



Angola's new Constitution: The old hegemony authorized

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Angola's new Constitution entered into force in February in the midst of the Cabinda incident and the African Cup of Nations. The timing of this approval contributed to limit its visibility for outsiders. Internally, however, many sectors of society understood that the legal changes it brought about are paramount for the future of the country.

How can one explain the changes introduced by the Constitution? Looking back, one can recall the concept of "political and economic hegemony", applied to Angola by Christine Messiant as a way of analysing the quasi-total grip exerted by the MPLA party. Above all, this was used to explain Presidential control over the country in those areas since the late 1980's. Hence, truth be told, this new Constitution does not bring real po-

litical change; it only translates into legal text Angola's political and economic reality. These legal changes will influence Angola's immediate prospects.

The main change introduced is, of course, the method of electing the President. One could hardly describe it as an election, as the head-list of the winning party in legislative elections is directly picked as President without any form of indirect election or approval by the Parliament. This method erases any effective separation of power between executive and legislative. Furthermore, this Constitution reinforces the President's authority, as he now becomes head of the Executive, nominating both the Vice-President as well as government ministers. The Parliament – vastly controlled by the MPLA – becomes a rubber-stamp institution. Similarly, public prosecutors and magistrates are also nominated by the President, thus deepening his control over the political system.

This new Constitution having been approved, the main question facing Angola in the near future – the one about the Presidential succession – is answered. It is now clear that the present President will choose his successor, not the electorate. With MPLA's current hegemony, it seems clear that its own candidate will win

the 2012 general elections. José Eduardo dos Santos already signalled he will run and ordered the party politburo to start preparing to win the elections. Two years ahead of polling, the President and the party are already campaigning – with means incomparably larger than the opposition.

By establishing these electoral mechanisms and by reinforcing the position of the current power holders, the Constitution mirrors the Presidency's growing control over the country in the last 20 years. Ever since the peace talks with UNITA in the end of the 1980's and after the first elections in 1992, Angola has been stuck in transition. Scholars would identify it – using Marina Ottaway's concept – as a triple transition: from war to peace, from authoritarianism to liberal democracy, from state to market economy. Nowadays, one can clearly assert that none of these transitions were fully achieved, proving that "regime transition" theories have many shortfalls. Angola only transited to a hybrid regime: the Cabinda situation remains murky, although under control; the Presidency controls the political situation; and the economy is dominated by a clientelistic network centred on the Presidency.

This said, the Angolan situation is, without comparison, much better in



every field since the end of the war in 2002. One should not solely judge the current situation against legitimate expectations (internal and external ones). It is worth to note that only eight years have passed, after a devastating half century of wars. Habits acquired during this time, in particular by the ruling President, do not disappear easily.

Unfortunately, this Constitution does not take a step in the direction of a 'full' transition; instead, it stalls it even more by clearly underpinning the dominant position of a few.

Yet, positive signs exist. The new Constitution protects individual and group rights such as freedom of speech, of association and political liberties (Title II, Chapter II – although one can question its strength). One can find in Angola, beyond the state-controlled media, free press – albeit not irresponsible (the *Novo Jornal* or *Radio Ecclesia* are good examples). Angolan academia and activists, both outside and inside the country, are active and heard (like Justino Pinto de Andrade or Rafael Marques de Morais). Inside Angola, this is permitted because the Presidency and the MPLA have confidence in their overall control of the situation, therefore allowing for some valid and true criticism. Even inside the MPLA – where politics and debate have always taken place – some analysis is now expressed beyond closed doors.

This indicates that, at least, an elite, but probably most of the population in urban centres, has a lucid consciousness of the political and economic situation Angola is in. This is a clear and positive change that occurred in the last years. Yet, in the coming years no authentic political change will come thanks to this new Constitution. The question now is to think further down the road: will the country's political and economic situation remain as a hybrid regime – shielded from outside criticism by oil – or will internal criticism and demands rise? Plus, how will the Presidency react? Will it control the

situation such as it is doing now? Will it answer legitimate demands or will it feel threatened and crack down on opposition more openly? Angola is evolving in every field, probably not as fast as desired, but there is real and palpable change in daily lives and the way the country reflects and examines itself.

Threats to food sovereignty in Guinea-Bissau

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Guinea-Bissau's poverty levels and human development indicators are among the most dismal in the world. Amidst such dire straits, however, the crucial problems of under- and malnutrition have traditionally been kept in check by the relative abundance and fertility of the land and the lack of significant political or economic constraints to the access to the land by the Bissau-Guinean peasantry. This has enabled the peasantry, which constitutes the bulk of the population, to maintain substantial control over the local systems of food provision. In addition to the direct advantages in terms of ensuring access to and control over food, in the past this has arguably had a positive effect in the conflict and security domains, by preventing even greater discontent and an even more accelerated urbanisation process than has actually occurred. Over the last couple decades, however, Guinea-Bissau's agrarian world has undergone significant

changes that increasingly threaten the food sovereignty (i.e. control over food production and provision systems) of its population. While taking locally specific forms, these changes are also manifestations of processes at work on a wider scale around the world.

The first of these is the gradual shift from food crops to cash crops – in other words, to agricultural production destined for international markets instead of local consumption. In Guinea-Bissau, this has taken the form of an astonishing expansion of cashew production and increasing reliance upon the import of rice, the local staple. Once a net exporter of rice, the country now imports around 40% of its total rice consumption. Given the advantageous terms of trade extant at the outset of this process and explicit encouragement from the government, cashew production for sale to traders or barter for imported rice seemed a sensible strategy for local producers, and it gradually swept across Guinea-Bissau from the late 1980's onwards. The expansion of cashew production has been directly linked to the increasing reliance upon rice imports: the former rivals the dry-land varieties of the latter in terms of land requirements, and the seasonally concentrated labour requirements of cashew production have had a negative effect upon the rural labour supply by encouraging rural-urban migration during the rest of the year, with a significant share of the urban population only returning to the countryside for the cashew harvesting season.

This has largely locked the country in a situation of monoculture specialisation that is not easily undone. Cashew now accounts for 98% of the country's export earnings, but, crucially, not only is its price in the international market extremely volatile, it has also exhibited a persistent downward trend since the inception of this transition. As a consequence, the increase in the volume of cashew output has been largely offset by the



declining terms of trade of cashew for rice, which on average have declined by around three-quarters over the last decade. While food *security* as such (in the narrow sense of sufficient availability of food) is not at risk at present, subjection to world market forces in the context of an international food regime that is prone to food price crises, such as that which occurred in 2007 and 2008, has already had a destabilising effect upon rural livelihoods and may have even more serious consequences in the future.

Moreover, there is a risk of this being compounded by the second threat to food sovereignty facing Guinea-Bissau, namely the allocation of land to international corporations with a view to the cultivation of crops for biofuels. A large-scale project in this area has already been pre-approved by the government and other expressions of interest have been made public. Should this become a more widespread policy, the reduced access to arable land by the peasantry may well prove to be a ticking time-bomb, especially alongside the aforementioned increasing reliance upon cash crops, unfavourable climate changes afflicting the region and the country's high population growth rate.

Guinea-Bissau's domestic financial resource base is slim, hence the pressure upon domestic policymakers to search for foreign sources of revenue is very great. In doing so, however, they should steer clear of giving signals and taking policy options that are likely to ultimately cause more harm than good. Agrarian policy will in the next few years be a central arena in this respect and the choices made at this level will inevitably have important consequences in other spheres of Guinea-Bissau's economic and political life. Domestic and international actors should not lose sight of this fact and should ensure that steps are taken to reverse current trends so that food sovereignty is upheld in the country.

Mozambique and Portugal: Is the Cahora Bassa issue solved, once and for all?

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In early March, Portuguese Prime Minister José Sócrates visited Mozambique, accompanied by a group of businessmen, as well as of members of the government and leaders of the public administration. As usually happens in these official state visits, several memoranda of understanding were signed. Among other topics, the Portuguese government promised to double the credit line to Mozambique from €200 million to €400 million, and a new financial institution was created – a joint venture between Mozambique and the Portuguese bank *Caixa Geral dos Depósitos*, with an initial financial capital of €500 million divided in equal parts. Equally important, Maputo and Lisbon also agreed to hold annual summits between the two governments. Finally, Sócrates announced that the Portuguese government decided to sell its share of 15% in the stock capital of the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric dam in Mozambique.

Cahora Bassa has been an irritant in bilateral relations because Mozambique saw it as a legacy of the colonial times. After several decades of disagreement, an accord was reached, in November 2005, between the governments of Portugal and Mozambique. Lisbon agreed to sell 67% of the shares of Cahora Bassa to the government of Mozambique at a total cost of US\$950 mil-

lion. Portugal remained as a shareholder and strategic partner – now with only 15% of the stock capital – and the government in Maputo became the majority shareholder with 85% of the stocks.

It is questionable whether this was a good deal for Lisbon and if Portugal's national interests were served. To answer this, we must take into account elements of policy and strategy that go beyond the exclusive fields of economy and finances. Here it is enough to ask if it would be worthwhile to continue to require the payment of a debt that Mozambique simply was not able to pay. Indeed, the Mozambican government gave the first installment of US\$250 million, but then there were some difficulties concerning the payment of the remaining US\$700 million, which were only paid after a banking consortium, which included the *Banco Português de Investimentos* (BPI), ensured funding, with the guarantee of sales of energy from Cahora Bassa to South Africa, among other states.

One also could ask whether it would not have been more reasonable to try to reach a platform of understanding that would minimize the damage to the Portuguese treasury, while at the same time ending a sticking point in the political and diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Recently, Portugal has made clear its desire to overcome the hurdle Cahora Bassa presented to the consolidation of better relations and exploitation of the potential opportunities of Mozambique's increasing regional influence. In the last few years, Maputo's role within the sub-region of Southern Africa and SADC has been growing, both in economic and geopolitical importance. In addition to its key position in transport and communications throughout the region, Mozambique now also holds a very important card regarding energy and water. The control of Cahora Bassa by the Mozambican state is presented in an internal report as a factor of "added strategic importance to Mozambique and its prestige to the regional and international levels," adding that Cahora



Bassa is the key development for the *Plano de Desenvolvimento do Vale do Zambeze* (PDVZ). This plan covers an area of 229,000 square kilometers and has attracted great international interest from countries such as Australia, China, India, and the U.S., among others, all of them hoping to invest in the exploitation of Mozambique's vast energy, agro-pastoral and geological resources.

Meanwhile, who will buy the remaining Portuguese 15% stake in Cahora Bassa is still uncertain. It could be one of the large electric companies in Portugal, *Energias de Portugal* (EDP) or *Redes Energéticas Nacionais* (REN). The details are not yet known, nor the price or the conditions involved. Either way, the Portuguese exit strategy from Cahora Bassa will provide the political conditions for a new path. Indeed, the decision to hold annual bilateral summits between the two governments reveals that the door for the strengthening of diplomatic relations between both countries has already been opened.

Portugal and the gas market of the South

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In an interview this month to the weekly newspaper *Expresso*, the Portuguese Secretary of State for Energy and Innovation, Carlos Zorinho, said that Portugal – together with Spain – was actively working to-

wards consolidating the gas market of the South, in hopes that it would serve as a tool to avoid excessive European dependency on Russian natural gas, as well as on the pipeline network coming from Eastern Europe. In his words, Portugal wants to be a significant player as far as the gas market of the South is concerned, in particular regarding gas storage facilities. Indeed, although Portugal is deprived of natural gas reserves, it could be a privileged transit country linking natural gas producers – such as Algeria, Brazil, Libya, Nigeria, or Venezuela, among others – and European consumers of natural gas.

Currently, Russia provides about a quarter of all natural gas consumed in the European Union, and the Ukraine ensures transport for about 80% of Russian gas consumed by European states. Three major gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine have taken place since 2005. Each one of them has come to show that European states are excessively dependent not only on Russian natural gas, but also on the Eastern European pipeline grid. Thus, any reasonable strategy on energy security would recommend both an effort to diversify the sources of the natural gas consumed in the European Union, and to create viable alternative transit routes. Indeed, if it goes forward, the Nabucco gas pipeline will connect the Caspian region, the Middle East and Egypt via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary with Austria and further on with the Central and Western European gas markets. Although a welcome initiative, European projects such as the Nabucco gas pipeline provide only a partial answer to the energy security problem. The gas market of the South fits within this European strategy of diversification both regarding access to different gas producers and the creation of alternative transit routes.

Despite the European Union's efforts to promote a more efficient use of energy or its support of renewable

sources of energy such as sunlight, wind, rain, tides, and geothermal heat, the fact remains that natural gas consumption will not decline in the short-to-medium term future. Rather, the contrary is true. Natural gas consumption will continue to increase in the forthcoming years. As a result, under normal circumstances, investing in the gas market of the South is almost inevitable: it does not make any sense for the European Union to continue ignoring alternatives to Russian gas and to the Eastern European pipeline network. Therefore, the question is not if the gas market of the South will take place, but when exactly it will take shape.

Moreover, as far as liquefied natural gas (LNG) is concerned, there is enormous potential for growth. The LNG market in the European Union is still incipient. With just a few regasification terminals in Belgium, France, Italy, Greece, Spain and the United Kingdom, the European Union continues to ignore the potential of this LNG technology within its energy security. An overall strategy reinforcing the import of LNG would allow European states to diversify their array of natural gas producers and access routes.

Either way, both concerning natural gas and LNG, Portugal can play a relevant role as a strategic pivot between the European Union, the Mediterranean, the Maghreb, the Atlantic and Latin America. Since 2007, Algeria's *Sonatrach* has a 2% stake in *Energias de Portugal* (EDP). Meanwhile, in the last few months, Brazil's *Petrobrás* has been in talks to buy a stake in Portugal's *Galp Energia*, probably ENI's stake (Angola's *Sonangol* is already a shareholder of *Galp Energia*). In order to reinforce this role as a strategic pivot, Portugal must consolidate key partnerships with oil and gas producers. *Sonatrach's* stake in EDP could potentially increase in exchange for a more developed partnership. The same is true regarding other natural gas producers. In order to guarantee



that Portugal will play a role in the gas market of the South, a successful strategy must not only be concerted with Spain, but should also assume an integrated approach regarding upstream and downstream operations.

São Tomé and Príncipe: 12 oil ministers since 1999, but not a single drop of oil yet

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In 1999, Luís dos Prazeres "Kapa-la", a Nigerian-trained airline pilot and, since its inauguration in 2004, the executive director of São Tomé and Príncipe's National Oil Agency (ANP), became the country's first minister of natural resources. Since then, the small country has had another eleven ministers in charge of the oil portfolio. Prime Minister Rafael Branco alone, himself the third oil minister in 2002, has appointed four different ministers of natural resources since he assumed office in June 2008. Curiously enough, the country has not yet discovered any hydrocarbons, let alone produced a single barrel of oil. However, since October 2007 São Tomé has resold crude supplied by Nigeria. At that time President Olusegun Obasanjo

conceded São Tomé an allocation of 30,000 barrels per day at a preferential price for resale on the international market. The supply was suspended in 2007 after Obasanjo was succeeded in office by President Umaru Yar-Adua, but in early 2009 the latter promised President Menezes the resumption of the crude supply.

Long gone is the enthusiasm of 2003 when the first licensing round for oil blocks in the Joint Development Zone (JDZ) with Nigeria took place. Then the minimum bid per block was set at US\$30 million. Chevron submitted the highest offer of US\$123 million for Block 1, while the highest bids for the seven blocks in this auction amounted to a total of some US\$500 million. Almost forgotten were the troubles of São Tomé's contested oil agreements with the Nigerian ERHC (signed in 1997), Mobil (1998), and the Norwegian PGS (2001), which had been renegotiated in 2003 after international oil experts had denounced their terms as detrimental to São Tomé's national interests. The initial euphoria of the licensing round subsided when the governments in Abuja and São Tomé realized that most bidders were Nigerian companies without any financial or technical capacities for deep-sea oil exploration.

Consequently, in 2004 only the exploration license of Block 1 was awarded to Chevron (51%), ExxonMobil (40%) and a Nigerian company (9%). In December of the same year, Blocks 2-6 were again put on sale in a second auction. Following a process marked by accusations of irregularities, in May 2005, the five blocks were attributed to various consortiums. However, Product Sharing Contracts (PSC) were only signed for Blocks 2, 3 and 4, while the ownership of Blocks 5 and 6 has become the object of a never ending juridical dispute involving ERHC, which claims 15% preferential rights on both blocks. For the four blocks with a PSC, São Tomé received its share of 40% in signature bonuses,

altogether US\$77.8 million. Nearly a quarter of this amount was used to repay debts to Nigeria, while the remainder was channelled to the national budget and predominantly spent on current expenditures.

A major setback occurred in May 2006 when Chevron announced the results of the exploration well drilled in Block 1 earlier that year. Hydrocarbons had been found, but they were not considered commercially viable. For more than three years the oil sector in São Tomé and Príncipe came almost to a standstill. Additional exploratory wells were not drilled and licensing rounds were held neither in the JDZ nor in the country's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

Irrespective the unproven hydrocarbon reserves in the JDZ, since 2005 the original ownership of the exploration licenses for the four blocks has changed considerably through acquisitions and a major takeover. Owing to its preferential rights, ERHC maintains working interests in Blocks 2 (22%), 3 (10%), and 4 (19.5%). Through acquisitions, Addax Petroleum, a Swiss company that had not participated in the licensing rounds, became the largest stakeholder in the JDZ. In February 2006, Addax and the China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), which likewise did not take part in the auctions, took over 14.3% and 28.7% respectively in Block 2 from a U.S. company. In September 2007, Addax bought ExxonMobil's 40% working interest in Block 1. Finally, last August, Addax acquired Anadarko's 51% stake in Block 3. At that time Addax owned stakes in Block 1 (40%), Block 2 (14.3%), Block 3 (66%) and Block 4 (45.5%). Already in June 2009 Addax had announced its takeover by Sinopec for \$7.3 billion, which became effective in October. Besides the stakes in the JDZ, Addax owned drilling rights in Gabon, Nigeria, and Kurdish area in Iraq. Through the takeover, Sinopec has now become by far the largest investor in the JDZ. At least so far,



the Chinese engagement in the JDZ has not affected São Tomé's relations with Taiwan, which since 1997 has been one of the archipelago's major donors. Meanwhile, in early March, it was reported that Chevron might sell its interest in Block 1 to the French Total.

Finally, in late August 2009 Sinopec and Addax, the operators of Blocks 2 and 4 respectively, started exploration drillings that initially had been announced for 2008. In October, Addax commenced exploration drillings in the newly acquired Block 3. In November and December Addax drilled another two wells in Block 4. Jorge Santos, executive director of the Joint Development Authority (JDA) in Abuja, has announced that signs of oil have been found in Blocks 2 and 3. However, official drilling results have not yet been disclosed. Instead, the two companies asked the JDA for a 6-12 month extension of the exploration period that ends in March.

Last November, São Tomé approved an amendment to the oil revenue management law of 2004 that now allows the direct award of blocks in the EEZ to interested oil companies, provided that the bidding round failed to attract suitable bids.

On 2 March the ANP launched the first licensing round for seven of 19 delineated blocks in the EEZ that will be closed on 15 September. This time no minimum bid was required. Already in February, ERHC and Equator Exploration, a company that had acquired PGS pre-emption rights in 2004, exercised their preferential options of 100% working interests in two blocks of their choice each in the EEZ. Consequently, ERHC and Equator were awarded Blocks 4 and 11 and Blocks 5 and 12 respectively. Furthermore, ERHC and Equator have additional rights to acquire up to 15% paid working interests in another two blocks and one block respectively. Meanwhile, Luís dos Prazeres of the ANP has claimed that various reputable oil companies have manifested their interest in the

open tender, including the majors ExxonMobil and Shell.

Preceding the licensing round, São Tomé has resumed efforts for the constitution of a "lusophone" consortium for oil exploration in the EEZ. This idea was first launched by São Tomé in 2005, but the consortium has never gotten off the ground. The Brazilian *Petrobrás*, a company with deep-sea exploration capacity, has already declined participation due to other operational priorities. Angola's *Sonangol* has manifested interest, but stressed that nothing was definite yet, while the Portuguese *Galp Energia* initiated exploratory talks with São Tomé about a consortium with *Petrogás*, the archipelago's state oil company, which still exists only on paper. The establishment of the consortium is also a political decision, since both Portugal and Angola maintain close ties with São Tomé and Príncipe. However, it remains to be seen if without *Petrobrás* and in the absence of proven commercial hydrocarbon reserves in the EEZ such a consortium is economically viable at all.

The recurring dilemma in Timor Leste: Tribunals or trade?

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Since Timor Leste's independence in 2002, following a quarter century of Indonesian occupation, human

rights groups have issued continuous calls for a tribunal to press charges against those responsible for ordering and committing atrocities under Indonesian rule and during the tumultuous period leading up to and following the independence referendum of 30 August 1999. Discussion on this topic recently reentered the news following a report from Amnesty International on 8 March that President José Ramos-Horta had told the group that "he would support the establishment of an international criminal tribunal for crimes committed during the 1975-99 occupation by Indonesia, should the UN Security Council set it up". This stood in contrast to Ramos-Horta's previous stance of eschewing a tribunal in favor of reconciliation with Indonesia. Indeed, the next day Ramos-Horta told *Agence France-Presse* that he had been misquoted by Amnesty, saying "I remain firmly unconvinced that the interests of the victims of my country and the cause of peace and democracy are best served with an international tribunal".

While the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor Leste (CAVR) issued its final report, *Chega!*, in 2006, and a Commission for Truth and Friendship (CTF) to review crimes committed in 1999 was jointly established by Timor Leste and Indonesia in 2005 and issued a report in 2008, the issue of impunity and the establishment of tribunals has remained a thorny one. The *Chega!* report is clear in its recommendation that the United Nations "be prepared to institute an International Tribunal pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter should other measures be deemed to have failed to deliver a sufficient measure of justice and Indonesia persists in the obstruction of justice". While the Security Council has failed to press the matter and Indonesia has most certainly been clay-footed on the issue, much of the reluctance to pursue the establishment of a tribunal has come from the government of Timor Leste itself.



The establishment of the CTF was widely decried by activist groups, with a coalition of Indonesian and Timorese NGOs declaring that the CTF "is clearly intended to pardon those guilty of serious human rights violations in East Timor, without regard to their degree of culpability". Yet Timorese officials, including those at the highest levels, have continuously failed to give support to the calls of human rights groups to use international channels to hold accountable those Indonesians and Timorese responsible for atrocities during the occupation and in 1999. In August, Ramos-Horta rejected another call by Amnesty for a tribunal's establishment, saying, "Why always should East Timor be an international experiment with international justice? I have opposed and continue to oppose an international tribunal for East Timor", which is why Amnesty's recent claim was met so quickly with skepticism. The very day the Amnesty report was released Timor Leste's Ambassador Manuel de Araújo Serrano met with Indonesia's Military Chief General Djoko Santoso, stressing the importance of bilateral ties and improved relations with the Indonesian military.

This incident highlights the dilemma that has been facing the government of Timor Leste since independence: should it press for accountability for human rights abuses committed against its people by Indonesian forces and by Timorese currently living in Indonesia, or should it leave these events in the past and concentrate on cultivating a strong relationship with Indonesia for the future? Given the serious nature of the atrocities committed and the impunity enjoyed by perpetrators today, it seems unjust to obstruct or fail to push for an independent international criminal tribunal that could call to account those responsible for Timor Leste's long and painful period of repression. This would not only help to provide closure for victims and their families,

who would cease to feel that their suffering has been ignored, but it would also contribute to the construction of a global human rights regime in which crimes are not allowed to go unpunished, demonstrating the serious consequences violators will face.

On the other hand, Timor Leste is one of the poorest countries in the world, dependent largely on foreign aid (though it is beginning to develop its petroleum resources). Indonesia is the world's fourth most populous country and has a fast-growing economy. For Timor Leste to develop its own economy and to begin to wean itself off of aid, increased trade with Indonesia is a necessary, logical step. Indonesia has made it clear that it is opposed to any attempts to establish a tribunal and prosecute its military officers. This is, after all, a country which never undertook any measures to provide justice for the hundreds of thousands of its own citizens massacred in 1965-1966. Among Ramos-Horta and the rest of the Timorese leadership a decision appears to have been made that it is for the collective benefit of current and future Timorese to seek reconciliation and stronger ties with Indonesia, even if this is to the detriment of justice for human rights violations.

As unpalatable as it may be to allow impunity for war criminals, the best course for the international community is to respect the wishes of the government of Timor Leste and drop any efforts to establish a criminal tribunal. As has been documented in the CAVR and CTF reports, the human rights of thousands of Timorese were systematically violated between 1975 and 1999. However, the Timorese government has determined that what is more important now is the safeguarding of its people's right to freedom from want, which will be most easily achieved with Indonesian assistance. The abuses committed should continue to be condemned, but without a change of stance from Timor Leste's

government, international action toward a tribunal would be presumptuous and erroneous.



Brazil's National Defense Strategy: At last, matching words with deeds?

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In recent decades, as Brazil's regional power and foreign ambitions consistently grew, it also began to come to terms with the harsh reality of its long ignored military sector. With the excruciating experience of the military dictatorship and the profound wounds left within civil society in mind, consecutive Brazilian governments preferred to carefully avoid the necessary investments to modernize and update the country's security forces, while also neglecting to produce a coherent strategy that would theorize and synthesize a new defense policy, amidst a new democratic order.

Aiming to move beyond this background, the current administration focused on outlining a new National Defense Policy (NDP) and National Defense Strategy (NDS), in 2005 and 2008 respectively, thus opening a new chapter for the development of this particular sector. This shift has been backed by acquisitions of state-of-the-art military equipment, designed to improve the means and abilities of the Brazilian Armed Forces and thus establishing the country as a necessary and reliable international security partner.

Therefore, an overall assessment of the past governmental policies towards the military will be made, followed by a thorough analysis of the primary document in force, the NDS and its implications for Brazil's defense apparatus. The ongoing and foreseeable investments in this particular field will then be summarized in order to better demonstrate the current and existing link between political discourse and military means.

The defense sector: From Collor to Lula da Silva

With the end of the military dictatorship and the transition to civilian rule, in 1990 the Fernando Collor Administration found itself in a precarious position, trying

to appease all parties. Ultimately, it opted to focus on consolidating democratic rule instead of resolving the existing grievances against the military – whose so-called “bureaucratic authoritarianism” led, according to unofficial reports, to about 300 deaths, 25.000 political imprisonments and 10.000 exiles – and chose to initiate budgetary constraints on a security sector whose equipment was already considered antiquated due to excessive past concerns with domestic politics and lack of attention to its operational needs.

With Fernando Henrique Cardoso's presidency, between 1995 and 2003, while the consolidation of civilian control over the military continued, the first-ever NDP was published in 1996, articulating for the first time the nation's guiding principles for defense. The document balanced statements of diplomatic engagement and the application of military power to defend Brazilian interests, but ultimately ended up reflecting the context of gradual demotion of the Armed Forces and their diminishing role amongst the State's priorities.

Later, Cardoso reinforced his authority over the military by creating the long-awaited Ministry of Defense in 1998. Although he promised a new US\$3.6 billion purchasing program of aircraft, helicopters and other weapon systems until 2015, this was not followed through.

As Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva took office as President in 2003, the defense sector was once again confronted with painful budget cuts. On one hand, the Argentinian crisis affected the Brazilian economy, curbing its growth and prompting reductions in military spending. On the other hand, the new President won the elections with promises of addressing issues of social inequality, and therefore decided to focus the national budget on programs against poverty, hunger and promotion of access to education and healthcare. As a result, Brazilian military expenditure shrank to 1.5%, in comparison with 1.9% in 2002, according to the Stockholm International



Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Also, in his first days in office, Lula da Silva postponed indefinitely the FX-2 program that would supply the Air Force with much-needed modern aircraft.

Nevertheless, these positions on the military sector were soon questioned as Brazil actively embarked in pursuit of the ultimate foreign policy goal: a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. This objective became the cornerstone of the Lula Administration's foreign policy and as Brazil international status has risen, so have demands for increased participation in the world's system.

Accordingly, backing an assertive foreign policy with credible military power became a concern for Brazilian politicians, especially when the international community asked for the country's leadership – and additional human and financial contributions – in the United Nations reinforced mission in Haiti in 2004. Despite the weak operational capability available and the costs involved – to this day, over R\$700 million – Brazil still managed to deploy 1.200 personnel to Haiti.

With this new scenario of operations for the Brazilian Armed Forces, the lack of a coherent updated policy became evident, and, intending to address this shortcoming, Lula in 2005 issued the new NDP. Unlike its predecessor, this NDP won widespread praise for outlining a clear framework that defined the strategic concepts of Security and National Defense and specified the existing Brazilian strategic interests.

Moreover, the document highlighted the risks of a “unipolar power” that “produces tensions and undesirable instabilities to peace”, a distinctly different tone from previous policies, while attributing “priority to the countries of South America and Africa, especially those from Southern Africa and Portuguese-speaking” and calling for a “valorization of diplomatic action as first instrument of solution to conflicts”.

The Amazon region also received particular focus with the recognition of an “invigoration of the military pres-

ence” and “effective action from the State in socioeconomic development” in order to face “opposing threats”. The development of the defense industry, the condemnation of international terrorism and the recognition of the need to “participate in peace missions and humanitarian actions” and in “important international decision making processes” were also addressed.

Overall, the 2005 NDP maintained the structure of its predecessor but, unlike the first NDP, which focused on strengthening the civilian authority over the resilient military officers, the 2005 version was able to provide concrete guidelines for sustainable growth of the security sector, while acknowledging the changes in the international context over the previous decade, with important consequences for Brazil's stance in the world.

The current administration focused on outlining a new National Defense Policy and National Defense Strategy, thus opening a new chapter for the development of the defense sector. This shift has been backed by acquisitions of state-of-the-art military equipment, designed to improve the means and abilities of the Brazilian Armed Forces and thus establishing the country as a reliable international security partner.

The 2008 National Defense Strategy

Despite the new policy guidance, defense appropriations continued to be incongruent with the existing political rhetoric, and therefore defense persistently remained underfunded. Facing growing criticism over the lack of connection between the operational means available and the set of goals put forward, President Lula da Silva decided in 2007 to announce his intent to develop a new NDS for Brazil. Behind the plan was a shuffle of government officials, in particular, the appointment of Nelson Jobim as the new Defense Minister and of Roberto Mangabeira Unger as Minister of Strategic Affairs.

Together with the highest ranking military officers and other ministries, a new task force was charged with designing a plan that would concentrate on middle and long term strategic actions, involving civil society and the state in a common pursuit of security and development of the nation.

From the start, the NDS recognizes the difficulties for “such a peaceful country like Brazil to keep, amidst peace, the encouragement to be ready for combat and to develop the habit of transformation in favor of this state



of readiness”, but also makes it clear that developing strategic thinking in this sector will always be bound by a greater purpose – to become a developed nation, “that shall rise to the first stage in the world neither promoting hegemony nor domination”.

To that end, the NDS was based upon three structuring axes: reorganization of the Armed Forces, the restructuring of the Brazilian defense industry, and the troop requirements policy.

Amongst the various guidelines, the document conceptualizes a new ‘triad’, monitoring/control, mobility and presence, as the primary focus for the organization of a military faced with the need to “develop the ability to monitor and control the Brazilian air space, the territory and the jurisdictional waters”. For this purpose, repositioning of the majority of the military personnel – currently heavily stationed in the South and Southeast – is seen as a priority to safeguard the most critical defense concerns, identified in the North, West and South Atlantic regions.

Regarding the Amazon area, the NDS continues on the path of asserting unconditional Brazilian sovereignty and domain. As such, the nation “will repudiate, by means of actions of development and defense, any attempt of external imposition on its decisions regarding the preservation, development and defense of the Amazon region”, explicitly declaring that it is “Brazil that takes care of the Brazilian Amazon region, at the service of mankind and at its own service”.

Additionally, three decisive sectors for national defense are brought into evidence: cybernetics, space and nuclear. The first two are considered essential in the capacity to not depend on foreign technology and create a Brazilian-owned monitoring system. As for the nuclear issue, the NDS seems to adopt a ‘regretful’ tone when states that “due to a constitutional imperative and to an international treaty, Brazil was deprived from the option of employing nuclear power for any non-peaceful purposes” and that “by forbidding itself from having access to nuclear weapons, Brazil should not renounce use of

nuclear technology”. In that sense, the document calls for national attention to – and subsequent investments in – the nuclear-propelled submarine program, the further mapping of uranium deposits, the development of more nuclear-thermo power plants and increased use of nuclear power “for a broad range of activities”.

When broken down by service, the NDS calls for the Brazilian Navy to act with urgency in controlling strategic areas of maritime access to Brazil, especially the 200 mile shoreline known as the ‘Blue Amazon’, home of some of the world greatest oil reserves, and the Amazon River

area, through the intense use of conventional and nuclear submarine capabilities. As for the Army, “flexibility and elasticity” of the existing means are to be the main vectors, while the Air Force should focus on air surveillance and local superiority, which requires replacement of the current decrepit fleet of fighter aircrafts. Furthermore, this strategy also presents the inevitability of the Mandatory Military Service’s continuity and the importance of the reorganization of the national defense industry – bearing in mind the example of Embraer, the sector’s flagship company – with “priority given to the development of independent technological capacities”, possibly through cooperation with other countries, since the “country is far more interested in partnerships to strengthen its independent capacity building, than in purchasing finished products and services”. Finally, the increasing South American integration – including the po-

tential of the recently formed South American Defense Council – and growing responsibilities in peacekeeping operations are also considered crucial factors in the development of the Brazilian defense sector.

However, and despite the clear improvements in the development of a 21st century strategy for the country, the NDS is not immune to criticism. Among the biggest concerns is the vastness and the magnitude of the ambitions proposed in the document for the following years. Although legitimate, one could question the realism – or lack of it – and viability of these goals, when taking into account a country where the majority of the defense budget is still spent on personnel wages – 50%

The 2005 National Defense Policy maintained the structure of its predecessor but, unlike the first NDP, it was able to provide concrete guidelines for sustainable growth of the security sector, while acknowledging the changes in the international context over the previous decade, with important consequences for Brazil’s stance in the world.



of which destined for military pensions – and not in the massive investments the NDS calls for. Moreover, the unstable budgetary relationship between civilian governments and the military in the past decade and the scarce resources usually available must be taken in consideration when foreseeing likely scenarios for the Brazilian defense sector, even despite the final efforts of the near-ending Lula da Silva Administration and the currently favorable high price of commodities.

Another thorny factor is the apparent lack of definition of the existing and more pressing threats to the country's national security. Although identifying the priority regions to defend, the NDS fails to clearly state the origin and the substance of the main security risks to Brazil's sovereignty. Even more, amidst such uncertainty, the document still refers the danger of an "asymmetrical war, especially in the Amazon region, to be sustained against a military enemy with a far superior power either by the action of a country, or coalition of countries" – a blatant euphemism for a highly-unlikely U.S.-led intervention – while recommending preparations for a "resistance war", as if such an outcome was even remotely possible in the near future when considering Brazil's size, political-military weight and the current international context.

Additionally, the dispositions concerning the rest of South America seem to take on an excessively 'commercial' approach, viewing the surrounding neighbors as mere future clients for Brazil's defense industry which, although perfectly valid from an economic point of view, could tamper with some of the existing political capital towards a regional integration project.

Finally, the positions related to the nuclear topic should also be analyzed carefully. By openly opposing the amendment of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and encouraging an increased use of nuclear power, Brazil is likely to obtain aggravated attention from the world's nuclear watchdogs, as has occurred in the past, which could eventually affect the desired partnerships with other countries and even its 'neutral' foreign status in the campaign for a seat in the Security Council.

The latest shopping-sprees

Together with the new NDS and taking advantage of solid and sustained economic results, President Lula da Silva took the opportunity to try to overcome the chronic underfunding of the defense sector by announcing a US\$15 billion investment in the subsequent years to reequip the Brazilian Armed Forces with the state-of-the-art equipment demanded by the new strategic guidelines.

Consequently several acquisitions were concluded in the past few years. Although previously ordered, the first out of 220 Leopard 1A5 battle tanks began to arrive in late 2009, finally meeting one of the Army's greatest demands and giving a new dimension to Brazil's armored

combat vehicles, now able to be deployed along the majority of the 17.000 kilometers of the country's borders.

Russia became an important associate, especially after Dmitri Medvedev's 2008 visit to Brazil, which saw him signing a series of deals with his counterpart, from civilian nuclear cooperation to the purchase of 12 Mi-35M helicopters for the Brazilian Air Force. Negotiations towards the acquisition of the Tor-M2E ground-air defense system are also supposedly underway.

Likewise, cooperation agreements with other countries were established, such as joint military exercises and defense industry developments with Argentina, an old foe turned into a natural ally, and carrier training programs with China.¹

Nevertheless, it is France who recently won the status of preferred military trading partner.

In September 2009, after a 2008 initial agreement, Presidents Lula da Silva and Nicolas Sarkozy disclosed the news of a US\$9.4 billion deal for the construction of 5 Scorpène submarines – including the coveted nuclear powered unit, as well as the construction of a brand new naval base and shipyard – and a US\$2.6 billion agreement for the supply of 50 EC 725 Super Cougar transport helicopters, to be built locally by Eurocopter's subsidiary in Brazil, Helibras.

But the crown jewel of the recent Brazilian military in-

Taking advantage of solid and sustained economic results, President Lula da Silva took the opportunity to try to overcome the chronic underfunding of the defense sector by announcing a US\$15 billion investment to reequip the Brazilian Armed Forces with the state-of-the-art equipment demanded by the new strategic guidelines.

¹ For more on Brazil-China military cooperation see Kai Thaler, "Using BRIC to build at sea: The Brazil-China aircraft carrier agreement and shifting naval power" (IPRIS Viewpoints, No. 9, January 2010).



vestments is undoubtedly the FX-2 program. Faced with the troubling possibility of having the majority of its deteriorated Mirage 2000 fighters grounded in the upcoming years, and after much hesitation, the Lula da Silva Administration restarted the bidding process, worth an estimated US\$6 billion, for the purchase of at least 36 jet fighters. Still competing among each other are the French Dassault's Rafale, U.S. Boeing's F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and Swedish Saab's JAS-39 Gripen NG, although a final decision is expected in the last months of Lula da Silva's presidency. The decisive factor seems to be the level of technological transference to Brazil, as the NDS recommends the accumulation of technical expertise so that Brazil may eventually sell fighter jets and other military technology to the rest of South America. Accordingly the French offer appears to have taken the lead and has gathered political favoritism, to the detriment of the Swedish proposal which is technically preferred by the local military and actually considered cheaper.

Final remarks

By trying to formalize strategic goals and involve the society in a common project of development, Lula da Silva's administration has produced a galvanizing document, that motivates the military sector in contributing to the defense of its country, explains to the nation the security risks that Brazil's sovereignty faces and will continue to

face, and points out ways the military can contribute to the national industrial and economic growth.

Usually such rhetoric is not accompanied by concrete efforts, but, unlike past trends, the current administration, enjoying a favorable economic context, opted to pursue in its second term an aggressive program of military purchases and re-equipment, with the distinct objective of providing the Brazilian military with modern operational capabilities that can match the country's growing global power and assertiveness. As a revisionist player, seeking a relevant seat at the world's power table, Brazil needs to demonstrate that it can back its discourse with effective and capable Armed Forces, available to be deployed and used in the unpredictable scenarios that international security often demands, as the experience in Haiti has taught.

Nevertheless, Brazilian political leaders should bear in mind the possible difficulties in the country's path, as the goals envisioned comprise a decade-long timeframe that could easily be pushed aside or forgotten by the next tenant in the *Palácio do Planalto*, thus compromising any existing strategy.

Still, when taking into consideration the strategic developments and the military expenditures designed by this administration, the Brazilian defense sector should be aware that it has been presented with a unique opportunity, where political will and increased budgets are combined in a rare formula, seeking to finally provide Brazil with the necessary means to "reach its deserved spot in the world".



Timeline of Events

Angola

1 March (Luanda):

The Home Affairs Ministry and the Russian Federal Security Services, represented by Vice-Minister of Interior for Internal Order, Ângelo da Veiga Tavares and General Vladimir Pronichev respectively, signed an agreement on cooperation and training protocol for national border police staff.

1-12 March (New York):

A delegation led by the deputy minister for Family and Woman Promotion, Ana Paula Sacramento Neto, attended the UN 54th session of the Commission on Women Status.

2 March (Luanda):

An International Monetary Fund (IMF) team, led by Lamin Leigh begin its first review of the US\$1.4 billion loan given to the Angolan government in November 2009. In particular, accounts of the state-owned national oil company Sonangol will be screened. The *Novo Jornal* reported that the government is planning to implement a Sovereign Fund to increase transparency in oil funds management.

3 March (Arusha):

Angolan ambassador to Tanzania, Ambrósio Lukoki, represented Foreign Minister Assunção dos Anjos in the Second Regional Forum on the Prevention of Genocide.

4 March (Luanda):

Nigerian Foreign Minister, Ojo Maduekwe, arrived in Luanda and met with President José Eduardo dos Santos, his counterpart, Assunção dos Anjos and several local representatives in a bid to boost bilateral relations and discuss regional issues.

5 March (Cabinda):

A co-founder of the Inter-Ecclesiastical Committee for Peace in Angola, reverend Daniel Ntoni-Nzinga, stated in an interview to *Voice of America* that the arrest of civil rights activists in Cabinda is an error.

5 March (Luanda):

President José Eduardo dos Santos sent a message of solidarity and condolences to the President of Chile, Michelle Bachelet, following the earthquake that hit the country.

5 March (Luanda):

The Parliament approved a new law that according to the Speaker, Paulo Kassoma, will increase transparency and prevent and punish corruption by public officials, as well as encourage a more responsible and accurate management of public goods.

6 March (Luanda):

It became public that Vice-President Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos "Nandó" suffered a mild stroke a few days after the Government was sworn-in. No official sources commented on the issue, but Nandó is known to be in a London hospital under surveillance.

6 March (Luanda):

The *Semanário Angolense* reported that Brigadier Gilberto Veríssimo, who became famous after denouncing his former intelligence chief Fernando Miala – a José Eduardo dos Santos *protégé* who as a result was removed from his post and charged with corruption – was appointed to serve as counsellor in the Angolan embassy in Washington. This comes after he left his position as deputy director of the Foreign Intelligence Service last July.

7 March (Lisbon):

On the eve of the 2nd Parliamentary Assembly of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), Angolan ambassador to Portugal, José Marcos Barrica, warned that free circulation of Portuguese speaking citizens within the community must be carefully examined, in view of the reality of each member country.

8-10 March (Lisbon):

Parliament's Speaker, Paulo Kassoma, attended the 2nd Parliamentary Assembly of the CPLP. The Assembly debated the challenges of the Portuguese presidency of the CPLP, the international political and economic situation, the new Orthographic Agreement and the role

of the International Institute of Portuguese Language. Kassoma asserted that CPLP must be more ambitious. For example, it could explore each CPLP member's integration in their own region, thus allowing CPLP to be a bridge-builder between them.

12 March (Luanda):

The World Bank revealed that Angola's economy is expected to grow between 6.5% and 7.5% in 2010. The government expects a 8.6% expansion. This growth is due to higher oil prices and the *kwana* devaluation. However, inflation will remain high, averaging 13%.

15 March (Luanda):

The U.S. will dispatch two government officials to assist in managing Angola's debt, U.S. ambassador Dan Mozena said. This support aims to assist in the reform of the country's economic and financial system, which is also targeted by the IMF US\$1.4 billion loan.

16 March (Washington):

The IMF released an online statement regarding the Fund's mission to Angola from 2 to 12 of March. The IMF declared that economic development has been in tandem with its projections since the US\$1.4 billion grant was agreed for Luanda, with greater market confidence. Nonetheless, the Fund alerted that further steps to strengthen the country's fiscal position, tackle inflation and build foreign exchange reserves are needed.

18 March (Luanda):

The Secretary of State for Cooperation, Exalгина Gamboa, stated in a meeting with a Chinese delegation from the Advisory Committee on External Policy that Angola wants to strengthen bilateral ties. This comes after President José Eduardo dos Santos sacked the head of the Presidency's Military Office and close ally, General Manuel Hélder Vieira Dias "Kopelipa".

20-21 March (Windhoek):

Speaker of Parliament Paulo Kassoma represented President José Eduardo dos Santos at the celebrations of Namibia's 20th independence anniversary. Kassoma also attended the



swearing in ceremony of Hifikepunye Lucas Pohamba, elected for a second term as President.

24 March (Luanda):

The National Assembly approved the Defense Cooperation Agreement with Mozambique by unanimity. This accord was negotiated by Foreign Minister Assunção dos Anjos in 2008.

24-28 March (Luanda):

Colonel Hua Bo, director of the Africa and Middle East desk at the Chinese Defense Ministry, headed an official mission aimed at identifying possible cooperation areas in the field with his Angolan counterpart. Currently, China trains Angolan military officials and supplies the country with defense material.

25 March (Luanda):

Following a Parliamentary vote on maritime border negotiations with the Democratic Republic of Congo, Foreign Minister Assunção dos Anjos stated that bilateral relations are in good shape. Vice President Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos "Nandó" stated that a negotiated settlement will be reached allowing for joint exploration, thus rejecting the need for arbitration.

28 March (Beijing):

Sinopec bought a 55% stake in Sonangol Sinopec International Ltd. from its parent company, China Petrochemical Corp. for US\$2.5 billion. Sinopec's daily oil production will rise 8.8% with this acquisition, its first overseas.

29-31 March (Brasília):

Foreign Minister Assunção dos Anjos participated in the VIth CPLP Extraordinary Council of Ministers meeting. The role of the Portuguese language in the world and a strategy for its projection, as well as the agenda for the CPLP meeting in Luanda later this year, were among the topics discussed.

Brazil

1 March (Montevideo):

Brazilian President, Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva attended the inauguration of Uruguay's recently elected President José Mujica.

1 March (Brasília):

Brazilian opposition parties PSDB, DEM and PPS have filed an appeal to the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), regarding a lawsuit accusing President Lula da Silva and his Chief of Staff, Dilma Rousseff, of illegally running a presidential election campaign.

1 March (Santiago):

President Lula da Silva, alongside a congressional delegation, arrived in Chile and met his counterpart, Michelle Bachelet, to discuss aid strategies following the recent earthquake.

2-3 March (Brasília):

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met President Lula da Silva and Foreign Minister Celso Amorim. Among the issues discussed were the Iranian nuclear program and the possibility of new U.N. sanctions, the ongoing bid to supply Brazil with new fighter jets and regional issues. Clinton also met with Development, Industry and Foreign Trade Minister, Miguel Jorge, to discuss future Brazilian sanctions against U.S. exports.

8 March (Brasília):

The government announced trade sanctions against a variety of American goods in retaliation for illegal U.S. subsidies to cotton farmers. The published list of 100 U.S. goods subject to import tariffs in 30 days will amount to US\$591 million together with the possibility of another US\$238 million in penalties regarding the intellectual property and services sector, already allowed by the World Trade Organization.

8-10 March (Lisbon):

Representing President Lula da Silva, Congressman Rafael Guerra participated in the 2nd Parliamentary Assembly of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP).

9-14 March (Brasília):

Hungary's Foreign Minister Péter Balázs met Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, with whom he signed a Protocol of Political Cooperation. Balázs also met with Minister of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade, Miguel Jorge, several political dignitaries, members of the Hungarian community and potential business partners.

10-13 March (Brasília):

Germany's Foreign Minister, Guido Wester-

welle, visited Brazil aiming in a bid to improve bilateral economic and trade relations between both countries. He held meetings with his counterpart Celso Amorim and Minister of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade, Miguel Jorge, as well as with several local businessmen.

14-16 March (Tel Aviv):

President Lula da Silva traveled to Israel to boost bilateral ties and offer his services in the ongoing Middle East peace process. High-level cabinet and leading business meetings were agreed upon after Lula da Silva met with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, President Shimon Peres and opposition leader, Tzipi Livni. Relations with Mercosur and the Iranian nuclear proliferation were also addressed.

16 March (São Paulo):

Petrobrás announced that it found light oil in Northeast Sergipe state.

16-17 March (Bethlehem):

President Lula da Silva visited the Palestinian National Authority territories where he met with President Mahmoud Abbas to support the freezing of settlement construction in order to resume negotiations with Israel. Lula da Silva also visited late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat's tomb in Ramallah and participated in the Brazil-Palestine Business Seminar.

17-18 March (Aman):

President Lula da Silva traveled to Jordan, where he met with King Abdullah and Prime Minister Samir Rifai, in order to further develop bilateral relations between the two countries. Energy, industry, water, agriculture, a possible free trade agreement between Jordan and Mercosur and the peace process in the Middle East were high on the agenda. Lula da Silva also participated in the Jordanian-Brazilian Economic Forum while Foreign Minister Celso Amorim and his counterpart Nasser Judeh signed a visa agreement.

18 March (Damascus):

Foreign Minister Celso Amorim visited Syria where he met with President Bashar al-Assad and his counterpart Walid al-Moallem, to discuss the Middle East peace process and the potential role Brazil could play in it.

**21-26 March:**

An institutional and business delegation headed by the Basque President of the autonomous region, Patxi López, visited Brazil to boost bilateral economic relations. López also held a meeting with President Lula da Silva and Foreign Minister Celso Amorim.

22 March (Brasília):

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko visited Brazil, where he met with President Lula da Silva and Foreign Minister Celso Amorim.

23 March (Brasília):

Foreign Minister Celso Amorim received the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Yukiya Amano, for talks regarding Iran's nuclear program and the possibility of new negotiations or new sanctions.

23-26 March (Brasília):

Sweden's King Carl XVI Gustaf and Queen Silvia met President Lula da Silva. Besides encouraging increased political and economic cooperation, Defense Minister Sten Tolgfors also lobbied in favor of Swedish Aircraft, in hopes that Brazilian officials would choose them over French and U.S. rivals in the ongoing tender.

30 March (Brasília):

President Lula da Silva announced the second phase of Brazil's Growth Acceleration Program. R\$959 billion will be spent between 2011 and 2014, both in public and private investment.

31 March (Brasília):

External Relations Secretary General, António de Aguiar Patriota, co-chaired over the CPLP's Ministerial Meeting, where the potential of the Portuguese language in the world was high in the agenda.

31 March (New York):

Foreign Minister Celso Amorim attended the international donors' conference on Haiti, where he also took the opportunity to hold meetings with several dignitaries, including U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Catherine Ashton, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, Canada and Japan's Foreign Ministers, Lawrence Cannon and Katsuya Okada, respectively.

Cape Verde

1 March (Beijing):

Wang Gang, member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China's Central Committee, pledged to enhance cooperation with Cape Verde's ruling African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV) following a visit by a Cape Verdean delegation to China.

3 March (London):

The United Kingdom will provide £26 million to support the construction of 40 wind turbines capable of generating 40 megawatts to supply Cape Verde with electricity.

8-10 March (Lisbon):

The Parliament Speaker, Aristides Lima, attended the 2nd Parliamentary Assembly of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP).

16 March (Praia):

The chairman of the Brazilian Micro and Small Business Support Service (Sebrae), Paulo Okamoto, visited Cape Verde in order to boost bilateral business ties.

19 March (Praia):

Cape Verde's Foreign Minister, Carlos Brito, signed two cooperation agreements with Japanese Ambassador Takashi Saito, amounting to US\$7 million for reconstruction of infrastructures on the island of São Nicolau and in food aid.

31 March (Brasília):

Foreign Minister José Brito attended the CPLP's Ministerial Meeting.

Guinea-Bissau

1 March (Dakar):

The United Nations Special Representative for Guinea-Bissau, Joseph Mutaboba, expressed his confidence that the country has the potential to become a stable and developed state, a thing that was difficult in the past because of repeated crisis.

2 March (Bissau):

The European Union's Security Sector Reform

(SSR) Mission will be renewed after the 1st of June, with a renovated and clear mandate focused on the institutional strengthening and training of the military and the police, General Juan Esteban Verastegui, the current leader of the mission, informed after a meeting with Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior.

2 March (Bissau):

Five people are said to be under arrest following the investigations of General Tagme Na Waié's assassination. All the detainees are military officials.

3 March (New York):

United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, released a new report regarding the current situation in Guinea-Bissau, highlighting that SSR remains the most crucial element to ensure stability in the country and calling on the international community to support the country's efforts towards this goal.

5 March (New York):

The United Nations Special Representative for Guinea-Bissau, Joseph Mutaboba, told the Security Council that 2010 could be a turning point for the country and that current conditions bode well for progress towards peace and prosperity, adding that there is still a lot to be done.

6 March (Bissau):

Territorial Administration Minister, Luís Oliveira Sanca, stated that the government wants to hold municipal elections until the end of the year. These would be the first in the country since its independence, a crucial step towards democratization and decentralization.

8-10 March (Lisbon):

Raimundo Pereira, Speaker of Parliament, participated in the 2nd Parliamentary Assembly of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP).

11 March (Bissau):

The European Union ambassador to Guinea-Bissau, Franco Nulli, announced a two year, €6.1 million aid program with the objective of promoting democracy in the country, focusing on women and youth participation in electoral acts.

15 March (Bissau):

Fourteen Finance Ministry officials were ar-



rested for embezzlement of funds. These officials diverted salaries from the Ministry, using false payrolls of some of the 3.000 ghost public functionaries identified in a recent census by the Ministry of Public Service and Labour. Guinea-Bissau is undertaking a public sector reform financed by the European Union, but the exact number of public officials is still unknown.

15-16 March (Lisbon):

Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior met his Portuguese counterpart José Sócrates, as well as the Portuguese President, Aníbal Cavaco Silva. Gomes Júnior announced that a donors' roundtable will probably take place in October, centered not only on the SSR, but also covering drug-trafficking, organized crime and economic development.

22 March (Bissau):

The investigation led by Guinea-Bissau's Attorney General, Amine Saad, into corruption in the fisheries sector is done. Saad's office is now attempting to lift the Parliamentary immunity of former Minister of Agriculture and now a PAIGC deputy, Carlos Mussa Baldé, so that charges can be brought to court.

22 March (Lisbon):

During an official visit to Portugal, Zamora Induta, Guinea-Bissau's Armed Forces Chief of Staff, stated that the implementation of the SSR program should be launched briefly. The SSR program is supported by the European Union and the United Nations, and will be focused on reducing the number of troops, modernizing infrastructures and cease military mingling in politics.

23 March (Bissau):

EU ambassador to Guinea-Bissau, Franco Nulli, announced a EU €3 million aid-project aimed at improving the country's road and bridge system, as well as creating a legal framework for its management. The measure intends to foment local commerce and communications.

24 March (Bissau):

Speaking in a conference centered on extractive industries and sustainable development, Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior defended that his country will not repeat the same errors made by other African countries when exploring its bauxite, phosphate and oil reserves.

29 March (Bissau):

Shortly after recognizing the Saharawi Republic, President Malam Bacai Sanhá reconsidered his decision, thus suspending recognition. The President argued this measure follows the United Nations' neutral procedures, a position now shared by his country.

30 March (Addis Ababa):

The African Union's Peace and Security Council praised Guinea-Bissau's efforts and development towards security, political stability and democratic rule since last June's Presidential elections. The African Union also urged the country to bring to justice those involved in João Bernardo "Nino" Vieira and General Tagme Na Waié's assassinations.

Mozambique

1 March (Maputo):

Norway's Environmental and International Development Minister, Erik Solheim, and the Mozambican Foreign Minister, Oldemiro Baloi, signed a memorandum of understanding to support the national plan of action against land mines for 2010-2014. Solheim also met with President Armando Guebuza and announced plans to fund projects in the areas of energy, oil and gas, as well as non-governmental organizations with US\$100 million.

5 March (Maputo):

Portucel and Mota Engil, Portugal's biggest paper manufacturer and construction company respectively, announced they will invest a combined US\$2.4 billion in Mozambique.

8 March (Maputo):

The U.S. Embassy in Mozambique announced that the country was due to receive food aid from the United States worth US\$26.3 million, as part of the "Food for Progress" program.

8 March (Maputo):

The World Bank has approved a loan of US\$40 million to support the implementation of the Mozambican government's Higher Education Science and Technology (HEST) project.

8-10 March (Lisbon):

Verónica Dhlovo, Speaker of Parliament, attended the 2nd Parliamentary Assembly of the Portuguese Speaking Countries Communities (CPLP).

10 March (Maputo):

Foreign Minister Oldemiro Baloi signed an agreement with Japanese ambassador Susumu Segawa, in which Japan commits itself to grant a loan of US\$60 million to fund work to repair the Nampula-Cuamba road, which links the provinces of Nampula and Niassa.

11 March (Maputo):

The French Minister of State for Foreign Trade, Anne-Marie Idrac, met with local authorities and signed five agreements, including a pledge to pardon the €18.9 million debt owed by Mozambique to France and to channel €10 million to the State Budget between this year and 2014 to carry out activities to combat poverty. A loan of €20 million to fund projects in the cities of Maputo, Matola and Pemba, was also agreed upon.

15 March (Maputo):

President Armando Guebuza received the President of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, alongside members of various aid agencies.

17 March (Maputo):

The Mozambican Minister for Planning and Development, Aiuba Cuereneia announced that the stalemate between the government and the group of countries and institutions that contribute to the state budget – the G19 – was resolved.

21 March (Windhoek):

President Armando Guebuza attended the swearing in ceremony of Namibian President Hifikepunye Lucas Pohamba that took place during the celebrations for the country's 20th independence anniversary. Guebuza also briefly met with South African President Jacob Zuma, to discuss the situation in Zimbabwe.

22 March (Maputo):

Italy will provide €12 million to support the Mozambican state budget during the three-year period of 2010-2012, according to an agreement signed by Foreign Minister, Oldemiro Baloi, and by Italian ambassador to Mozambique, Carlo Lo Cascio.

**26 March (Maputo):**

Cimentos de Moçambique, a subsidiary of Portuguese cement group Cimpor, announced it would invest up to €18 million in its main factory in Matola, south of Mozambique, in order to double cement production to 1 million tons.

30 March (Maputo):

Prime Minister Aires Ali presented to the Parliament, the new government's five year program for the period 2010-2014.

31 March (Brasília):

Mozambique's Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Eduardo Koloma, attended the CPLP's Ministerial Meeting in Brazil.

Portugal

1-2 March (Windhoek):

Foreign Minister, Luís Amado, met with his Namibian counterpart, Marco Hausiku. Amado aims to reinforce bilateral ties between the two countries.

1-2 March (Geneva):

Secretary of State for European Affairs Pedro Lourtie attended the 13th Session of the United Nations Human Rights Council, during which Portugal's human rights revision exercise was formally approved. Lourtie also promoted the ratification of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, a new international treaty on human rights, fruit of a Portuguese initiative.

3-7 March (Maputo):

Prime Minister, José Sócrates, led a delegation, including Foreign Minister Luís Amado and Defense Minister Augusto Santos Silva, in an official visit to Mozambique. Beyond meetings with President Armando Guebuza and Prime Minister Aires Ali, nine agreements were signed. The creation of a Portuguese-Mozambican investment bank, the doubling of the credit line to Mozambique to a total of €400 million, as well as Cahora Bassa's hydroelectric dam's new shareholder structure were also agreed upon.

4-5 March (Barcelona):

Portuguese President, Aníbal Cavaco Silva, visited the Autonomous Community of Catalonia, where he met with Spanish Foreign Minister, Miguel Ángel Moratinos and with the President of the Generalitat de Catalunya, José Montilla Aguilera.

5 March (Lisbon):

The U.K. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, David Miliband, met with his counterpart, Luís Amado, in order to discuss developments regarding the Lisbon Treaty implementation, as well as other European affairs.

5-6 March (Córdoba):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado attended the informal meeting of European Union foreign ministers.

5-7 March (Andorra):

President Aníbal Cavaco Silva visited the Principality of Andorra, where he met with Prime Minister Jaume Bartumeu.

7 March (Tripoli):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado met with his counterpart Moussa Koussa and Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi. Among the topics discussed were the recent diplomatic crisis surrounding the concession of visas to EU citizens.

8 March (Tunes):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado visited met with his counterpart Kamel Morjane. Bilateral political and economical ties, EU-Tunisia relations, the Union for the Mediterranean and regional Maghreb issues, together with preparations for the upcoming Portugal-Tunisia Summit, were the main topics in the agenda.

8 March (Lisbon):

Prime Minister José Sócrates and Speaker of Parliament Jaime Gama attended the 2nd Parliamentary Assembly of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP).

8 March (Lisbon):

President Aníbal Cavaco Silva sent a message of condolences and solidarity to his Turkish counterpart, Abdullah Gul, due to the recent earthquake that hit the country.

9 March (Lisbon):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado and President

Aníbal Cavaco Silva attended the 2nd Parliamentary Assembly of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP).

10-11 March (Santiago):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado traveled to Chile, to attend the inauguration of President José Piñera Echenique. Amado also met with his new counterpart, Alfredo Moreno, and discussed bilateral ties between the two countries.

12 March (Lisbon):

Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic visited Portugal, where he met with his counterpart Luís Amado. Among the topics discussed were bilateral ties, EU-Serbia relations, and regional issues such as Kosovo.

12 March (Lisbon):

Portuguese police arrested Andoni Zengotita-bengoia, a suspected member of the Basque separatist group ETA, as he tried to board a flight to Caracas.

13 March (Lisbon):

German Foreign Minister, Guido Westerwelle, held a meeting with Foreign Minister Luís Amado and discussed pending EU issues.

15-16 March (Lisbon):

Serbian Defense Minister, Dragan Sutanovac, traveled to Portugal where he met with his counterpart, Augusto Santos Silva, and high-ranking military officers, aiming at improving military cooperation between the two countries.

16 March (Brussels):

Secretary of State for European Affairs, Pedro Lourtie, attended the European Affairs meeting in Brussels, where the Spanish Presidency's initiatives were discussed as well as the Europe 2020 Strategy Proposal.

18 March (London):

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, João Gomes Cravinho, met the Minister of State whose responsibilities include Africa, United Nations, Human Rights and Climate Change and Energy, Baroness Glenys Kinnock, to discuss African policy issues, including the situation in West Africa. Cravinho also met with the Minister for International Defense and Security, Baroness Ann Taylor.

**18 March (Lisbon):**

Foreign Minister Luís Amado and Defense Minister, Augusto Santos Silva, received Ambassadors Ümit Pamir and Yannis-Alexis Zepos, members of the Group of Experts on NATO's New Strategic Concept (NSC). The NSC will be adopted at the Atlantic Alliance summit in Lisbon on the 19 and 20 of November.

19 March (Lisbon):

Venezuela's Foreign Minister, Nicolás Maduro Moros, visited Portugal where he held meetings with Prime Minister José Sócrates, Foreign Minister Luís Amado and Minister of Economy, José Vieira da Silva. High on the agenda was the assessment of bilateral relations between the two countries, including trade and economic ties.

21-22 March (Lisbon):

The Secretary of State for National Defense and Maritime Affairs, Marcos Perestrello, participated in the I Formal Meeting of CPLP Sea Ministers. A common Lusophone Strategy for the Oceans was agreed on.

21-22 March (Tripoli):

Prime Minister José Sócrates and Foreign Minister Luís Amado, alongside with several officials and businessmen, began an official visit to the Maghreb. In Libya they met with Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi and General Secretary of the General People's Committee (Prime Minister) al-Baghdadi Ali al-Mahmudi. The increase of economic relations between the two countries as well as the recent EU-Libya visa conflict were high on the agenda.

22 March (Algiers):

Prime Minister José Sócrates visited Algeria, where he participated in a forum of Algerian and Portuguese business leaders with his local counterpart, Ahmed Ouyahia, and later held a meeting with President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Mutual energy investments and local business possibilities for Portuguese companies were amongst the topics covered.

22 March (Brussels):

Secretary of State for European Affairs, Pedro Lourtie, attended the EU Foreign Affairs Council. The situations in the Middle East and in Haiti were the main topics. Lourtie also participated in the EU General Affairs Coun-

cil, meant to prepare the upcoming European Council.

22-23 March (Tunis):

Prime Minister José Sócrates traveled to Tunisia where he participated with his counterpart Mohamed Ghannouchi in the second Luso-Tunisian summit, aiming at improving economic bilateral relations. Sócrates later also met with Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.

22-25 March (New York):

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, João Gomes Cravinho, attended two events sponsored by the President of the United Nations General Assembly concerning water and development financing. Cravinho also took this opportunity to meet separately with the Group of African ambassadors accredited to the United Nations, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) ambassadors and with the ambassadors of the Group of Small Island Developing States, as part of talks regarding the Portuguese candidature to the United Nations Security Council for the 2011-2012 biennium.

23 March (Rabat):

Ending his visit to the Maghreb, Prime Minister José Sócrates met with his counterpart, Abbas El Fassi, and discussed bilateral cooperation between the two countries.

23 March (Lisbon):

Defense Minister Augusto Santos Silva met with his Belgian counterpart, Pieter de Crem, to assess bilateral cooperation between the two countries.

24 March (Lisbon):

Fitch Ratings cut Portugal's sovereign credit rating to AA- citing budgetary underperformance in 2009 and warning that a similar outcome this year and the next one could cause another downgrade.

29 March (La Paz):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado held meetings with his Bolivian counterpart, David Choquehuanca Céspedes and with the President of the Senate's International Political Commission, Fidel Surco, signing two agreements regarding visa waiver for diplomatic personnel and establishing a political-technical cooperation mechanism.

31 March (Brasília):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado co-presided over the CPLP's Ministerial Meeting, intended to prepare the next Heads of State and Government Summit in July. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, João Gomes Cravinho, joined the Portuguese delegation after a meeting with Brazilian External Relations Secretary General, António de Aguiar Patriota, in order to prepare the upcoming Portugal-Brazil Summit and address regional and international issues.

São Tomé and Príncipe

1 March (São Tomé):

According to the National Oil Agency (ANP), the government of São Tomé and Príncipe is set to auction only 7 of the 19 oil blocks identified in the archipelago's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

1 March (Washington):

The IMF announced that it would provide São Tomé and Príncipe with US\$570 thousand, under the terms of the current agreement.

2 March (São Tomé):

Carlos Neves, director of the ANP, stated his belief that Portugal's Galp Energia, Angola's Sonangol and São Tomé and Príncipe state company Petrogás may form a consortium for oil exploration in the EEZ.

3 March (São Tomé and London):

São Tomé and Príncipe began the auction of 7 oil blocks, the bidding process taking place both through the ANP and the American Association of Petroleum Geologists in London.

8-10 March (Lisbon):

Francisco Silva, São Tomé and Príncipe's Speaker of Parliament, presided over the 2nd Parliamentary Assembly of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP).

17 March (São Tomé):

President Fradique de Menezes scheduled lo-



cal and regional elections for 25 July, and legislative elections for the 1 of August.

31 March (Brasília):

São Tomé's Ambassador to Portugal, Alda Espírito Santo, represented the country in the CPLP's Ministerial Meeting in Brazil.

Timor Leste

3 March (Díli):

The Timorese court sentenced 24 rebels to up to 16 years in prison for the attempted assassinations of the country's President, José Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister, José Alexandre "Xanana" Gusmão, back in 2008.

4 March (New York):

Sónia Borges, the new Permanent Representative of Timor Leste to the United Nations, presented her credentials to Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.

5-7 March (Bradford):

President José Ramos-Horta visited the University of Bradford to discuss the situation in the country and launch a worldwide petition demanding democracy in Burma and the release of fellow Nobel Peace Laureate, Aung San Suu Kyi.

8-9 March (Dublin):

President José Ramos-Horta visited Ireland and met President Mary McAleese, Taoiseach Brian Cowen and Minister for Foreign Affairs Micheál Martin, as well as Minister of State for Overseas Development, Peter Power. Bilateral relations and increased development aid were high on the agenda.

8-10 March (Lisbon):

Vicente Guterres, Vice-President of Parliament, participated in the 2nd Parliamentary Assembly of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP).

9 March (Díli):

Timor Leste, alongside Papua New Guinea, received US\$2.5 million in technical assistance grants from Japan and the Asian Development Bank, to increase cross-border travel, trade,

investment and tourism with neighboring Indonesia.

11 March (Díli):

President José Ramos-Horta denied claims by Amnesty International that he would support a tribunal for abuses committed during Indonesia's occupation.

12 March (Geneva):

President José Ramos-Horta, while on an official visit to Switzerland, announced that Timor Leste's economy grew 14% during 2009, despite the international financial crisis.

14-20 March (Tokyo):

President José Ramos-Horta traveled to Japan where he met with Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and energy sector executives. Ramos-Horta secured US\$7.7 million in grant aid for forest preservation and renewable energy projects.

16 March (Tokyo):

While visiting Japan, President José Ramos-Horta said that Indonesia still needs to apologize for its brutal occupation even if bilateral relations have improved.

18-19 March (Díli):

Australia's Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston traveled to Timor Leste where he met the 400 soldiers still stationed in the country as part of the International Stabilization Force (ISF) charged with maintaining security. Houston also held meetings with Vice Prime Minister José Luis Guterres and Chief of Defense, Major General Taur Matan Ruak, as well as with Special Representative for Timor Leste and Head of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor Leste (UNMIT), Ameerah Haq.

30 March (Beijing):

Timor Leste's Secretary of State for Defense, Júlio Tomás Pinto, traveled to China where he met with Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie to discuss bilateral military exchanges and cooperation.

30 March (Díli):

Economist and Special Adviser to the U.N. Secretary General, Jeffrey Sachs, declared that Timor Leste is on the cusp of an economic boom that will eclipse even China in terms of growth.

31 March (Brasília):

Zacarias Albano da Costa, Timor Leste's Foreign Minister, attended the CPLP Ministerial Meeting in Brazil.



Reading List

Alex Vines, "China and India in Angola: Differing Strategies", in Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi (eds.), *The Rise of China and India in Africa: Challenges, Opportunities and Critical Interventions* (Zed Books, 2010).

Dirk Kohnert, "Democratization via Elections in an African 'Narco-state'? The Case of Guinea-Bissau" (*GIGA*, Working Papers No. 123, February 2010).

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