis):

Tunisia supported a proposed high-speed rail link with Libya, Morocco and Algeria. Secretary of State for Foreign Trade Chokri Mamoghli said that the Maghreb transport sector serves as a bridge between Europe and Africa. The proposed "Trans-Maghreb" TGV will extend from Casablanca to Tripoli via Algiers and Tunisia.

18 August 2010 (Abidjan):

The Secretary of State for Maghreb, Arab and African Affairs Abdelhafidh Herguem conferred with Ivory Coast's Minister of Foreign Affairs and African Integration Jean Marie Kacou Gervais. Both parties agreed to strengthen bilateral ties.

25 August 2010 (Tunis):

Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Ángel Moratinos met with his Tunisian counterpart, Kamel Morjane. The ministers discussed the "5+5" dialogue, the Union for the Mediterranean and other issues of common interest.

1 September 2010 (Tripoli):

On the sidelines of Libya's celebration of the 41st anniversary of the Great Revolution, Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi met with the French Secretary of State in charge of European affairs Pierre Lellouche to review ways to boost the Euro-Mediterranean process and reinforce cooperation between the peoples of the region.

3 September 2010 (Tunis):

Tunisia backed Muammar Gaddafi's proposal for €5 billion from the EU to tackle illegal immigration. The Tunisian Foreign Affairs Ministry described the proposal as "serious" in view of "strengthening the capacities of our country to identify appropriate solutions to tackle illegal and non-organized immigration".

5 September 2010 (Tunis):

President of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas met with senior Tunisian officials.

8 September 2010 (Tunis):

Foreign Affairs Minister Kamel Morjane conferred with Libyan Secretary for Arab affairs in charge of external communication and international cooperation Omrane Boukraa. Both examined the implementation of decisions made at the 22nd session of the higher joint committee held in Tripoli in December 2009, and reviewed the 23rd session of the high executive committee, as well as the 8th session of the consular affairs commission due to be held in Tripoli at the end of next October.

16 September 2010 (Cairo):

Foreign Affairs Minister Kamel Morjane led the Tunisian delegation to the 134th session of the Arab League Council, held at the ministerial level. On the sidelines of the session, Morjane had talks with the Secretary-General of the Arab League, as well as with his Algerian, Egyptian, Djiboutian and Comoran counterparts and Kuwait's State Minister for Foreign Affairs.

20-22 September 2010 (New York):

A delegation led by Foreign Minister Kamel Morjane took part in the 65th UN General Assembly, part of the high-level Plenary Meeting on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Morjane had bilateral talks with several heads of delegations from countries such as the foreign ministers of Algeria, Morocco, Portugal and Australia.

29 September 2010 (Tunis):

Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi met with the Canadian Prime Minister's Special Representative for Francophony, Jacques Bilodeau. The meeting focused on the Summit of Francophony currently chaired by Canada pending the 13th Summit scheduled to be held from from the 22nd to 24th of October, 2010 in Montreux, Switzerland.

Reading List

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EDITORS | Paulo Gorjão • Tobias Schumacher ASSISTANT EDITORS | Diogo Noivo • Laura Tereno

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Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security (IPRIS) Rua Vitorino Nemésio, 5 - 1750-306 Lisboa PORTUGAL

http://www.ipris.org email: ipris@ipris.org

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